Showing posts with label compendia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label compendia. Show all posts

Friday, December 30, 2022

2022 in review

While new substantive posts go on the substack, I plan to keep (cross-)posting annual review posts here, for ease of archiving.

[Past annual reviews: 2021, 2020, 2019 & '18, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.]

Posts from before the move (that weren't cross-posted)

Cross-posted annual review from Good Thoughts

I started the new substack in May 2022, after 18 years of blogging at philosophyetc.net, with the hope that the new platform would boost my reach and prompt more reader engagement (e.g. comments). So far, it seems to be working! I’ve enjoyed many interesting discussions (thank you, commenters!), and was delighted to surpass 2000 subscribers in early November, after the welcome surprise of being featured on the Substack main page for a couple of days.

In this post, I’ll flag some of the year’s highlights, and bold a handful of posts that I especially recommend (for anyone who missed them the first time around).

Off the blog

Last spring/summer I was awarded tenure (and promoted to Associate Professor) at the University of Miami. I received a grant from Longview Philanthropy, allowing me to take this academic year off from my faculty position, work full time on a mix of research and outreach projects (including utilitarianism.net and this blog), and visit Oxford’s outstanding Global Priorities Institute for this past autumn term. My paper ‘Pandemic Ethics and Status Quo Risk’ (summarized here) was published in Public Health Ethics. And, a few days before Christmas, I was interviewed live on NPR about the ideas behind effective altruism.

New pages I wrote this year for utilitarianism.net include:

There are always more things I want to work on than I’m actually able to get around to. But once you add these 50-odd substack posts into the mix, and new academic papers currently under review and in draft, I’m overall pretty happy with my productivity. I’m also excited about my plans for next year—and will be happy if I manage to complete at least half of what I have in mind.

Posts on Effective Altruism & Applied Ethics

A major theme of Good Thoughts is that it’s good to do good things (and even better to do better)! Some relevant posts include:

  • Effective Altruism FAQ - what I wish everyone knew about EA

  • Beneficentrism - how the moral foundations of EA are much broader (and less controversial/disputable) than full-blown utilitarianism

  • The Nietzschean Challenge to Effective Altruism - here’s a foundational challenge one doesn’t often hear: maybe well-being is overrated? At least, it may be worth giving weight to things like achievement and not just things like comfort.

  • Ethics as Solutions vs Constraints - contrasting beneficence-first vs purity-first ways of thinking about ethics

  • Pick some low-hanging fruit - while not quite as vivid as Singer’s pond, I quite like this alternative metaphor for (moderate) effective altruism in the face of seemingly limitless demands.

  • The Strange Shortage of Moral Optimizers - Why doesn’t EA have more competition? It’s weird that more people aren’t even trying to “promote the general good in a serious, scope-sensitive, goal-directed kind of way.”

  • Billionaire Philanthropy - would you prefer they spend it on luxury consumption? Or donate to the US treasury? Seriously?

  • Review of What We Owe the Future - an important book, well-targeted at introducing longtermism to a general audience, but in many respects too uncontroversial for philosophical audiences. Expect academic critics to exaggerate the core thesis (or even conflate it with total utilitarianism) to give them more of a target.

  • Utilitarianism and Abortion - there’s no particular reason for longtermist pro-natalists to focus specifically on abortion (rather than other non-procreative choices), and there’s no utilitarian excuse to force people to do good things (like procreate) when you could instead incentivize them. (Cf. kidney donations.)

On Utilitarianism and Ethical Theory

I think most people—including most academic philosophers—have a pretty terrible understanding of utilitarian ethics, relying on misleading and oversimplified caricatures. Some of the below posts try to correct those misunderstandings. Others more positively explore what we should think about tricky issues in ethical theory.

  • Introducing utilitarianism.net - an overview of the new website and its main features. (N.B. more updates coming soon!)

  • Utilitarianism and Reflective Equilibrium - why utilitarianism is (contrary to common perception) actually the most intuitive moral theory: its conflicts with intuitive verdicts are shallow and easy to accommodate, whereas deontology’s conflicts with intuitive principles are deep and utterly irresolvable.

  • Utilitarianism debate with Michael Huemer - expanding on the above point, and on the inferential role of wrongness

  • (Im)permissibility is Overrated - distinguishing right and wrong is less important than settling what’s worth caring about.

