Decomposing Descriptive Content

I think that descriptivists may have to reject semantic compositionality in some cases. In particular, the two sentences (1) 'Bob is human' and (2) 'Bob = Bob' may not be strictly decomposable in their descriptive contents. I will show that there is another term X which can replace the first mention of 'Bob' in the first sentence, but not in the second, without altering the sentence's content. So the contribution that either term ('Bob' or X) makes to the meaning of the whole depends on the rest of the sentence in which it is embedded. In sentence #1, 'Bob' and X will contribute the same semantic value, whereas in sentence #2 they will differ.

First, some background: I use 'descriptive content' to refer to the kind of ('narrow') representational content or semantic value that is grounded in scenarios (conceptual possibilities, or centered possible worlds considered as actual) -- namely, the primary intension. For example, the descriptive content of a proper name, 'Bob', is given by some associated reference-fixing descriptive property, D, such that 'Bob = the D' is analytic (if D can be captured in our language). Equivalently: it is the set of possible persons who are such that he is Bob follows a priori from the hypothesis that his world is actual. [Read up on the links if this is hard to follow.]

Now for the argument:

Consider a perfectly symmetrical universe, containing two qualitative duplicates we may dub 'Bob' and 'Mirror-Bob'. They share all their objective intrinsic and extrinsic properties (for their surroundings are also qualitatively identical). So there is no difference between them -- no unique property that could fix the reference of my term 'Bob' (or 'Mirror-Bob') as referring to the one person rather than the other.* Probably the best way to make sense of this is to say that the two terms are indeterminate between the two referents, and so to assess the truth of any sentence involving the terms, we supervaluate over the various possibilities.

* = Aside: this problem could be overcome if we were inside this universe, for then we could appeal to the relative property of being the Bob in my vicinity, or whatever.

Consider, then, the following sentences:
(1) 'Bob is human' and (2) 'Bob = Bob'

And compare the first-term substitutions:
(1a) 'Mirror-Bob is human' and (2a) 'Mirror-Bob = Bob'

Both 1 and 1a are true, and indeed true in all the same scenarios, which is to say that they have the same descriptive content. (Intuitively: to say that Bob is human, and to say that Mirror-Bob is human, is not to describe two different scenarios. Both names actually range indeterminately over the same two people, and both apply equally determinately to any unique Bob-counterparts in other, non-symmetric, worlds.)

But 2 and 2a clearly differ in content, for the former is true and the latter false! For although it is indeterminate which of the two people each of these terms denotes, it is determinate that they denote numerically distinct people. (Either 'Bob' denotes the one guy and 'Mirror-Bob' the other, or vice versa. On either way of resolving the indeterminacy, the names turn out not to be co-referential. Hence, by supervaluation, it is determinate that they are non-co-referential.)

The problem for compositionality is that this fact -- that the two terms do not co-refer -- cannot be derived from the descriptive contents of each term alone. Indeed, we've seen that both names have the same primary intension (an intension which happens to be indeterminate at this world, but not at others). But, despite having the same content, they can potentially make significantly different contributions to the content of a whole sentence in which they are part, as the comparison of 2 with 2a shows.

(Can anyone suggest a neater way to make sense of this puzzle case?)

Aid and Age

Here's a misleading headline for you: 'Treatment based on need not age':

"The BMA is against blanket bans based on age or other arbitrary factors. It is outrageous to suggest that just because someone is old that they would not have a right to be considered for treatment." ... Dr Calland's comments follow reports that in a survey of 870 doctors (carried out by Doctor magazine) one in three said that elderly patients should not be given free treatment if it were unlikely to do them good for long.

Dr. Calland's comments here seem kind of daft. Age is very obviously not an "arbitrary" factor. If resources are scarce, and we have to decide between investing in one patient to grant them an extra couple of years of quality life, or another patient who would gain several decades of quality life, isn't the latter clearly the greater need?

To generalize, I think it is much more important for a society to invest in their youth than in their elderly. This holds across sectors as well as within, e.g., the health sector. (Education should be a higher priority than hip replacements, etc.) It's unfortunate that such trade-offs need to be made, of course. Ideally, we should want everyone to be maximally well-off. But, failing that, we should do the most good that we can. And pretending that these trade-offs don't exist is not the way to achieve this.

The Role of Rhetoric

I know some intellectuals are put off by Obama's rhetoric, complaining that his campaign represents the victory of "style over substance". But I think this is mistaken. The complaint would only be legitimate if his rhetoric were serving to mask a genuine lack of substance, but closer examination reveals that in fact there is no such lack. Instead, we have a substantial candidate who, when campaigning, plays up style for the sake of motivating and winning over the electorate. Isn't this just good politics?

In an ideal world, of course, the electorate would not be swayed by non-rational influences. Wonkish talk about increasing transparency by RSS-ifying government data should suffice to "uplift" and motivate support. But this is not an ideal world, populated by ideally rational citizens. People are influenced by a nice suit and haircut, personal charisma, and eloquent rhetoric. So an effective politician will play to these biases in order to shore up support. Would it be better if they didn't? I don't see how. They should want to reform the system to make it more responsive to reason, of course. But for as long as the flaws still exist, it would seem imprudent not to take advantage of them. (Their opponents certainly will.)

N.B. This only holds within moral limits. I certainly don't want to excuse deception, for example. But there is a clear and principled distinction here. Rhetoric and such are rationally neutral, making us neither more nor less likely (in general) to reach the truth. Deception, on the other hand, is anti-rational, a positive obstruction to informed decision-making.

So I don't see any grounds for objecting to politicians using all morally permissible (even if non-rational) means to garner support. Granted, this just shifts the question to which methods are morally impermissible. But I doubt that anyone could seriously contend that rhetoric belongs on the blacklist.

