Utilitarianism is sometimes criticized on the grounds that it may be self-effacing: supposing that things would be worse if belief in the theory were widespread (say because people would incompetently misapply it), the theory recommends against bringing about such widespread belief.
I find this objection puzzling. Surely any sane moral theory is at least possibly self-effacing. This is because any sane moral theory includes a disaster-avoidance override, if the stakes are high enough. So suppose an evil demon will impose eternal torture on us all, unless we forget the true moral theory (whatever it is) and come to believe in (say) Kantianism instead. The appropriate response is, "Yikes, let's learn us some moral falsehoods," right? It sure beats torture.
So the mere possibility of self-effacement is no objection. And utilitarianism isn't necessarily self-effacing. So the only objection left seems to be that it happens to be self-effacing in our actual circumstances. I'm not sure that's true -- but if it is, that's a problem with our circumstances, not with the theory. (Otherwise, this objection would seem to imply that it's a contingent, empirical matter which moral theory is true. That can't be right for reasons explained here.)
Or have I misunderstood the objection?