  • Theses on Mattering - addressing common misconceptions about what it takes to truly value people equally

  • A New Paradox of Deontology - how only consequentialism combines normative authority, guidance, and adequate concern for rescuable victims

  • Constraints and Candy - both appeal to our lizard-brains, but neglect less salient interests

  • Deontic Pluralism - How to reconcile Maximizing, Satisficing, and Scalar Consequentialisms

  • Consequentialism Beyond Action - and why we need two dimensions of moral evaluation: the fitting the and the fortunate. (Too many consequentialists neglect the former!)

  • Caplan’s Conscience Objection to Utilitarianism - why the demandingness objection is confused, and utilitarianism does not in fact imply that we're all bad people

  • Emergency ethics - and why I think there’s no special duty of easy rescue, just general reasons of beneficence

  • Level-Up Impartiality - non-utilitarians sometimes imagine that impartiality means treating everyone as badly as they treat strangers, rather than as well as they treat their friends and loved ones. But I think there’s independent reason to think we’re more likely right about the latter.

  • Ethically Alien Thought Experiments - don’t let alien cases masquerade as real-world ones (transparently alien thought experiments are fine, though!)

  • Consequentialism and Cluelessness - why I'm skeptical of Lenman's Epistemic Objection

  • A Multiplicative Model of Value Pluralism - how do distinct kinds of value combine?

  • Double or Nothing Existence Gambles - seem like a bad deal! But what’s the best theoretical explanation of this?

  • Killing vs Failing to Create - addressing the replaceability objection by allowing both impersonal and person-directed reasons

  • Puzzles for Everyone - Some of the deepest puzzles in ethics concern how to coherently extend ordinary beneficence and decision theory to extreme cases. Too often, people mistakenly believe that these are only puzzles for utilitarians, as though other theories needn’t care at all about beneficence or decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. I explain why this is a mistake, and especially explain why appealing to “neutrality” about adding happy lives is not an adequate solution to the problems of population ethics.

On the link between Theory and Practice

  • Theory-Driven Applied Ethics - how utilitarianism may inspire mid-level “beneficentric” principles that can command wider assent, and still suffice for all practical purposes.

  • Is Non-Consequentialism Self-effacing? - turning Bernard Williams on his head: even non-consequentialists should probably want others to be more beneficent, which is a goal that may be better served by promoting utilitarian ethics.

  • How Useful is Utilitarianism? - some early thinking about what a ‘Beneficence Project’ for utilitarian-leaning academics might look like (with an invitation for potential collaborators to get in touch).

  • Naïve vs Prudent Utilitarianism - careless pursuit of the good is bad in expectation (but of course nothing in utilitarianism justifies such carelessness).

  • Ethical Theory and Practice - stipulated thought experiments are not a good guide to how to behave in real life, with its ineliminable uncertainties. As a result, it turns out that utilitarianism and moderate deontology are surprisingly difficult to differentiate in terms of their real-world implications.

Other Posts

My Top Three

For any new readers, I’d especially encourage you to check out my following “top three” most-liked posts:

  1. Puzzles for Everyone
  2. Beneficentrism
  3. Theses on Mattering
Happy New Year!

Friday, December 31, 2021

2021 in review

[Past annual reviews: 2020, 2019 & '18, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.]

Off the blog:

The biggest development for me was joining utilitarianism.net as lead editor.  I then completed their chapters on population ethics and theories of well-being, and wrote a new chapter outlining some basic arguments for utilitarianism.  More to come soon!

For more traditional academic publications:
* Parfit's Ethics appeared in print with Cambridge University Press. (Summary here.)
* 'Pandemic Ethics and Status Quo Risk' (summarized here) was accepted by Public Health Ethics.
* 'Negative Utility Monsters' was published in Utilitas.

I'm also pretty excited about various works-in-progress that are currently under review, especially my new paradox of deontology...

Blog posts:

Normative Ethics

* The Cost of Contraints -- sets out the core of my "new paradox of deontology".  Further developed in Preferring to Act Wrongly, Why Constraints are Agent Neutral, and Discounting Illicit Benefits.

* The Most Important Thing in the World -- is plausibly the trajectory of the long-term future.


* Three Dogmas of Utilitarianism -- (i) Confusing value with what's valuable; (ii) Neglecting fittingness; and (iii) Treating all interests as innocent.

* Agency as a Force for Good -- and the appeal of consequentialism.