Estlund on Non-Fairness

I've long thought that fairness is overrated, and often brought up in situations where it is completely unnecessary (e.g. the suggestion that one must flip a coin to decide which of two needy strangers to help). Rather, as Estlund argues, it is at most "an occasional value":

It can sometimes seem as if everything should be fair. The hegemony of fairness is partly owed to an unfortunate linguistic habit, in which anything that is not fair, but could have been fair, is called unfair. Since unfairness is, as the language works, so obviously a moral failing, it would follow that everything ought to be fair if it can be. But there seems to be a legitimate questions about this, which we should not let linguisitic habits settle. For example, to defend my choice to save my son from drowning rather than saving the stranger next to him, it is not obvious that I should need to show that doing so conforms to some appropriate standard of fairness. Or consider my giving five dollars to one beggar and nothing to the next. Is it obvious that this is only permissible if it is, in some way, fair? It is obviously not fair, but is it unfair? (We might call this the non/un issue.)

-- D. Estlund, Democratic Authority, p.67.

Open Thread: Questionable Things

(1) I've added a new poll to the sidebar, asking: Will the most common response to this poll be 'No'? Given the three responses so far, mine is correct.

(2) Egoism-Infected Science (ht).

Lee suggests adults flatter for two reasons. It can be to show gratitude for some positive action in the past. As well, when they’re meeting someone for first time – someone who may turn out to be important for their advancement down the road – flattery is also used as an investment for future favourable treatment from the person. “We don’t know which the child is doing,” says Lee. However, the fact that the older children flattered strangers as well as familiar people suggests “they are thinking ahead, they are making these little social investments for future benefits.”

Or maybe they just didn't want to make the other person feel bad?

(3) All the sane feminists out there must be feeling pretty embarrassed for their NOW-NY sisters right about now. They apparently believe that we have an "obligation" to support only a candidate with the right genitalia, and anyone who considers the candidates on their merits is "betraying" the cause of equality:

Women have just experienced the ultimate betrayal... This latest move by Kennedy is so telling about the status of and respect for women’s rights, women’s voices, women’s equality, women’s authority and our ability – indeed, our obligation — to promote and earn and deserve and elect, unabashedly, a president that is the first woman after centuries of men who ‘know what’s best for us.’

It's times like this I realize that I have very little grasp of the depths of human stupidity.

The Price of Meat

The NY Times has an interesting article on meat production. I was puzzled by the following, though:

Perhaps the best hope for change lies in consumers’ becoming aware of the true costs of industrial meat production. “When you look at environmental problems in the U.S.,” says Professor Eshel, “nearly all of them have their source in food production and in particular meat production. And factory farming is ‘optimal’ only as long as degrading waterways is free. If dumping this stuff becomes costly — even if it simply carries a non-zero price tag — the entire structure of food production will change dramatically.”

What does consumer awareness have to do with the price of fish meat? I read Eshel as suggesting that we legislate to internalize the cost of pollution (and I would add a further cost for the harms to animal welfare, if this could be reliably measured). Fixing the system in this way would relieve the ethical burden placed on consumers -- and just as well, since I tend to think it unduly burdensome to ask individuals to address such concerns in their day-to-day lives. Much better if we can fix the market so that a trip to the grocery store need not be an occasion for grueling moral decisions.

The Clintons' Lies

Hilzoy describes how "Hillary Clinton, and her husband, have told a series of lies about Barack Obama", and why this matters:*

The Clinton campaign apparently thought that presenting Hillary Clinton herself, and saying true things about Obama, might not be enough to convince people to vote for her. There are ways of responding to this thought that demonstrate respect for people's right to make up their own mind whom to vote for: trying to become a more compelling candidate, for instance, or accepting the possibility of defeat. But lying is not one of them.

Lying in an election is basically a way of saying: we know how you ought to vote, and if we can't get you to vote that way by presenting you with facts and arguments, or even with truthful but emotionally shaded appeals, then we will get you to vote our way by telling you things that are not true. It's hard to see what could be more profoundly disrespectful of people's right to decide for themselves whom to vote for.

This is simply intolerable, and I'm increasingly hopeful that informed and responsible citizens will not, in fact, tolerate it any longer. Here, for example, is the former president of Chicago NOW, explaining how Clinton's blatant lies drove her to become an Obama supporter:


I don't think it's sufficiently widely appreciated just how important this issue is. I mean, we're constantly complaining about the wretched state of public discourse and the dishonesty of politicians, and yet it is accepted as necessary and inevitable. (Some cynics even consider sleazy viciousness a virtue in politicians. Again, all I have to say to such people is: read Hilzoy.)

But it is not inevitable. In Obama, we finally have a candidate who promises to turn things around, to change the way that politics is done. He offers a clear alternative: we need not join the race to the slimy bottom. And if we embrace this alternative, and state clearly and publicly that our reason for doing so is that we will not tolerate dishonesty in our representatives, then maybe - just maybe - things will begin to change. If we can ensure that dishonesty is a losing strategy, an instant disqualifier the same way that racism is, even the most unprincipled politicians will begin to respond to these incentives. But it's up to us:

It's not the lies; it's people in the Democratic party who realize they're lies being indifferent to them, and Democratic voters rewarding them. Of all the major groups in politics--the press, GOP politicians, Democratic politicians, Democratic voters, GOP voters--the only ones I trust at all are Democratic voters. And the presidential primary is our best shot to try to change things for the better. And we always blow it.

It's not too late. Every voice helps: please do your bit.


* See also Bruce Baugh's comment:

I'm certainly not the first to point this out, but it really reflects badly on her qualifications for office at this particular time. We've got a president who takes all disagreement as attacks to be crushed by any means possible, who rejects diplomacy as a thing losers do, and so on. A big part of the new president's job will be repairing the damage from all that - giving potential allies and partners reasons to think we're trustworthy again. It seems really unlikely to me that someone who campaigns this way can go on to govern effectively in the diametrically opposite style, and I don't want to gamble on it.

Update: Obama's hard-hitting response to the smears is spot-on: "Hillary Clinton. She'll say anything, and change nothing."

Reasons for Obama

1. Meta-politics
I think our top priority should be to strengthen democracy: improving the political system to make it more responsive to reason. That means increased transparency in government, ethics reforms to reduce the influence of lobbyists, and modelling intellectual honesty and civic virtue in political debate. On each of these grounds, Obama is the better candidate by far.