* Learning from Lucifer -- If Satan would be a consequentialist, should the good guys be likewise (just, you know, with better goals)?  Or is there a deeper asymmetry between right and wrong?

* Tendentious Terminology in Ethics -- against common uses of "mere means" and "separateness of persons" talk.

* Is Effective Altruism Inherent Utilitarian?  I suggest not.  There's a weaker normative principle in the vicinity, potentially shareable by any other sensible view, which should be difficult to deny. In a later post, I call this: Beneficentrism: The view that promoting the general welfare is deeply important.

* Consequentialism's Central Concept may be importance rather than rightness.

* What's at Stake in the Objective/Subjective Wrongness Debate? Seems terminological.  Appeal to "what a morally conscientious agent would be concerned about" doesn't help, because (my Moral Stunting Objection shows) a morally conscientious agent wouldn't be concerned about right or wrong per se.


Welfare and Population Ethics

* Is Conscientious Sadism still bad?


* Parsimony in Theories of Welfare -- is it really a relevant consideration at all?

* The Limits of Defective Character Solutions -- and why they don't help with the non-identity problem.

* Stable Actualism and Asymmetries of Regret -- actualist partiality is defensible once you subtract the possibility of elusive permissions.


Pandemic Ethics

* Lessons from the Pandemic: blocking innovation is bad.


* Epistemic Calibration Bias and Blame Aversion -- we're often too scared of being wrong, and not sufficiently attuned to the risks of failing to be right (e.g. by instead remaining non-committal) when it matters.

* There's No Such Thing as "Following the Science" -- normative principles are needed to bridge the is/ought gap.  Better slogan: Follow Decision Theory!

* Appeasing Anti-Vaxxers -- and why it's wrong.


* Imagining an Alternative Pandemic Response -- with vaccine challenge trials, targeted immunity via variolation, and immunity passports to spare many (e.g. healthy young people) from lockdowns.



Applied Ethics

* Companies, Cities, and Carbon -- blaming large corporations for proportionately large carbon emissions makes no more sense than blaming large cities. 

* Five Fallacies of Collective Harm -- Critiquing the five main reasons why people falsely believe that collective difference-making doesn't require individual difference-making.

* The Absurdity of "Undue Inducement" argues that there's no in-principle basis for objecting to monetary incentives to (e.g.) research participants.  If concerned that an offer might be exploitative, the solution is to pay more, not less.

* Against Anti-Beneficent Paternalism - as a general rule, we shouldn't prevent people from doing good (even if we aren't entirely certain of the quality of their understanding or consent).

* Puzzling Conditional Obligations -- if positively good to comply with, then you ought to have unconditional reason to get yourself into position to meet the putative obligation.


Metaethics

* The Parochialism of Metaethical Naturalism - the basic moral facts should not differ depending on our location in modal space (i.e. which world is actual).  But synthetic metaethical naturalism, with its 2-D semantic asymmetry, violates this principle.

* Ruling out Helium-Maximizing -- without giving up robust realism. 

* Why Belief is No Game - pragmatists (like Maguire & Woods) are wrong about what people are rationally criticizable for, and hence wrong about what reasons there are.


Other

* Philosophical Pluralism and Modest Dogmatism - On why we should welcome philosophical dissensus.

* Querying vs Dismissive Objections - are you aiming to create a dialectical opening (to which you'd like to hear a response), or simply shutting things down?  When is the latter appropriate?

* Commonsense Epiphenomenalism - could the view be less weird than everyone tends to assume?

* Helen interviewed on Idealism -- including why Idealism might warrant up to 30% credence.

* New Blogs of Note -- three recommendations.

* Zach Barnett's guest post on 'Meeting Taurek's Challenge'.

* Philosophy Spotlight posts from Eden Lin, Jess Flanigan, and Hrishikesh Joshi.  I'm still waiting for other blogs to join in!

Happy New Year!

Thursday, December 31, 2020

2020 in review

[Past annual reviews: 2019 & '18, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.]

Off the blog: In contrast to many families, our childcare situation actually improved in 2020 (!), so I was able to be much more productive than in the previous couple of years:

* Completed my little Parfit book for Cambridge University Press' Elements in Ethics series.

* 'The Right Wrong-Makers' -- probably my best paper yet -- accepted for publication in PPR.

* Co-authored a Washington Post op-ed (on pandemic research ethics) with Peter Singer.

* Expanded the above into a short-but-sweet open-access paper in Research Ethics.

* Contributed to another co-authored paper (highlights here) exploring the prospects for controlled voluntary infection as a pandemic policy tool.

* 'Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good' appeared in print.


Blog posts:

Academia

* Beneficent Retirement and Academic Successorships - exploring Smilansky's suggestion that "for a great many people, the best professional action that they can currently take is to leave their profession." Argues for time-limited tenure and other policies to encourage more & shorter academic careers.  Are there any non-selfish reasons to oppose this?

* Academic pay cuts vs job cuts -- in a forced-choice situation, we should much prefer the former. We should even prefer pay cuts for established professors over more common measures like hiring freezes.

* What if authors could respond to referee comments? - could help relieve the systemic overburdening of journals, as a confused report just means the review process will start all over again somewhere new.

* What Should Editors Ask of Referees? - suggestions for improving peer review.


Ethical & Political Theory

* A New Paradox of Deontology - why the shift to agent-neutral deontology doesn't help. (Improved version posted to PEA Soup.)

* Moral Theory and Motivational Contingency - How, if at all, would your motivations change in response to changes in your normative- or meta-ethical beliefs? 

* Nefsky on Tiny Chances and Tiny Differences - I refute some bad arguments for thinking that consequentialism has any kind of "inefficacy problem".

* When is Inefficacy Objectionable? - after addressing three prominent arguments, I conclude: "none of these arguments appear to have any potential to establish that consequentialism is collectively self-defeating. They're complete non-starters. If I'm right about this, then the current literature on this topic would appear to be deeply confused."

* Emergence and Individual Impact - explains why Sinnott-Armstrong's famous arguments in defense of "joyguzzling" rests on an incoherent assumption.

* Who's responsible for offset harms? - working through some puzzles about moral offsetting.

* No Utility Cascades - a simple refutation of a recent Analysis paper.

* Monotonicity and Inadvisable Oughts - Sometimes you ought to do a specific thing that's of a general kind, but you ought not to do that general thing (because you'd actually do it in the wrong specific way). (Responding to contrary arguments from Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer).

* Vulcan Interests and Moral Status - affect is required for non-zero welfare, but one may possess moral status even while one's welfare is stuck at zero.

* Hedonism, Egoism, and Implausible Restrictions - Why I think hedonism and egoism are completely bonkers, poorly-motivated views.

* Political Beliefs, Uncertainty, and the Expected Value of Paralysis - uncertainty is no reason to suspend belief (undermining Jason Brennan's latest argument against voting).

* Adams' Critique of Global Consequentialism - a good objection, though his follow-through is off-track.


Posts on the Ethics of Controlled Voluntary Infection

* Highlights from my coauthored paper on deliberate infection (summarizes and links to major points from the following posts).

* Pandemic moral failures: how conventional morality kills.

* When is CVI worthwhile?

* Three Neglected Advantages of Controlled Infection

* Combining Experimental Vaccines + Variolation - this policy could have stopped the early pandemic in its tracks, with minimal risk.


Other Applied / Pandemic Ethics

* Lives are the Wrong Measure - many issues in ethics are subject to reasonable dispute, but this isn't one of them.  Counting all deaths as equal is simply idiotic.  This post refutes a contrary argument that rests upon a kind of probabilistic bias.

* Innocuous vs Unjust Systemic Discrimination - disparate outcomes needn't be unjust. Common objections to QALYs rest on a very basic failure to appreciate this: "If men end up worse off when everything is counted as it ought to be, that does not make correctly counting things sexist against men. And so it goes, of course, for the elderly and (detrimentally) disabled."

* Against Conventional Moral 'Decency': There's actually nothing "decent" about blindly prioritizing quantity over quality of life.

* Against 'prudish' research ethics - A striking analogy between prostitution and so-called "exploitative" medical research.

* The Optimal Use of Sub-optimal Vaccines - NYT "experts" cannot imagine how to incentivize people to remain in socially valuable medical trials.

* Against Bad Government (pandemic edition) - I'm shocked by how incompetent and harmful our local government's response has been.

* Scale and Symmetry in Covid Debates - on the importance of comparative assessments when every available option involves grave costs.  Plus a quick illustration of how immense the indirect harms from the pandemic could be.

* Legality is No Excuse - it's possible to exercise one's legal rights in ways that are morally wrong, obvs.

* Where Best to Give - now easier to know than ever before!