2. No More Torture
Here I defer to Katherine's expert judgment:

Neither [Clinton] nor Obama is good enough about accountability for past abuses; I think he probably is good enough going forward, but she isn't.

Update: see also Habeas Lawyers for Obama:

Some politicians are all talk and no action. But we know from first-hand experience that Senator Obama has demonstrated extraordinary leadership on this critical and controversial issue...

3. Iraq
Obviously. Here's what Obama said in 2002:

But I also know that Saddam poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States, or to his neighbors, that the Iraqi economy is in shambles, that the Iraqi military a fraction of its former strength, and that in concert with the international community he can be contained until, in the way of all petty dictators, he falls away into the dustbin of history. I know that even a successful war against Iraq will require a US occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences. I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale and without strong international support will only fan the flames of the Middle East, and encourage the worst, rather than best, impulses of the Arab world, and strengthen the recruitment arm of Al Qaeda. I am not opposed to all wars. I'm opposed to dumb wars.

Here's why it matters:

[T]his isn't just about the past, it's about the future. I don't talk about my opposition to the war to say "I told you so." I wish the war had gone differently. But the reason I talk about it is because I truly believe that the judgment, and the conviction, and the accountability that each of us showed on the most important foreign policy decision of our lives is the best indicator you have of how each of us will make those decisions going forward.

How we made that decision, and how we talk about it, is critical to understanding what we would do as President. Will we carefully evaluate the evidence and the consequences of action, or will we skip over the intelligence and scare people with the consequences of inaction? Will we make these decisions based on polls, or based on our principles? Will we have the courage to make the tough choice, or will we just choose the course that makes us look tough?

4. Effective Diplomacy and Consensus-building
From international to local politics, Obama is willing to bring to the table those he disagrees with. And you know what: it works. Over to Mark Schmitt:

One way to deal with that kind of bad-faith opposition is to draw the person in, treat them as if they were operating in good faith, and draw them into a conversation about how they actually would solve the problem. If they have nothing, it shows. And that's not a tactic of bipartisan Washington idealists -- it's a hard-nosed tactic of community organizers, who are acutely aware of power and conflict. It's how you deal with people with intractable demands -- put ‘em on a committee. Then define the committee's mission your way.

This point also comes out vividly in Obama's in-depth Chronicle interview (highly recommended, especially if you want a better understanding of how Obama would go about things as president).

5. Competence
Many people complain that Obama doesn't have Hillary's "experience" in Washington. But anyone who doubts his wonkish credentials should simply take a look at his record:

[W]hile Obama has not proposed his Cosmic Plan for World Peace, he has proposed a lot of interesting legislation on important but undercovered topics. I can't remember another freshman Senator who so routinely pops up when I'm doing research on some non-sexy but important topic, and pops up because he has proposed something genuinely good. Since I think that American politics doesn't do nearly enough to reward people who take a patient, craftsmanlike attitude towards legislation, caring as much about fixing the parts that no one will notice until they go wrong as about the flashy parts, I wanted to say this.

Follow the link for the details. (Then follow all the previous links in this post!)

Overall: Compared to Hillary, Obama is more electable, more likely to be able to effect change once elected, and the changes he proposes are the right ones. Why in the world wouldn't you support him?

Philosophers' Carnival #61

... is here!

Widespread Discrimination

I previously endorsed the 'individualist' line that discrimination is bad insofar as (and for the reason that) it involves ignoring individuality and treating people as mere 'tokens of a type'. I didn't see any necessary reason to focus on historically oppressed groups here (except insofar as they are more commonly the targets of arbitrary discrimination); the same kind of wrongful disrespect is found in affirmative action, or in arbitrary discrimination based on eye colour or anything else.

But I've since come to realize that I was overlooking a key practical difference: the greater harm of widespread exclusion. Scanlon states the problem especially clearly in ch.2. of his manuscript on permissibility:

One thing that seems crucial to racial discrimination in particular is that the prejudicial judgments it involves are not just the idiosyncratic attitudes of a particular agent, but are widely shared in the society in question and commonly expressed and acted on in ways that have serious consequences. The petty likes and dislikes of other individuals may be something we just have to live with, but it is another matter when the view that members of a certain group are inferior, and not to be associated with, becomes widely held in a society, with the result that members of that group are denied access to important goods and opportunities. (p.34)

If someone is idiosyncratically prejudiced against some arbitrary characteristic of mine, that kind of sucks, but it isn't such a huge deal. I can always just go to someone else instead. But if the prejudice is widespread in society, each act of discrimination is increasingly harmful, because I have nowhere else to go. If one grocer won't serve me, that costs me a few minutes as I head to another store down the road. But if no grocers will serve me, I starve.

On this view, acts of discrimination are wrong "because of their consequences", and so this impermissibility does not depend on vicious intentions. Scanlon continues:

Once a practice of discrimination exists, decisions that deny important goods to members of the group discriminated against and do so without sufficient justification, are wrong even if they express no judgments of inferiority on the agent's part. They are wrong even if done simply out of laziness, or a desire to avoid offending others by going against established custom.

Note that this objection only applies to discrimination that is part of a system of "widespread denigration and exclusion". A curious upshot: in a largely non-racist society, the odd racist is perhaps not acting as terribly as we might imagine. (Unless there is a risk of their repugnant attitudes becoming more widely shared once again.)

False beliefs are worth upsetting

Goodness. (HT)

Schools are dropping the Holocaust from history lessons to avoid offending Muslim pupils, a Government backed study has revealed. It found some teachers are reluctant to cover the atrocity for fear of upsetting students whose beliefs include Holocaust denial.

Less Sensitivity, please.

Correction: apparently 'some teachers' in this context refers to one teacher. [Thanks David.] Still, the broader issue bears highlighting:

The report concluded: "In particular settings, teachers of history are unwilling to challenge highly contentious or charged versions of history in which pupils are steeped at home, in their community or in a place of worship."

Can we choose our reasons?