Other

* What Makes Your Papers Worth Reading?  I offer my answers there.  I look forward to others contributing to my Philosopher Spotlight Series soon (I've some exciting guest posts lined up for the new year -- feel free to shoot me an email if you're interested in joining in!). 

* VR Recommendations for Oculus Quest - and at just $300, I'd strongly recommend the latest headset to anyone interested in the technology -- after surviving 2020, you deserve a treat.


Happy New Year!

Wednesday, December 02, 2020

Philosopher "Spotlight" Series

In a previous post, I summarized my published papers, with an eye to trying to answer the questions, "What makes your papers worth reading?" and "What insights or lessons from your work do you wish were more widely appreciated?"

I'm hoping to encourage more people to do the same, since I think it'd be (i) interesting, and (ii) helpful for discovering new papers I should read!  No need to list all your papers (unless you want to) -- even just highlighting a few favourites, with suitable summaries, could be really helpful.  You could also include works in progress if you wish. Be sure to provide links to your papers (or their associated PhilPapers pages) for ease of access.

Write your own blog post (or a public Facebook post or the like) doing this, and email me the link, and I'll add it to the link-list below. (Please also link here from your post, so that your readers can discover others in the series.)  I'll help to kick things off with a few invited contributions hosted here on my blog...

Eligibility: Anyone with a Ph.D. in Philosophy, or who has multiple publications in reputable philosophical journals (tracked by PhilPapers) is welcome!

Spotlight series to date: [to be updated]

Saturday, May 30, 2020

What Makes Your Papers Worth Reading?

Given how many academic papers are out there, it would be useful to have more filtering and discovery mechanisms for helping us to find the ones we might be most interested in.  One thing that could help is if authors themselves offered a concise 'overview' of what they think makes their various papers worth reading (when they are).  Many of us already list our papers on our websites, but (i) standard academic abstracts rarely do a good job of explaining why a paper is worth reading, and (ii) who reads academic websites anyway?  So I'm going to take a stab at doing this in a blog post, and invite others to follow suit (whether on Facebook or wherever you like: feel free to additionally post your response in the comments here, especially if your research interests overlap with mine at all). What lessons from your work do you wish were more widely appreciated?

Ordered by how much I happen to like each paper today:

Tuesday, December 31, 2019

2019 (and '18) in review

(Past annual reviews: 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.)

I didn't get around to this last year due to being in the midst of an international move (not an easy process with a toddler, to put it mildly, but worth it nonetheless).  So I guess this post can serve to summarize my past two years of blogging...


Epistemology, Metaethics, and Mind

* Philosophical Expertise, Deference, and Intransigence argues that we should only be moved by peer disagreement (and related phenomena) when we take the other person's views to be evidence of what we ourselves would conclude upon ideal reflection.  So there's no epistemic pressure to defer to even your acknowledged "philosophical superiors" if their starting points are too different from your own.

* Why a related (intransigence-based) argument against cognitivism goes wrong.

* On Parfit on Knowing What Matters - responding to Parfit's response to my paper. (Includes a summary of my original paper's central claims.)

* Ambiguously Normative Testimony - why Bedke's objection to non-naturalism over-generalizes.

* Normativity for Value Realists -- if you don't believe in (genuine) "Nazi value" you shouldn't believe in (genuine) "Nazi reasons" either.  (May have converted Norcross to normative realism!)

* Sub-experiences and Minimal Duration -- what's the best way to make sense of experiences that have a minimum duration?


Applied Ethics

* How to Make a Difference -- exposing the fallacy in claims that "individual action" is necessarily inefficacious in the face of global problems.

* Three kinds of offsetting -- exploring what kinds of harms can (or cannot) be morally "offset", and why.

* Worthless Harm-Prevention and Non-Existence -- how some great harms might nonetheless not be worthwhile to prevent.

* Is Price-Gouging Good? - maybe!

* Police Shootings: Mortal Threats vs Tragic Mistakes - how to tell if there are too many of the latter.

* The Value of Academic Research -- there's more to it than Michael Huemer realizes.


Political Theory

* Charity Vouchers: Decentralizing Public Spending with follow-up posts:
- Philanthropy Vouchers and Public Debate: Political vs Civic Advocacy
- What Compassionate Conservatism Could Be

* Ideological Ascent and Asymmetry - can you always diagnose whether someone's political behaviour is "unreasonable" in a completely value-neutral way (abstracting away from the details of what's under dispute)?