The main objection to Scanlon's separation of intention and permissibility comes from the suggestion that we not only ought to do the right thing, but do it for the right reasons. Perhaps, one might suggest, this is the only permissible option. Not only is it impermissible to perform the wrong action, but it is also impermissible to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. Scanlon responds (ch.2, p.20):

The agent's failure to be moved by the right reason reveals a fault in him, but it does not count against the permissibility of his action. The best explanation of this distinction seems to me to lie in the close connection between permissibility and the guiding of choice.

The question of permissibility is the question, "May I do X?" which is typically asked from the point of view of an agent who is presented with a number of different ways of acting. The question is, which of these may one choose? The question of permissibility thus applies only to alternatives between which a competent agent can choose.

And, Scanlon suggests, we cannot choose what we see as reasons. (Sure, we "decide whether something is a reason or not" (p.22). It is a judgment of sorts, and one we can be held responsible for. But it is not a willed choice, and so doesn't raise questions of permissibility.) We can choose whether to do X or not, but we cannot choose to do X for certain reasons rather than others.

Is that right? Scanlon continues (p.23):

This explanation may seem at odds with the very appealing idea that moral considerations are not esoteric but are available to any agent. If the reasons that a moral principle identifies as relevant are "available" in this sense, why is acting on them -- doing the right thing for the right reason -- not also available to the agent? The answer is that the availability of moral considerations simply means that a normally competent agent ought to be able to understand them and see that they provide reasons. It does not follow that an agent who, for whatever reason, does not see the force of such a reason, is nonetheless in a position to choose to see its force, or to act on it.

In our seminar, Michael raised an interesting comparison with epistemic obligation. It's usually thought that we ought to see or access all the epistemic reasons. Even though it is not strictly a matter of "choice", nonetheless, in failing to recognize the evidence available to us, we fail to believe as we should. So it seems that what matters for responsibility here is simply our rational capacities, and the fact that we could have accessed the relevant reasons (even if not simply by exercising our will).

So why the difference in the practical case? Do we have more freedom to inquire into facts than to change our internal motivations? Or are the resulting obligations different in nature, such that practical obligations have to meet a stricter form of the 'ought implies can' requirement? Any ideas?

Threats and Offers: Shaping Meaning

Scanlon argues that one's intentions typically don't affect the permissibility of an action. In 'Permissibility and Intent II: The Significance of Intent', he explores some possible exceptions to this rule. One particularly interesting case, I think, is that of threats, or (more broadly) intentionally influencing another's choices. What's interesting here is the way in which this can affect the very nature of the other's choice, by changing the meaning or significance of the options available to them. Scanlon writes:

In the sexual harassment case, for example, in the absence of the threat, the recipient could choose between having sex with the intervener or not. But once the threat has been made what he or she can decide to have or not is coerced sex with the intervener, which is something quite different. In addition, the alternative of taking the job now involves working for someone who has treated one (or tried to treat one) in this way, and declining it can be seen as an assertion of one's dignity. More generally, whatever A may be, the threat to attach a penalty to the recipient's doing A changes the alternative of doing A into the alternative of doing A in defiance of this threat, and adds to B the character of giving in to the intervener and being "pushed around" by him or her. (p.39)

He adds on p.40, "Recipients may have good reason to object to changes of these kinds in the meaning of the actions available to them, and therefore good reason to object to others intervening in their lives in these ways."

This strikes me as an important point, but I don't think that the potential moral objections here depend upon the actual motives or intentions of the intervener. Rather, it seems that what matters is their apparent intention, or what the recipient could reasonably interpret their intention to be. For example, it may be that I have no intention to threaten you at all, but if I carelessly make a remark that is naturally interpreted as a threat, then that seems sufficient to problematically impact the way you perceive the meaning of your subsequent choice. Presumably, the im/permissibility of my causing this is unaffected by whether I did so intentionally or negligently. If I should have known better, then that suffices to settle the question of permissibility; my actual motives don't matter.

Conflicting Non-standard Reasons

[See my previous post for background.]

Raz writes:

While we may have epistemic reasons for a particular belief and a practical reason not to have it... The outcome of "conflict" between adaptive and practical reasons is not, as in genuine conflict between practical reasons or between epistemic ones, that the better reason prevails. They are not in competition, and reasons of neither kind can be better than reasons of the other. Rather, adaptive reasons, being the standard reasons for belief or for having emotions, prevail. Practical reasons, being non-standard, can 'win' only by stealth. (p.23)

He adds in a footnote: "Note though that standard and non-standard reasons for action, both being practical, do conflict in a straightforward way. And the same is true of reasons for intentions."

So how are we to assess a situation where your standard and non-standard reasons for action or intention conflict? Take, for example, Kavka's toxin puzzle. Clearly the thing to do is to bring it about that you have other (i.e. standard) reasons to intend to drink the toxin -- to keep a promise or to avoid some self-inflicted punishment, perhaps. But in the absence of those new reasons, i.e. reasons you can rationally follow, wouldn't it be irrational for you to form the intention? (It'd be fortunate, for sure, but that merely shows that sometimes it's fortunate to be irrational, right?) In what sense is this 'conflict' any different from the belief case?

Following Reasons

Say I offer you $100 to hop on one leg for non-pecuniary motives. You cannot follow this reason directly, for that would be self-defeating. (I can read your mind, and so tell if you cheat.) Instead, it is a reason to hop for some other reason. It is thus a non-standard reason for hopping. Mind you, it could be a standard reason to bring it about that you hop, e.g. by stabbing yourself in the foot. You can stab yourself in the foot for the reason of the $100 prize, without this causing any (logical) problems.

The non/standard distinction is also seen in the contrast between practical vs. epistemic reasons for belief. The practical benefits of a rich ideologue's patronage might provide you with non-standard reasons to believe that global warming is a hoax. But if all the evidence is against it, then you have no standard reasons for the belief, and cannot come to hold it through the direct process of rational belief formation. (You might get yourself to believe by indirect methods, of course. Again, it could be a standard reason for some such action.)