Ethical Theory

* Constitutive Instrumentality: a response to Lazar - how to make sense of fungible values.

* Is the 'separateness of persons' better understood as constraining our actions or our attitudes?  I argue for the latter.

* Negative Utility Monsters - a twist on the original case may serve to undermine its intuitive force.

* Does Welfare have Diminishing Marginal Value? - an alternative (utilitarian-compatible) way to capture prioritarian intuitions: assign DMV not to welfare, but to the basic goods (e.g. happiness) that contribute to one's welfare.

* Consequentialism, Moral Worth, and the Fitting/Fortunate Distinction - why consequentialists should not conflate "right reasons" with "consequentialist-recommended motivations".

* Good Motives, Act-Features, and What Matters - how to understand talk of "right-making features".

* When Killing is Worse than Letting Die -- when the victim is more salient, (all else equal) the harmful act reveals a worse quality of will.  In other cases, there may be no moral difference between killing vs letting die. (Related: Options without Constraints at PEA Soup.)

* Actualism, Evaluation and Prerogatives - addresses an objection from Pete Graham.

* The Aim(s) of Practical Deliberation - is there a fact of the matter about "how high" we morally ought to aim?  I defend a pluralist answer.

* Stacking Time-Relative Interests and Acquired Tastes and Necessary Interests -- exploring McMahan's account, and developing it in response to objections.


Off the blog...

Four of my previously-accepted papers appeared in print this year:
* 'Willpower Satisficing' (Noûs)
* 'Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?' (APQ)
* 'Fittingness Objections to Consequentialism' (OUP)
* 'Overriding Virtue' (OUP)

I also wrote a new paper, 'Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good' (summarized here), that I'm pretty excited about.  (It aims to put to rest the debate between maximizers, satisficers, and scalar consequentialists, by showing how the views are best understood as not actually being in conflict with one other.)

Happy New Year!

Sunday, December 31, 2017

2017 in review

(Past annual reviews: 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.)

Off the blog... Mostly I've been occupied this year by the arrival of this little guy:


Professionally, I was delighted to finally find a good home for my 'Willpower Satisficing' paper (in Noûs!).  'Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?' was accepted by APQ.  And a couple of previously-accepted papers -- 'Knowing What Matters' and 'Rethinking the Asymmetry' -- appeared in print, while 'Fittingness Objections to Consequentialism' was officially approved for an OUP-edited volume.  Busy times!


On the blog...

Applied Ethics

* A series of posts took a critical look at a healthcare fiasco unfolding in the UK which our family experienced first-hand: UK shuts down Independent Midwives, Medical Indemnity: Protection or Compensation?, and Assessing the NMC's Defense of its Independent Midwifery Ban.

* Universalizing Tactical Voting rebuts the moral objection to tactical voting.

* Anomaly vs Huemer on Immigration -- explaining why the default presumption should be to favour freer immigration.


Moral Theory

* Aggregating the Right Moments addresses one intuitive reason for thinking that it'd be better to give one person half a million minutes (i.e. one year) more life than to give a million people one minute more each.

* Nanoseconds that Matter explains why even arbitrarily small durations of time should not be assumed to lack value entirely.

* Harms, Benefits, and Framing Effects defends the existence of 'framing effects' against the objections of a recently published paper.

* Iterating Badness in the Paradox of Deontology explores an objection to Setiya's new paper, 'Must Consequentialists Kill?'

* Drawing the Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction does just what it says on the tin.


Other

* Our Zombie Bodies, and Physicalist Epiphenomenalism discusses the idea that our mental properties should not be attributed to our physical bodies in addition to our person, and so our bodies are, in a sense, philosophical zombies.

* Intelligible Non=Natural Concerns explores exceptions to the rule that we shouldn't care about morality 'de dicto'.


Happy New Year!

Saturday, January 07, 2017

2016 in review

(Past annual reviews: 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.)


Applied Ethics

* The Instrumental value of one vote -- can be much higher than many philosophers seem to assume.

* Pets and Slavery -- explains why domesticated animals are not inherently wronged by their guardians, or morally akin to "slaves".

* Philanthropic focus vs abandonment -- diagnoses some bad reasoning from the CEO of Oxfam, who mistakenly thinks there are reasons of fairness to help people inefficiently.