In his 'Reasons: Practical and Adaptive', Raz makes the distinction as follows:

Standard reasons are those which we can follow directly, that is have the attitude, or perform the action, for that reason. Non-standard reasons for an action or attitude are such that one can conform to, but not follow directly. (pp.4-5)

This makes it sound like a contingent empirical matter, for isn't it up to psychology to tell us what considerations humans are able to act upon? But not really. Science might tell us what considerations humans can respond to, and even cite in folk-psychological explanations of their own behaviour. But there are normative elements to action (as opposed to mere behaviour), and to genuinely following a reason (as opposed to merely taking oneself to have done so), which return us to the philosophical domain.

But now we have a problem. Suppose Bob mistakenly takes practical reasons to warrant belief. Anne offers him $100 to believe that the world is flat, and Bob manages to form the belief, citing the monetary reward as his reason. Does this mean that Bob follows the practical reason for belief? If that's possible -- if practical reasons for belief can be followed after all -- then they would (by definition) qualify as standard reasons.

Raz wants to deny this, which means that we need some independent basis for determining whether the reason was followed in such a case. (It would be circular to appeal to the fact of its being a non-standard reason to explain why it doesn't qualify as having been followed!) Recognizing this, Raz instead appeals to facts about "the nature of that reason" (p.19) to settle the matter. For example, if following a reason would be self-defeating, as in our original example, then that's a basic fact which explains why it cannot be successfully followed, and thus why it is non-standard. The case of practical reasons for belief is less clear. Raz claims (p.20):

the fact that non-epistemic reasons cannot serve to warrant belief shows that they cannot be followed. Ultimately, however, the explanation of the force of this point depends on understanding the normativity of reasons, their hold on us, a matter I deal with elsewhere.

Further direction would help. Oh well. That all seems a bit mysterious to me, so I wonder whether we might do better to just define standard reasons directly in terms of warrant. Or, if we take rationality as fundamental: standard reasons are those that our rational capacities respond to (insofar as they are functioning properly).

Valoric Consequentialism

Rather than focusing on the deontic categories of 'right' and 'wrong' action, Railton* suggests that an evaluative theory - what he calls "valoric utilitarianism" - better captures "the guiding utilitarian idea that no sort of act or motive or institution has intrinsic moral value and that whatever value it has from a moral point of view depends in the final reckoning upon how it affects human well-being." (p.409) Assessments of what is more or less morally fortunate (i.e. better or worse) form the core of the valoric consequentialist's theory, which may be applied quite generally to acts, motives, rules, and so on.

The binary distinction between right and wrong has no fundamental significance, and we are free to construct this component of our moral theory in a much more "indirect and intricate" manner (p.411). Railton thus suggests:

a valoric utilitarian account of rightness might deem an action right if it would conform to normative practices - comprising rules, motivations, dispositions, etc. - that would be morally fortunate. (p.412)

Note, however, that in any given case the most morally fortunate act may conflict with what would be permitted by morally fortunate normative practices, or what someone with a morally fortunate character would do. Railton explains:

This may seem puzzling. "What am I to do," an agent seeking moral advice in such circumstances may ask, "that which is most fortunate or that which is right?" Shouldn't there be a definite answer as to which evaluation to follow? There are definite answers, but there is no one question. If the agent wants to know which acts, of those available to him, are most highly valued from a moral point of view, he receives one answer. If he wants to know which acts are right or wrong, he receives another...

Perhaps, however, the agent is asking a different question still. He may want to know whether he has more reason to do what is morally fortunate or that which is morally right. This, however, is not a question to refer to moral standards or even to the moral point of view. For it is the office of practical reason to answer questions about the place of morally fortunate -- or morally right -- action in a rational life. (p.412)

Is this an adequate response? Shouldn't a moral theory at least be able to tell us what we have most moral reason to do? Abstracting away from the other domains and demands of a rational life, what reasons are given to us simply from a moral perspective?

A better answer, I think, would hark back to the "guiding utilitarian idea" that obtaining better consequences is fundamentally what matters. This suggests a simple formula: we have most reason to do what is best. Hence:

Q. What motives should I have?
A. Whatever would do the most good, i.e. the most morally fortunate motives.
Q. What act should I do?
A. The most morally fortunate act.
Q. What decision procedure should I employ in deciding how to act?
A. The most morally fortunate decision procedure.
Q. But I can't aim at all of these at once!?
A. Who ever said that you should? You should have whatever aims would be most morally fortunate!

* All references are to Railton's (1988) 'How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism' Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIII.

Project Playlist

This is a neat service. They index music files that are freely available elsewhere on the web, from which you can construct, listen to, and share a custom playlist:

[Update: I think the embedded player makes this page too slow to load, so you can go here to listen to it instead.]

It sure beats just mentioning the songs, as in the "Friday Random 10" lists that pop up on blogs every now and then.

Motivated Incomprehension

Take the following passage, written by a respected academic:

Hillary Clinton suffers from being a Clinton, as well as having one of the most unappealing public personae of a national politician in recent memory. Dick Cheney is creepier and scarier, to be sure, but “fake” is the only word that captures the impression Ms. Clinton makes every time she opens her mouth.

Now, could any competent speaker of the English language reasonably interpret this as RM does?

“unappealing,” meaning–I, Brian Leiter, would not want to sleep with her?

Because that just sounds completely loony to me. When I asked RM to explain how she[?] could possibly interpret the talk of 'appeal', in this context, as referring to sex appeal, RM wrote:

the “context” is the historical characterization of women being evaluated in terms of sexual appeal. This context is always present, regardless if it is explicitly referred to or not.

So apparently it is impossible in our linguistic community to successfully refer to any kind of 'appeal' other than sex appeal, when speaking of a person who is female. That would surprise me. At least, when I read the original quote, the "sex appeal" interpretation did not even occur to me. Yet RM leaped at it as the only possible interpretation. So one of us must be way out of touch with the rest of the speech community. (I assume it's RM who's wrong here, but I'd encourage any readers to report their linguistic intuitions in the comments, just so I can be sure.)

This illustrates one of the things that really bothers me with ideological movements: they seem to impede clear thought (to put it mildly). Paranoia leads ideologues to see threats and insults where none exist. Further, some seem motivated to twist others' statements and read them in the most uncharitable light, willfully misunderstanding them in order to get that dark rush of moralistic pleasure that comes from thinking ill of others. (Cf. Hilzoy's 'Hatred Is A Poison' - possibly the best blog post I've ever read.)

Indeed, RM repeats the debacle later in the very same comments thread. I wrote: "if we are to take sexism seriously, then wrongful accusations of sexism are also pretty serious, to my mind." To which RM responded:

Richlet,

This my last comment. If you feel the need to get the last word in, well, I’ll write that off to your nature.

Have you ever heard of Modus Tollens (it’s related to Transposition)? When we have a conditional statement if A then B, and if not B is shown to be the case, we can conclude not A. This means that B not being the case can, indeed, show that A is false (or as you loosely put it, call A “into doubt”).

In your example, B NOT being the case would be making false accusations of sexism, i.e. if we prove that there are lots of false accusations of sexism then we should not take sexism seriously.

So, my dear boy, given that you think that Leiter has been falsely accused of being sexist, we have at least one instance of not B that could call A (taking sexism seriously) into doubt. Granted, how many more of these “false accusations” are needed before you really begin to question sexism is not clear.

Regardless, I suggest you take a quick look at Modus Tollens. Google it. I teach it in my intro logic class.

Hugs,
RM

Never mind the patronizing false intimacy, or the passive-aggressive posturing re: getting the last word in. Here we have a logic professor suggesting that "if we prove that there are lots of false accusations of sexism then we should not take sexism seriously" is the contrapositive of the previously quoted conditional (apparently misreading the actual consequent, i.e. 'wrongful accusations of sexism are serious', as the very different claim: 'wrongful accusations of sexism don't occur'). The mind boggles.

Are Contradictions So Bad?

Granting the law of non-contradiction, do we necessarily have reason to avoid holding inconsistent beliefs (as such)? If so, then our pre-existing beliefs, no matter how absurd, would 'bootstrap' reasons into existence. But that seems dubious: just because one believes that the world is 6000 years old, it does not follow that one has any reason whatsoever to refrain from believing that the world is over a billion years old. (One ought to revise the former belief instead!)

In 'The Myth of Instrumental Rationality', pp.20-1, Raz addresses the grounds of our lingering hostility to contradictions:

When we learn that there is a contradiction among our beliefs we learn (1) that some of our beliefs are false, and (2) that we hold some beliefs that if used together as premises in an argument may lead us astray in a special way [i.e. logical 'explosion']. Big deal! We hope that we all know that some of our beliefs are false anyway. And the risk that we will actually be led astray not by the logical implications of our false beliefs, but by their contradictory features, is, for all practical purposes, negligible...

To conclude: There is nothing wrong with holding contradictory beliefs as such, and the fact that one does is no reason to change one's beliefs. At most we could say that we should abandon our false beliefs. But that is so not because of the contradiction. Knowing that a set of propositions is contradictory has epistemic relevance: It tells us that the contradictory set contains a falsehood. It may be part of a case for believing that one particular proposition is false. But it is no such case by itself. Without such a case we have no reason to abandon any of them. For all we know, we may then abandon a true belief and remain with false ones. Nor do we have reason to suspend belief in all the propositions in the contradictory set. The cost, epistemic and otherwise, of doing so may be too great. That is why the logical paradoxes are rightly not generally taken as a reason to suspend our acceptance of the principles that generate them.

What do you think?

Epistemic Akrasia

Is it possible to be weak-willed in one's beliefs, i.e. to believe other than what one takes oneself to have most reason to believe? It seems not: the possibility of weak-willed action arises from the gap between one's reasoned conclusions and the intentions to act that may be formed on their basis. But there is normally no such gap or further step involved in belief formation: reasoning concludes in belief (i.e. judgment about what is the case), without any further role for the will.

Raz offers a different argument, in his 'Reasons: Practical and Adaptive', p.7:

because there is no possibility that the lesser reason for belief serves a concern which is not served better by the better reason there is no possibility of preferring to follow what one takes to be the lesser reason rather than the better one. The possibility of akrasia depends on the fact that belief that a practical reason is defeated by a better conflicting reason is consistent with belief that is serves a concern which the better reasons does not, and which can motivate one to follow it.

The thought here is that in practical cases, there is at least something to be said for acting on the lesser reason. If I can save either one life or two others, there's something appealing about the former option, even if the latter is better on balance. The former reason is outweighed, but not entirely defeated. Epistemic reasons, in contrast, seem to be defeated and not merely outweighed. As Raz puts it (p.6):

The weaker reasons are just less reliable guides to one and the same end [viz., truth]. There is no loss in dismissing a less reliable clue.

Or, in other words, practical reasons are pro tanto reasons, exerting some degree of force, whereas epistemic reasons are merely prima facie reasons -- liable on further examination to turn out to be no real reason at all.

But I wonder whether it is true that "there is no possibility that the lesser reason for belief serves a concern which is not served better by the better reason". Sure, epistemic reasons serve truth, but practical reasons may be thought to serve a monistic good (e.g. human welfare), and that doesn't prevent tradeoffs between different instances of this end. So let's consider a case where there are competing truths (analogous to the competing lives in our earlier example):

Suppose I am assessing two competing belief-sets or comprehensive theories/ideologies (T1 and T2) regarding some area of discourse D. Though both seem flawed, I am aware of no alternatives which are more coherent and plausible than these two, and can see no promising way to combine them. Further suppose that T1 seems on balance the better theory -- more likely to be true, or true in more of the sub-areas of D that matter. However, I nonetheless think that T2 is much more plausible regarding some specific sub-area Ds. I am so drawn to T2's account of Ds, that I end up accepting (believing?) T2 overall, even though I judge that I have more reason to believe T1.

Does that sound like a genuine case of epistemic akrasia?

Railton on Moral Political Demands

By altering social and political arrangements we can lessen the disruptiveness of moral demands on our lives, and in the long run achieve better results than freelance good-doing. A consequentialist theory is therefore likely to recommend that accepting negative responsibility [i.e. for all the harms we let happen] is more a matter of supporting certain social and political arrangements (or rearrangements) than of setting out individually to save the world. Moreover, it is clear that such social and political changes cannot be made unless the lives of individuals are psychologically supportable in the meanwhile, and this provides substantial reason for rejecting the notion that we should abandon all that matters to us as individuals and devote ourselves solely to net social welfare. Finally, in many cases what matters most is perceived rather than actual demandingness or disruptiveness, and this will be a relative matter, depending upon normal expectations. If certain social or political arrangements encourage higher contribution as a matter of course, individuals may not sense these moral demands as excessively intrusive.

-- Railton, 'Alienation' (in Facts, Values and Norms), p.172.

I couldn't agree more: cf. Ego-Depletion and Moral Demands and Value, Alienation and Choice.

Excellent Imbalance

As someone who is very good at some things, and extraordinarily incompetent at others, I sometimes wonder whether it's preferable to be more balanced and 'normal' all round. Here are three blog posts from others that touch on the issue...

(1) Alex Tabarrok writes:

All personality differences increase in developed economies. If Chris Rock were a Bangladeshi rice farmer he might still be funny but he'd also have to be a hard-working, diligent rice farmer and that would push his personality closer to the mean of all rice farmers. The division of labor both opens up the possibility of becoming who you truly are and it magnifies and extends who you can be.

Aside: can anyone clarify exactly what is meant by such talk of "who you truly are"? What does the authenticity of a life, or being "true to yourself", consist in? It's intuitively very important, but seems difficult to pin down. Perhaps the idea is that we have certain deep-rooted characteristics that will influence what sorts of situations we best flourish in. Being "true to yourself" is then a matter of recognizing these unalterable facts, rather than forcing yourself to live as a round peg in a square hole, or however the saying goes. Is that it? (Or is inauthentic flourishing possible? Perhaps the thought is that we ought to nourish our individual differences and eccentricities whenever possible, so that someone who failed to do so - and lived a happily normal life in consequence - thereby failed to fully develop their individuality, the quirky unique version of them hidden within? That seems much more controversial.)

(2) Ben Casnocha discusses Marcus Buckingham, "someone who believes that cultivating your strengths is a better approach than trying to fix your weaknesses." I take it this depends upon being able to find the right niche, i.e. where your particular strengths are very important, and your particular weaknesses are not. Easier to change your environment than yourself, and all that.

(3) For a contrasting view, Steve Gimbel proposes that human excellence is a sign of mental illness:

To be more than good, but truly great requires sacrifice that would make most normal (and I would argue, rational) people say, "No, thank you." I posit that "love of the game," whether the game is football, academic scholarship, attaining political power, seeking social change, or whatever else one might engage in, will only get you to really good. To become great requires more and that more requires the willingness to step away from that which would make your life, writ large, well lived.

I've always been more sympathetic to the 'perfectionist' claim that excellence has increasing marginal value. It's nice to go from mediocre to good, but a descriptively "equal" improvement (however one measures these things) from great to outstanding is of greater value. What matters most is the peak of attainment. So it can be worth 'specializing' as a person, sacrificing some areas of our lives in order to truly excel in others. We all recognize the remarkable value of the lives of Beethoven, Gandhi, etc., despite their manifest flaws. A world without such greatness, but a much higher average happiness, would be the poorer for it.

Is that such a crazy view?

Myopic Medical Ethics

Janet Stemwedel has an interesting post describing "considerations from medical ethics that might explain why a birth control pill for men has not happened yet." Apparently the standard understanding of medical 'ethics' requires that any health risks involved in a new treatment are outweighed by specifically health benefits for the treated individual. It's insane.

First, health is not all that matters in life. Indeed, the value of good health is entirely derivative of how it enables one to live a good/flourishing life more generally. So it's just weirdly myopic to look only at the health benefits of a treatment, and ignore everything else that matters (which is, after all, a whole damn lot). Reproduction, in particular, is a big -- life-changing -- deal. As Janet says, "men have an interest in controlling their fertility, too." Unwanted paternity could really mess up a guy's life! This fact ought to carry some ethical weight.

Second, the individual focus is jarringly odd, especially in the context of intimate relationships. We care about the health and welfare of those we love, as we do our own. So in weighing the costs and benefits of some action, I care about more than just the benefits to me. If some course of action would benefit my partner, that's clearly a reason in its favour, as I see things.

There are things we care about besides physical health, and people we care about besides ourselves. It is ridiculous and myopic for medical "ethicists" to dismiss these legitimate values and interests. In fact, I don't see the need for ethicists here at all. I certainly don't appreciate their "concern" to limit my options. Just provide all the relevant information, then let me make an informed decision for myself, thank you very much.

Philosophers' Carnival #60

The 60th Philosophers' Carnival is here, including several entries on philosophers who died last year.

N.B. We need more hosts to continue the carnival from February onwards. You can read about what's involved here. Email me if you have a philosophy blog of your own, and would like to give it a go. (Repeat hosts are welcome, and first-time hosts especially welcome.)

More philosophy in schools

This is encouraging:

It was once described as "a route of many roads leading from nowhere to nothing", yet the popularity of philosophy in Scottish schools has seen a dramatic upturn in the past five years. The number of pupils studying the subject of thought has risen by more than 41% [i.e. 300 students]...

"Interest in the subject in this country is certainly growing. Philosophy teaches a range of transferable skills in critical and analytical thinking and we are finding a great deal of enthusiasm in both teachers and students," [Dr. Lisa Jones] said.

Though I'm less encouraged by the reader responses:

You don't need Maths or Science to do it, there are no wrong answers so everyone passes, newspapers ask you for you opinion on something you know nothing about, and you get called an "expert". Two words - "Dumb" and "Dumber".

Waste of time - what use is this worthless subject in today's world?

The hard working taxpayer is footing the bill for this rubbish. We see the same at some universities eg media studies. Every brain dead student wants a qualification, even if the subject is useless.

Great thing this philosophy --no right or wrong answers so your [sic] always right by default!

*sigh* I really wish people would get over the silly misconception that philosophy is 'all just a matter of opinion'. It would also be nice if they recognized the educational value of reasoning skills (and that there are issues that warrant rational reflection -- yes, even outside of math and science).

I guess much depends on how it's taught, though. It isn't difficult to imagine a class labelled 'philosophy' that instead contains mere fluff (or, perhaps even more likely, mere history by rote). The article notes that "Because there [are] currently no secondary teaching certificates for philosophy as a specialist subject, some schools are struggling to cope with the new found demand." Might ignorant teachers do more harm than good? Would online training help?

The situation has prompted St Andrews University to offer a new online course for teachers involving elements of philosophy such as ethical issues, reasoning and knowledge, mind and reality.

What do you think is the best way to bring philosophy into schools? (Another possibility, which I'm especially interested in, is for volunteers from academia - grad students and such - to lead informal / extra-curricular tutorial sessions.)

P.S. UNESCO has released a book-length study: Philosophy: A School of Freedom. Teaching philosophy and learning to philosophize: Status and prospects [PDF]. The buzzwords in the description ("innovative publication" - *shudder*) put me off, but I imagine the contents could be of interest nonetheless. If anyone can bear to check, do let me know what you think of it.

Edge Question '08: Changing Minds

This year's question from Edge to various scientists is: 'What have you changed your mind about? Why?' I haven't read all the answers, but here are a few that stood out (some for being intrinsically interesting, and others which call out for philosophical attention).

1. Geoffrey Miller has become more optimistic about uncovering human nature, thanks to the realization that there are plenty of 'local experts' already in every walk of life:

Almost all of them know important things about human nature that behavioural scientists have not yet described, much less understood. Marine drill sergeants know a lot about aggression and dominance. Master chess players know a lot about if-then reasoning. Prostitutes know a lot about male sexual psychology. School teachers know a lot about child development. Trial lawyers know a lot about social influence. The dark continent of human nature is already richly populated with autochthonous tribes, but we scientists don't bother to talk to these experts.

2. Helena Cronin explains why she's come to see sex differences as better explained by differences in variance than in averages. (Now a familiar, if still underappreciated, theme.)

3. Jonathan Haidt defends sports and fraternities:

By the time I became a professor I had developed the contempt that I think is widespread in academe for any institution that brings young men together to do groupish things. Primitive tribalism, I thought. Initiation rites, alcohol, sports, sexism, and baseball caps turn decent boys into knuckleheads. I'd have gladly voted to ban fraternities, ROTC, and most sports teams from my university.

But not anymore. Three books convinced me that I had misunderstood such institutions because I had too individualistic a view of human nature.

Haidt sees modern Westerners as "bees without hives", lost in "a world so free that it [leaves] many of us gasping for connection, purpose, and meaning." But can't we find a way to forge meaningful connections without degrading into a knuckleheaded mob? Primitive tribalism might make us happy, or satisfy some urges of human nature, but I don't see that this makes it any less contemptible. (Not that I support "banning" anything, of course. If people want to degrade themselves, that's their prerogative. But I sure wouldn't want to encourage these cultural elements.)

4. Sherry Turkle has grown increasingly suspicious of society's love affair with technology:

A female graduate student came up to me after a lecture and told me that she would gladly trade in her boyfriend for a sophisticated humanoid robot as long as the robot could produce what she called "caring behavior." She told me that "she needed the feeling of civility in the house and I don't want to be alone." She said: "If the robot could provide a civil environment, I would be happy to help produce the illusion that there is somebody really with me." What she was looking for, she told me, was a "no-risk relationship" that would stave off loneliness; a responsive robot, even if it was just exhibiting scripted behavior, seemed better to her than an demanding boyfriend.

Isn't that what pets are for? What new concerns do robotic "friends" raise? (Is it just that the illusion of love may be more compelling, the pretense so satisfying a substitute that one is less motivated to pursue the real thing?)

5. Simon Baron-Cohen has a trite piece on "equality", or rather, the fact that people are not all the same. I can't discern any point to the article once we distinguish between qualitative (descriptive) vs. moral (normative) equality.

6. Finally, Thomas Metzinger offers his thoughts on moral philosophy. First, we have (what looks like) the gratuitous assumption of hedonism:

shouldn’t we have a new ethics of consciousness — one that does not ask what a good action is, but that goes directly to the heart of the matter, asks what we want to do with all this new knowledge and what the moral value of states of subjective experience is?

Why "states of subjective experience", rather than "states of affairs" more generally? (There's nothing new about getting to "the heart of the matter" in this way, of course; it's called 'value theory', and something consequentialists and others have been interested in for some time now!) Maybe Metzinger is making the more modest point that a growing ability to manipulate X-states provides us with reason to work out how to evaluate the various X-states. But that is not such a revolutionary suggestion.

And then the nihilism:

Here is where I have changed my mind. There are no moral facts. Moral sentences have no truth-values. The world itself is silent, it just doesn’t speak to us in normative affairs — nothing in the physical universe tells us what makes an action a good action or a specific brain-state a desirable one. Sure, we all would like to know what a good neurophenomenological configuration really is, and how we should optimize our conscious minds in the future. But it looks like, in a more rigorous and serious sense, there is just no ethical knowledge to be had. We are alone. And if that is true, all we have to go by are the contingent moral intuitions evolution has hard-wired into our emotional self-model.

This is a whopping non-sequitur. "We are alone", therefore no choices are more or less reasonable or worthy than any others. Huh. That's not any kind of logic I'm familiar with. (Though I suppose nihilists can't believe in good reasoning anyway, so maybe he's more consistent than I give him credit for.)

Seriously, though, why would you ever look to "the physical universe" for normative insight in the first place? Obviously that's not going to work. If there are moral truths at all, this will be due to the nature of rationality, not the nature of the world. And Metzinger hasn't offered any reasons at all for doubting that some ethical systems are appreciably more reasonable or coherent than others. He just asserts, without argument, that "all we have to go by are the contingent moral intuitions evolution has hard-wired into" us. Shoddy thinking.