Tuesday, December 29, 2015

2015 in review

(Past annual reviews: 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.)

Metaethics & Epistemology

* Information and Parfit's Fact-Stating Argument - clarifying what I take to be one of the strongest (yet generally neglected) arguments against metaethical naturalism.
* Are "Internal Reasons" Normative?  I worry that Williams can't coherently think so.
* Normative vs Metaethical Wrong-making explains what I think is wrong with a recently-published "moral argument against moral realism".
* Self-Undermining Skepticisms -- argues that Street-style attempts to "debunk" normative realism will end up being self-defeating.
* Three options in the epistemology of philosophy compares skepticism, epistemic conservatism, and objective warrant views. (My sympathies lie with the latter.)
* Judgmentalism vs Non-commitalism -- would an ideally rational agent ever suspend belief?

Moral Theory

* Deliberative Openness and the Actualism-Possibilism Dispute - arguing that agents should treat as deliberatively "open" (or within their control) just that which counterfactually depends upon the outcome of their present deliberations.  If your best present efforts can do nothing to influence your future decisions, then this "future self" should, for deliberative purposes, be treated as a distinct agent -- not someone who you can rely upon to carry out your present plans and intentions.  So, plan accordingly.
* Three ways of rejecting moral intuitions -- some more legitimate than others.
* Thoughts on 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' -- is it a problem for a theory if it holds that reasonable choices and reasonable preferences diverge?
* Moral Theories and Fittingness Implications -- why the former have the latter.
* Wronging for Utilitarians -- not such a puzzle as some seem to think.
* Criterial vs Ground-level Moral Explanations -- a distinction that can help explain why various (e.g. motivational) objections to utilitarianism fail.  See also Rossian Utilitarianism.
* 'Objective Menu' theories of wellbeing -- the old 'list' metaphor is misleading.
* Questioning Moral Equality -- is there any interesting sense in which all people are truly "moral equals"?
* The Best Case for Voting -- invoking cooperative, rather than purely individualistic, utilitarianism.

Applied Ethics

* My paper 'Against "Saving Lives": Equal Concern and Differential Impact' was published in Bioethics.
* Is it OK to have kids? -- my article in Aeon Magazine.
* Procreative Externalities -- are additional people good or bad for those already here? (And more.)
* Good Lives and Un/conditional Value -- If good lives are not intrinsically good, it's hard to avoid the bleak conclusion that it'd be better had there never been life at all.

* GOP Closes Doors to Newborns -- satire, but distressing how little needs tweaking when you start from real quotes from politicians talking about Syrian refugees.
* Waiving Rights and "Second-class Citizens" -- there's something odd about objecting to extended guest-worker programs for the sake of the guest-workers who want to stay here and work.
* Basic Needs and Basic Rights -- why we should prefer a right to an efficient system over a right to free provision of basic needs like food and water.
* It's worth Thinking Realistically about Policy Outcomes.  So few seem to bother.
* Sex Selection and Gender Norms - rebutting a bad argument.

* Beyond Lip-service: betting for beliefs, donating for values -- given all that money can do, isn't it odd that we don't spend more on realizing our values?  If you don't donate to a cause, can you really be said to sincerely value it at all?
* Moral Priorities -- it's taboo to talk about moral tradeoffs.  It shouldn't be.
* Alas, so does Furrow on Eating Meat.  What's with all the bad arguments, people!?

Other

* Baffling Philosophy -- what views do you find completely baffling / unmotivated-seeming?
* For a view that's much more compelling than people generally realize, check out Helen's 'Idealism Without God' -- a radically original rethinking of idealism.  (Better than Berkeley!)

Wednesday, December 31, 2014

2014 in review

(Past annual reviews: 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.)

On the blog:

Metaethics

* Normative Concepts -- what makes a concept a normative concept?
* Non-Normative Epistemology -- does it make sense, or are we unavoidably committed to (at least epistemic) normativity?
* Fittingness and Normativity -- can fittingness views adequately capture the "oomph" of practical normativity (the sheer badness of the really bad)?

Tuesday, December 31, 2013

2013 in review

(Past annual reviews: 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.)

Publications / Awards:
Two big results this year... (1) My 'Value Receptacles' paper was accepted for publication in Noûs, and (2) I was (co-)awarded the RoME 2013 Young Ethicist Prize for my paper, 'Satisficing by Effort: From Scalar to Satisficing Consequentialism'.

On the blog: