Lenin - What is to be done?

[For our final history essay, we had to analyze a particular historical document. It sounds boring, but choosing Lenin's What is to be done? allowed me to discuss some interesting issues relating to Lenin's corruption adaption of Marxism.]

Lenin – What is to be done?

Lenin’s political pamphlet What is to be done? was first published in Geneva in 1902. Russia was at this time floundering in social and political turmoil. Different factions offered a variety of solutions and conflicting ideologies in the hope of inspiring change. Lenin wrote What is to be done? for his fellow socialists, addressing what he saw as the crucial issues of the day. He attacked the ‘economist’ ideology for its departure from orthodox Marxism and worship of ‘spontaneity’. He also elaborated his plans for the organization of the revolutionary movement, justifying the undemocratic system of creating a small elite group of ‘professional revolutionaries’. The pamphlet has intrinsic historical importance simply for what it is and what it represents. Furthermore, the instrumental value of the document is evident from the consequences of its publication – both in the short and long term.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Russia was going through a period of rapid industrial growth, but the working conditions for the growing proletariat were appalling. They had inadequate accommodation, poor safety regulations, and worked long hours under harsh, punitive labour laws for meagre pay.[1] Trade unions and political parties were banned, and strikes were illegal. In this repressive environment, opposition to the Tsarist autocracy was widespread. There was no doubt in the minds of many Russians that change was necessary – the only question was regarding the nature and extent of the desired upheaval.

To address these issues, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) was (illegally) founded in 1898, while Lenin was exiled in Siberia. There were two distinct, and ultimately irreconcilable, factions within Social-Democratic political thought. Members of the more moderate faction were dubbed ‘economists’ for their emphasis on economic reform rather than political revolution. Their priorities are evident from the Workers’ Thought journal’s stated motto: “The struggle for economic betterment, the struggle with capital in the sphere of everyday vital interests, and strikes as the means of this struggle”.[2] Lenin led the revolutionaries (who ultimately formed the Bolshevik party), and vigorously attacked the ‘economist’ perspective. In 1900 he returned from exile and – in Europe – founded the underground newspaper Iskra, through which he intended to develop a strong organizational network and fight the ‘economist’ heresy.[3]

Against this background of conflicting Socialist ideologies, and continuing the work of Iskra, Lenin wrote What is to be done?. Directed at his fellow socialists, both intellectuals and the workers themselves, Lenin’s aim is succinctly assessed by Connor to be “to establish once and for all the primacy of the activist view”[4] within Social-Democratic political thought. His biographer, David Shrub, notes the simplicity of Lenin’s general writing style – sometimes harshly criticized by his contemporaries – yet observes that “If his writing was often repetitious and over-simplified…[his words nevertheless] carried power for the larger mass at which they were aimed”.[5]

A major focus of Lenin’s pamphlet was to attack and discredit the ‘economists’, as exemplified by Workers’ Thought. The journal effectively redefined socialism as a gradual, peaceful series of reforms: “We see it [socialism] within the workers’ movement itself…in the gradual transition of contemporary private production first to social control by the organized workers (trade unions)…and subsequently in the general representative institution of the country”.[6] Lenin, in What is to be done?, argues vigorously against this view. He observes that “Workers’ Thought believes merely that ‘politics always obediently follows economics’”,[7] and then points out that the economic struggle of workers is connected with bourgeois politics, not Social-Democratic politics. He writes that “trade unionism means precisely ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie”, thus Lenin sees the ideology of the ‘economists’ as “tantamount to the abandonment of Socialism”.[8]

The next major issue Lenin attacks the ‘economists’ for is their support of what he calls ‘spontaneity’ over ‘consciousness’, that is, the workers over the intellectuals. From the workers’ perspective, the intellectuals were viewed with some suspicion, but more than that, as being somewhat unnecessary. After all, “the one tested weapon the workers understood and the government respected was the strike”,[9] and this weapon succeeded whether it was legal or not. What the workers (initially) wanted was economic, rather than political, reform, so the intelligentsia and their plans for revolution were somewhat superfluous to this end. But the issue of spontaneity also went deeper than that, for the ‘economists’ insisted that the workers would eventually (and ‘spontaneously’) work out their own, independent, ideology. The very idea was anathema to Lenin, who reserved this role solely for the intellectual: “the workers could not yet possess Social-Democratic consciousness. This consciousness could only be brought to them from the outside”.[10]

The other main focus of the pamphlet regards organization of the revolutionaries. Lenin observed that “in an autocratic country, the more we narrow the membership…the more difficult will it be to ‘catch’ such an organization”.[11] For this reason, he proposed having a small, well trained group of ‘professional revolutionaries’ at the core of the organization. He extolled the virtues of ‘utter centralization’, and dismissed his democracy-advocating critics, pointing out that the openness required by democracy would be suicidal for a secret organization.[12] However, a series of arrests of Iskra agents in 1902 demonstrated the shortcomings of Lenin’s centralization. The police simply intercepted a few messages, went through a short period of observation and pursuit, and nearly the entire Iskra organization fell into their hands.[13]

The intrinsic value of What is to be done? should not be underestimated. Wildman described the pamphlet as Lenin’s “definitive pronouncement on all theoretical and practical questions”,[14] a rather grandiose statement, but perhaps not too far off the mark. It is valuable to historians today because it provides them with a direct indication of Lenin’s political thought – both what he thought were the crucial issues for the socialist movement to face in 1902, and his proposed solutions – and thus it is a key document for understanding the underlying ideologies of the later Soviet Union, and its huge influence on global history in the twentieth century.

From a theoretical perspective, the pamphlet signifies a crucial turning point in history, as it marks “the beginning of that distinct variant of Marxism known as Leninism”.[15] According to Marx, socialist revolutions would only occur in advanced societies (such as Britain) which had passed through a completely capitalist phase. By asserting the need for revolutionary action in tsarist Russia, Lenin – influenced by the Russian revolutionary tradition[16] – began to adapt Marxism into an ideology for underdeveloped areas. This idea was further developed in his 1905 pamphlet Two Tactics of Social Democracy, where Lenin introduced the concept of the ‘weak bourgeoisie’, incapable of completing their bourgeois revolution without proletariat help, to further justify the idea of a socialist revolution even in countries which had not yet gone through a capitalist phase.[17]

The publication and spread of What is to be done? had a direct influence on Russian history. The most immediate result of the pamphlet was to accelerate Lenin’s rise to dominance within the RSDLP.[18] As one Iskra agent put it: “Iskra prevailed in… centres of the revolutionary movement only because the Iskra agents had in their hands What is to be done?”.[19] The work provided Lenin’s partisans with the arguments and slogans they then used against their ‘economist’ opponents in political debates. It also gained Lenin many new supporters, attracted either by its organizational ideas or the emphasis it placed on political struggle.[20] The predominant cause of the 1903 split of the RSDLP into separate Bolshevik and Menshevik parties, was, according to Wood, “Lenin’s uncompromising stand on party organization, discipline and leadership outlined in What is to be done?”.[21]

What is to be done? has not only had a huge impact on world history through its influence in forming the Bolshevik party and thus the Soviet Union, but also through the continuing influence it has had on Communist leaders. Lenin’s strategic principle regarding the “necessity of utilising in the political struggle all classes, strata or groups…opposed to the enemy one is fighting”, is one which has since been generally applied by Communists.[22] Perhaps even more significant is his main tactical precept – “in order to win the co-operation of an individual or a social group one must appear as the champion of the cause which this person or group holds to be of paramount importance”[23] – which was employed by Stalin in the wake of the Second World War. By painting himself as a fighter against fascism, Stalin won the support of the West as he brought Eastern Europe under Soviet control. Similar tactics were used by Lenin himself when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917. He won the support of the Socialist Revolutionaries by adopting their fundamental cause of land redistribution, and of the Anarchists through the slogan ‘All power to the Soviets’, which they assumed meant an end to the power of the central government.[24]

As the fundamental document of Leninism, What is to be done? is effectively the cornerstone of the Communist ideology which shaped much of twentieth century history. In it Lenin describes the basic divisions which existed within the RSDLP in 1902, and led – in part because of this very document – to the fragmentation of the party the next year. The pamphlet has theoretical importance because it marks the beginning of Lenin’s adaptation of Marxism for underdeveloped Russia. Its practical importance is perhaps even more significant. In the short term, it helped Lenin’s Iskra faction rise to dominance within Russian Social-Democrat political thought. The long-term effect of the pamphlet can be seen through the implementation of the strategic principles it espouses – first by Lenin himself in the Russian Revolution of 1917, and subsequently in the foreign policy his Communist successors. At a time when Russians were asking crucial social and political questions, Lenin provided answers which would change the world forever.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrea, A. & Overfield, J., The Human Record: sources of global history (4^th ed.), (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 2001)

Connor, J., Lenin on politics and revolution, (Indianapolis : Pegasus, 1968)

Lenin, V. (trans. & ed. by Utechin, S), What is to be done?, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1963)

Shrub, D., Lenin: a biography, (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1966)

Wildman, A., The Making of a Workers’ Revolution, (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1967)

Wood, A., The Origins of the Russian Revolution (2^nd ed.), (London : Routledge, 1993)

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[1] A. Wood, The Origins of the Russian Revolution, (London : Routledge, 1993), p.25.

[2] A. Wildman, The Making of a Workers’ Revolution, (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1967), p.123.

[3] Wood, p.28.

[4] J. Connor, Lenin on politics and revolution, (Indianapolis : Pegasus, 1968), p.xix.

[5] D. Shrub, Lenin: a biography, (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1966), pp.74-75.

[6] Wildman, p.146.

[7] V. Lenin (trans. & ed. by Utechin, S), What is to be done?, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1963), p.73. Note that Lenin was quoting from the first edition of Workers’ Thought.

[8] Ibid., pp.71,72.

[9] Wildman, p.138.

[10] Lenin, pp.62-63.

[11] Ibid., p.144.

[12] Ibid., pp.158-160.

[13] Wildman, p.236.

[14] Ibid., p.234.

[15] A. Andrea & J. Overfield, The Human Record: sources of global history, (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 2001), p.390.

[16] See S. Utechin, ‘Introduction’ in Lenin, V. (trans. & ed. by Utechin, S), What is to be done?, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1963), p.32.

[17] Connor, pp. xxi, xxii.

[18] Utechin, p.33.

[19] Wildman, p.235.

[20] Utechin, p.33, provides several examples of this, such as the Southern Worker group, which “opposed Lenin’s organizational views, [but] closely co-operated with Iskra on account of its strongly political orientation”.

[21] Wood, p.28.

[22] Utechin, p.18. Note that this quote, and the subsequent one, are Utechin’s summaries of Lenin’s strategic and tactical principles, not direct quotes of Lenin himself.

[23] Ibid., p.18.

[24] Ibid., pp.34-5.

China vs. Japan

[Another first-year history essay! I really like this one actually.]

Compare and contrast the Chinese and Japanese response to the West between about 1800 and 1920.

Despite some similarities between the early responses of China and Japan to the West, they later diverged; which greatly influenced the modernizing development of each country. Both Asian nations rejected the West and went through a period of self-imposed isolation, but the threat posed by Western imperialism in the nineteenth century forced them – though in varying degrees – to reconsider. By the end of that century, both states had introduced ‘westernising’ reforms – but of a significantly distinct nature. China’s aim was to use modern means to preserve their traditional Confucian culture. Japan, in contrast, underwent a remarkable social upheaval as it wholeheartedly pursued modernization. Consequentially, Japan had become a recognised world power by 1920, whereas China was at the brink of anarchy.

China and Japan followed a similar pattern of relations with the West between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, but with the former usually responding more slowly and less strongly. Both nations sought western cannon and firearms: the Japanese in the late sixteenth century, and the Chinese in the early seventeenth.[1] Both initially welcomed Jesuit missionaries, but later exiled them (due to the threat posed by their growing influence) from Japan in 1612,[2] and China in 1742.[3] Both withdrew into isolationism – restricting foreign trade to a single port, and banning their citizens from travelling overseas – Japan in the mid-seventeenth century, and China in the mid-eighteenth[4]. In each case, the Chinese response was not only many decades later, it also tended to be less vigorous. They were less interested in seeking foreign weaponry, they were less fearful of Jesuit influence, and the extent of their isolationism was not nearly as extreme as Japan’s. Some historians have pointed to the Japanese Bushido warrior code and more militaristic society as enabling them to more realistically assess the Western military threat.[5] This effect was complemented by the arrogance of traditional China, whose enduring civilization had never faced a serious threat before[6] – and the early years of contact would have merely reinforced their sense of superiority; for as Strayer remarks, “China was sufficiently strong and the Europeans sufficiently weak to ensure that China dictated the terms of the relationship”.[7]

Everything changed in the mid-nineteenth century. The benefits of industrialization led to such a degree of Western military ascendency that Asia could be (and was) forced out of its isolationist policies, and opened for western trade and exploitation. During this crucial period of history, the Chinese continued to underestimate the challenge posed by the West, and so met it with aggression. They were severely beaten by the British in the Opium War (1839-42), and made to sign a series of humiliating ‘unequal treaties’. Renewed hostilities broke out against Britain and France between 1856-60, which further weakened China.[8] The Boxer Rebellion (1899-1900) was a desperate attempt to oppose imperialism and drive out the foreigners, but it was eventually crushed by a multi-national force, and China made to pay even more indemnities.[9]

Japan’s isolation ended in 1853 when U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Edo (Tokyo) Bay. However, the Japanese had apparently learnt from the mistakes of the Chinese, and did not directly oppose the West. Instead, they adopted a policy of procrastination. They thereby succeeded in postponing the first of their own set of ‘unequal treaties’ until 1858, and impeded their implementation enough to provoke an Allied naval bombardment of Osaka in 1865.[10] With that minor exception, Japan’s policy successfully avoided the debilitating conflicts with the West that so plagued China throughout the nineteenth century. But as Strayer[11] argues, this was largely due to the external factor of the West’s greater interest in China, which led to greater exploitation. Japan was given more manoeuvring room, allowing them to belatedly acquiesce to the West’s demands – an option which would not have been viable for China.

In some respects, the response of the Chinese populace to the West was more significant than that of the country’s Manchu elite (who appeared to be more concerned for the welfare of their dynasty than for the country as a whole)[12] – the most noteworthy example being the Taiping Revolution (1850-65). Led by Hong Xiuquan (a mystic who was inspired by a Christian missionary), this revolutionary movement gathered a following of millions of Chinese peasants, and challenged the entire Confucian system.[13] The revolutionaries were open to western ideas, and planned to industrialize China (just thirty years after the first railroads were constructed in Britain), liberate women, and introduce social reforms akin to communism.[14] However, the Taiping Revolution threatened Western interests because of its nationalistic ambitions,[15] so the Great Powers supported the Qing dynasty with loans, arms, and mercenary soldiers. By 1865, the last of the revolutionaries were crushed by gentry-led armies, but the consequences of this failed revolution – an estimated 20-30 million casualties, and the Qing court’s loss of power to regional gentry leaders[16] – would haunt China for decades to come.

The Japanese had a revolution too, and theirs was successful. Samurai reformers in 1868 overthrew the Tokugawa in the name of the Meiji emperor.[17] They then began a series of drastic reforms designed to modernize Japanese society, by selectively adopting the features of western civilization that “enhanced national power”.[18] As their foreign minister declared in 1887, “What we must do, is to transform our empire and our people, make the empire like the countries of Europe and our people like the peoples of Europe”.[19] Feudalism was abolished in 1871, and two years later military reforms created a peasant conscript army replacing the samurai as a military class.[20] The State took over Japanese industries and modernized them. It established new factories, mines, railroads, banking and postal systems.[21] Countless Western books were imported and translated; technicians and experts were brought to Japan[22] – yet Fox notes that “By 1883 most of the work begun by British officers, engineers and doctors… was in the hands of the Japanese”.[23]

In contrast, the Chinese elite had effectively ignored the problem posed by Western expansionism up until 1858, but their defeat in the Second Opium War forced them to take some steps to strengthen their regime. Thus began a series of rather feeble reforms, called the ‘Self-Strengthening Movement’ (1860-95), which sought “the preservation of Chinese civilization by grafting on Western mechanisms”.[24] Although these reforms were state-subsidised (as in Japan), they tended to be agricultural in focus – thus reinforcing the importance of the gentry class. This was in stark contrast to the abolition of their Japanese equivalents, the Samurai. Some new industries were developed (such as steel works) but these remained largely dependent on foreigners for machinery, materials and expertise.[25] These superficial reforms were doomed to failure from the start, because their aim was not really reformation at all, but rather consolidation. The gentry leaders “had no interest in creating a modern industrial society”,[26] hence China’s utter failure to achieve that end through these ‘reforms’.

The failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement was highlighted by the Chinese defeats of 1885 (to France) and 1895 (to Japan).[27] The Qing dynasty was finally overthrown in 1911, and replaced with an ineffectual republic. This was effectively an autocracy under Yuan Shih-k’ai, which fell into anarchy after his death in 1916, as rival warlords divided the country up amongst themselves.[28] The 1911 revolution also spelled the end for Confucianism, as the “New Culture” movement embraced the West and sought a complete revamp of Chinese society.[29] This attitude soon soured however – leading to a boycott of Western products and democratic ideas – due to the treatment of China by the Western powers after WWI.[30] By 1920, China was adrift; its traditional political and social systems cast away, and no viable alternatives had yet been found to replace them.

Meanwhile, Japan was well on its way to becoming a respected world power – especially after its 1889 constitution provided the oligarchic regime with the legitimacy of a “parliamentary façade”.[31] During the years of the Meiji reforms, Japan had recognised its geographic parallels to Britain, and so set about developing a strong navy and becoming “the Britain of the East”[32] – with remarkable success. Military victories over China in 1895 and Russia in 1905 forced the West to take the Japanese seriously. By 1899, Japan had abolished extraterritoriality (so held legal jurisdiction over all foreign visitors), and by 1911, the unequal treaties were gone for good.[33] Japan emerged from WWI as a major power with new (Chinese) territories and a permanent seat on the council of the League of Nations.[34]

The pattern for China and Japan’s comparative responses to the West between 1800-1920 was set in the centuries preceding this period. Japan recognised the threat being posed, and so responded quickly and decisively. But China, in its arrogance – and self-interested leadership – tended to respond inappropriately, or be overly complacent. When the need for reform could no longer be denied, Japan accepted the need to modernize whole-heartedly; whereas China tried to preserve its traditional Confucian culture and social structure. China met the challenge of the West by resisting the West, but to no avail. Japan, in contrast, used the West – its experts, technology, science and institutions. By 1920, the remarkable rise of Japan was as undeniable as the tragic fall of China.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fox, G., Britain and Japan 1858-1883 (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1969)

Stavrianos, L., A Global History: From Prehistory to the Present, 6^th ed. (Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall, 1995)

Storry, R., Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943 (London : Macmillan, 1979)

Strayer, R., The Making of the Modern World, 2^nd ed. (New York : St Martin’s Press, 1995)

Teng, S., China’s Response to the West (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1954)

Woodruff, W., A Concise History of the Modern World, 1500 to the present, 2^nd ed. (New York : St Martin’s Press, 1998)

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[1] S. Teng, China’s Response to the West (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1954), p.13.

[2] W. Woodruff, A Concise History of the Modern World, 1500 to the present, 2^nd ed. (New York : St Martin’s Press, 1998), p.22.

[3] L. Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the Present, 6^th ed. (Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall, 1995), p.312.

[4] R. Strayer, The Making of the Modern World, 2^nd ed. (New York : St Martin’s Press, 1995), pp.345,396, see also Woodruff, pp.18-20.

[5] Woodruff, p.21. Note that Bushido placed warrior-rulers at the top of the social hierarchy, whereas Chinese Confucianism regarded warriors as being at the bottom.

[6] Strayer, p.328.

[7] Ibid., p.344.

[8] Stavrianos, pp.517-8.

[9] Ibid., p.522.

[10] Woodruff, p.85. Note that this bombardment merely weakened the Tokugawa regime, so helped the later Meiji revolution.

[11] Strayer, p.399.

[12] Teng, p.37, notes that as a general rule, the Manchu in China tended to advocate a policy of ‘appeasement’, passively accepting the West’s intrusions, then otherwise ignoring it, whereas Chinese nationalists (such as Lin Tse-Hyu) proposed more drastic reforms designed to actually meet the problem.

[13] Strayer, pp.351-2.

[14] Ibid., pp.352-3. The threat posed by their social reforms is probably the major reason why the gentry broke with tradition and supported the Qing dynasty rather than going along with the peasants’ rebellion.

[15] They planned to strengthen China by banning opium and opposing further foreign trading ports; see Stavrianos, p.519.

[16] Strayer, p.354.

[17] Ibid., p.398.

[18] Stavrianos, p.526. It is important to realise that they did not indiscriminately adopt everything Western – democracy and Christianity (instead Shinto was the state religion) are two major examples of this.

[19] R. Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943 (London : Macmillan, 1979), p.17.

[20] Woodruff, p.86.

[21] Strayer, p.400.

[22] Woodruff, p.86.

[23] G. Fox, Britain and Japan 1858-1883 (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1969), p.533.

[24] Stavrianos, p.520.

[25] Strayer, p.355.

[26] Ibid., p.355.

[27] Ibid., p.355.

[28] Stavrianos, p.524.

[29] Strayer, p.361.

[30] Ibid., p.362, see also Woodruff, p.183; the Chinese province of Shantung was given to Japan.

[31] Stavrianos, p.527.

[32] Fox, p.532.

[33] Stavrianos, p.527, and Strayer, p.402.

[34] Woodruff, p.183.

A Taxonomy of Reasons

First let's distinguish motivating and normative reasons. Someone's m-reason for acting is simply whatever motivated them to act. These explain actions. I take it they consist of psychological states, or more precisely, belief-desire pairings. But I'm more interested in normative reasons, i.e. things which count in favour of an action. These justify actions. (For the moment I'll put aside the question of what these consist of.)

We might next distinguish between objective and subjective normative reasons, where o-reasons appeal to facts, whereas s-reasons appeal to beliefs. An example will make this clearer. Imagine an unwilling drug addict, who wishes he could be free of his cravings. Suppose he comes across a needle which he believes contains the drug, but in fact it contains a special serum which will cure his addiction. The addict's cravings become overwhelming, and in a moment of weakness he injects himself. We can now say:

• His m-reason for acting was that he craved the drug and believed that the needle contained the drug.


• He had s-reason to act differently and not inject himself.


• He had o-reason to do as he did and inject himself, though he was unaware of it and thus not acting on this reason.

This is a good start, but we need to clarify the notion of an s-reason, and how it relates to o-reasons (which from now on I'll simply refer to as "reasons", unprefixed). We might then say that an s-reason is simply the belief that a reason obtains. We have subjective reason to do whatever we think we have (objective) reason to do. That is, we have s-reason to perform act A iff we believe that P, and we believe that P constitutes a reason for us to A.

But this raises some new possibilities. What if we have only one of the above two beliefs? Suppose that S, a libertarian opposed to "positive rights", sees a child drowning. S does not believe that she has any reason to intervene and jump in the pool to save the child. But she does believe the child is drowning -- a fact which, though she refuses to recognize it, is a reason for S to jump in the pool. Should we say that S has subjective reason to jump in the pool? Not according to the above account. But there is a sense in which she does. Let us call this a "partial reason", or p-reason, defined as the belief that P, where the truth of P would, in fact, constitute a reason. (Note that p- and s-reasons will also come apart in cases where an agent falsely believes that something constitutes a reason. Such a case is exactly opposite to the above example, as she will have s-reason but not p-reason to act.)

Lastly, we might consider a case where we believe that P constitutes reason to A, and P is true (though we may not realize this). We might call this a "quasi-subjective reason", or q-reason, to A. So if, say, an evangelical thinks he has reason to convert people to Christianity, and - unbeknownst to him - the best way to achieve this end would be to nuke Mecca, then we say he has q-reason to nuke Mecca. Note that it's not really an objective reason (assuming that evangelism is ungrounded), and it's not a subjective reason either, since he doesn't realize that nuclear war would achieve his unsavoury ends. It's a variety of reason in a class of its own: quasi-subjectivity.

To summarize, the 'objectivity-level' of normative reasons depends on the status of two factors:
(1) a proposition P
and
(2) P's constituting a reason.

Normative reasons (of various types) are yielded when each is either true or believed. Objective reasons are when both factors are true. Subjective reasons are when both are believed. Then we have the two 'hybrid' varieties of reasons. 'Partial' reasons are when (1) is believed and (2) is true; 'Quasi-subjective' reasons are when (1) is true and (2) is believed.

These types of reasons may fully or partially coincide. If each of (1) and (2) are both believed and true, then all four types of reasons will result! But we can also have four varieties of partial coincidation, i.e. reasons that are {either objective or subjective} and {either partial or quasi-subjective}. That is, one factor will be both believed and true, and the other factor will be either believed or true, but not both.

I think that's a full account of the various possible 'objectivity levels' of reasons. I'm not yet sure whether such an analysis actually serves any useful purpose, but it's kind of cool to have ready, just in case ;)

So we've distinguished motivational from normative reasons, and within normative reasons we've identified some different levels of objectivity. The last thing we need to do is distinguish between different normative frameworks. We can have prudential reasons, moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and so forth.

Suppose that General Jim has command over some nuclear warheads. He believes that if he nukes the Middle East then this will kill only bad people, and end terrorism forever, but cause him to face severe punishment. He thus has subjective moral reason to send the nukes, but subjective prudential reasons not to. Further suppose that he is mistaken on both counts. Sending the nukes would screw up the world, but Bush would give him an official pardon and blame it on "a few bad apples" further down the ranks somewhere, whereas Jim himself would get promoted and glorified. Thus Jim has (objective) prudential reason to send the nukes, but (objective) moral reason not to.

I hope that's all reasonably clear. Now, the really tricky questions are: what constitutes an objective reason? and which frameworks are genuinely reason-giving? This post is too long already, so I'll have to discuss that another day.

European Backwardness c.1500

[Here's the first university essay I ever wrote. It was for my Global History paper. Good fun. Not at all related to philosophy -- though I did manage to sneak in a dig at religion later in the essay -- but I've been a bit light on the "et cetera" recently anyway ;).]

European civilisations were still in their infancy at the end of the fifteenth century. This is perhaps the predominant underlying cause of the continent’s relative ‘backwardness’ around this time. Such backwardness was manifested in a wide range of features – political, cultural, economic and even technological – for which Europe could be compared (with unflattering results) to the more advanced civilisations of the East. Yet with the aid of hindsight, one can begin to appreciate that many of the region’s apparently ‘backward’ features, are precisely what enabled an infantile Europe to grow into the dynamic world power which dominated later centuries.

The ancient ‘western’ civilisations of the Greeks and Romans were Mediterranean rather than European empires. The development of civil society in northern Europe is hence a relatively recent phenomena – due in part to favourable climatic changes which occurred circa 1000 CE. Warmer temperatures thawed out the far north of Europe, making new areas accessible for agricultural development,[1] thus allowing new societies to grow there.

Europe’s peripheral position (at the far western edge of the Eurasian landmass) caused it to be cut off from the rest of civilisation for a large portion of its developmental years. During its early years, this isolated region was (justifiably) considered to be little more than “a frontier in a forest”.[2] Medieval Europe had only a cursory knowledge of the world beyond its borders, with popular tales (persisting into the fifteenth century) telling of “dog-headed men” inhabiting the East.[3] It wasn’t until the Crusades of the early second millennium that Europe was introduced to the ‘civilisation’ of the Eastern-dominated world system.[4]

As a newcomer to the global trade network, Europe initially met with limited commercial success. Geographical impediments restricted access to new markets, with mountain ranges barring direct access to the East.[5] The Islamic world was another physical obstacle, as it impeded access not only to the East, but also to the gold-rich West African markets.[6] European merchants were forced to work through Arab intermediaries, who naturally took their own share of the profits.

Compounding this problem was the limited desirability of Western merchandise. Europe’s basic trade goods (mostly agricultural produce such as grain and wool) were unappealing to many other civilisations (China especially).[7] This was evident in the early sixteenth century, when Portugal resorted to military (naval) strength in order to force Asian powers to trade with her.[8] Europe’s lack of desirable exports led to a pronounced trade imbalance with imported Eastern goods. This deficit was largely paid off in silver and gold,[9] which caused Europe to suffer from a “gold famine”.[10] It is not surprising that Europe began to see itself as the “poor neighbour” of Africa and Asia.[11] When one considers the oriental luxuries (e.g. silk, spices and tapestries) being imported from abroad, it becomes difficult not to think of Europe as being comparatively poor and primitive.

Another aspect of the world system from which Europe took more than it contributed, is that of technology. What Francis Bacon (an English philosopher of the seventeenth century) identified as man’s three greatest inventions – “printing, gunpowder, and the magnet”[12] – all derived from China. Arnold reluctantly admits: “In 1400 its maritime technology was in many respects Europe’s equal”[13] – a rather ungracious concession when one considers the evidence of Chinese superiority in this regard. Such important techniques as watertight bulkheads, stern-post rudders and navigational aids (the compass, in particular) all made their way to Europe from China.[14] Certainly, Woodruff is in no doubt that fifteenth century China possessed “the world’s greatest sea-going fleet”.[15]

While Europe may not have been quite as technologically advanced as China at this time, to call her ‘backward’ would perhaps be overly harsh. What the Europeans truly excelled at was adapting and improving others’ technology. It becomes evident that in many cases the Europeans put Chinese technology to better use than the Chinese did![16] Perhaps the best example of this is Gutenburg’s printing press. By 1500 there were 1700 of the machines facilitating mass communication in 300 European towns. The less flexible Chinese (block printing) technique would have run into great difficulties had they attempted such mass production of books.[17]

It is also worth noting Europe’s own ‘technological tradition’. The horse-collar, horseshoe, waterwheel and crossbow were all developed during its so-called ‘Dark Ages’.[18] Europeans were particularly adept at manipulating mechanical technology, and tapping non-animal sources of energy – England had 5624 watermills back in 1086 CE.[19] Some Historians[20] have suggested that the region’s labour shortages may encouraged these labour-saving techniques. However, one should not assume Europe’s mechanical superiority or uniqueness in this regard; fourteenth century China used a water-powered hemp-spinning machine “as advanced as anything in Europe until about 1700”.[21]

Another common mistake would be to overestimate Europe’s military capabilities at this time. Western Europeans may have made the “best known and most advanced gunpowder weapons”,[22] but this by no means ensured success. Fifteenth century Portuguese invasions of West Africa are a case in point – the outnumbered Europeans were driven back by Africans wielding spears or bows and arrows.[23] Furthermore, Europeans were not the only people with advanced gunpowder weaponry. It was Turkish artillery which demolished the walls of Constantinople in 1453, bringing the Byzantine empire to its knees.[24] Each of the three great Islamic empires (Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal) could muster armies of vastly greater size than Europe’s, and appeared to be equally well armed.[25] Indeed, sixteenth century Mughal India could raise an army of a million men.[26]

The relative ease with which the European powers conquered the Americas was not so much due to any military superiority, but rather the devastating effect of Old World diseases (against which the previously isolated Native Americans had developed no immunity). Within fifty years of the Spaniards’ arrival, Mexico’s population fell by ninety percent.[27] The impact of disease on warfare can be seen by reconsidering the Portuguese-African invasion. In this case it was the Europeans who suffered from alien pathogens (such tropical diseases as malaria and yellow fever proved especially troublesome)[28], and this susceptibility to illness likely contributed to their defeat.

However, European nations probably spent as much time fighting amongst themselves as against distant enemies. The region’s extremely fragmented political scene must have struck its Eastern contemporaries as being a sign of severe barbarism and backwardness. Europe contained some five hundred independent political units circa 1500.[29] This is in distinct contrast with China, who could boast the world’s most advanced and stable government. Indeed, all other major civilisations at this time were empires, based around powerful, centralised governments. Europe was alone in its apparently disorganised distress.

It is, however, precisely this political fragmentation which set Europe apart from the rest of the world. That which began as backwardness later contributed to a matured Europe’s global domination. The many states were in perpetual competition with one another, a system which provided – as Jones put it – “an insurance against […] stagnation”.[30] No single man or nation had the power to impose disastrous policies upon the rest of Europe. This balance of power protected Europe from the abuses of power which could happen elsewhere – such as the Chinese emperor who called a halt to all large-scale maritime voyages after 1430.[31]

The all-encompassing umbrella of ‘Christendom’ was perhaps the single unifying element of European culture. But even this was not to last. Martin Luther, a German priest, set the Protestant Reformation in motion when he publicly protested against the Catholic church in 1517.[32] This schism in the church was pounced upon by opportunistic rulers, and caused many long and bitter religious wars to shake Europe.[33] Despite its initial religious intensity, the Reformation eventually spelled the end of Christian dominance in the everyday lives of Europeans. Through its challenge to traditional papal authority and emphasis on religious individualism, the Reformation effectively cleared the way for secularism[34] – a concept which would radically change the future.

The implication of this is that the dominance of the Catholic church in pre-Reformation Europe was a feature of backwardness. Some historians[35] have pointed to elements of Christianity (its progressive view of time, affirmation of the material world, dualism and justification of human domination over nature) which set it apart from other religions as encouraging scientific development. However, it wasn’t until after the Reformation that great scientific progress was made. Furthermore, the (Christian) Byzantine empire had none of the dynamism or originality of Western Europe. Hence the growing secularism of Western society in later years would seem the better explanation for its progress. Such an hypothesis is consistent with China’s technological achievements in earlier centuries. It was, after all, a secular society; Confucianism being the dominant religion, which Woodruff describes as “not a religion so much as a system of order”.[36]

At the turn of the sixteenth century, a new sort of society was developing at the north-western tip of Eurasia. Inquisitive and outward-looking, it hungered for the knowledge and wealth it saw beyond its own borders. Naturally, this new European civilisation appeared in many respects to be ‘backward’ when compared to an older, wiser China. But with the energy and dynamism of youth, this new culture learned from – and in some cases, surpassed – its elders. Its advantage lay in being not so bound by the past or tradition, not so scared of change. European civilisation followed a unique developmental path, with unique results.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agius, D. and Hitchcock, R. The Arab Influence in Medieval Europe, Berkshire 1997.

Andrea, A. and Overfield, J. The Human Record: sources of global history, Boston 2001.

Arnold, D. The Age of Discovery, 1400-1600, London 1983.

DeVries, K. Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500, Aldershot 2002.

Hunt, E. and Murray, J. A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550, Cambridge 1999.

Jones, E. The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge 1987.

Peers, D. Warfare and Empires: contact and conflict between European and non-European military and maritime forces and cultures, Aldershot 1997.

Stavrianos, L. A Global History: From Prehistory to the Present, Englewood Cliffs 1988.

Strayer, R. The Making of the Modern World, New York 1995.

Wilson, N. World Eras: the European Renaissance and Reformation, 1350-1600, Detroit 2001.

Woodruff, W. A Concise History of the Modern World, 1500 to the present, New York 1998.

---

[1] R. Strayer, The Making of the Modern World, New York 1995, p.22.

[2] E. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge 1987, p.161.

[3] D. Arnold, The Age of Discovery, 1400-1600, London 1983, p.3.

[4] D. Abulafia, ‘The Role of Trade in Muslim-Christian Contact during the Middle Ages’ in The Arab Influence in Medieval Europe, ed. D. Agius and R. Hitchcock, Berkshire 1997, p.5.

[5] N. Wilson (ed), World Eras: the European Renaissance and Reformation, 1350-1600, Detroit 2001, p.41.

[6] Abulafia, p.19.

[7] W. Woodruff, A Concise History of the Modern World, 1500 to the present, New York 1998, p.18. Note however, that Abulafia (p.48) refutes this view, citing high demand for Western arms and timber by Middle Eastern Muslims.

[8] Arnold, p.30.

[9] E. Hunt and J. Murray, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550, Cambridge 1999, p.59.

[10] Arnold, p.9. also Strayer, p.112.

[11] Arnold, p.7.

[12] L. Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the Present, Englewood Cliffs 1988, p.179.

[13] Arnold, p.4.

[14] Woodruff, p.16.

[15] Ibid., p.16.

[16] Stavrianos, p.257.

[17] Jones, pp.61-62.

[18] Ibid., p.58.

[19] Strayer, p.29.

[20] Ibid., p.30.

[21] Jones, p.202.

[22] K. DeVries, Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500, Aldershot 2002, p.346.

[23] Arnold, p.25.

[24] DeVries, pp.344-5.

[25] D. Peers, Warfare and Empires: contact and conflict between European and non-European military and maritime forces and cultures, Aldershot 1997, p.xviii.

[26] Stavrianos, p.335.

[27] A. Andrea and J. Overfield, The Human Record: sources of global history, Boston 2001, p.46.

[28] Arnold, p.25.

[29] Jones, p.106.

[30] Ibid., p.119.

[31] Strayer, p.32.

[32] Strayer, pp.35-36.

[33] Woodruff, p.28.

[34] Strayer, p.37.

[35] Ibid., pp.30-31.

[36] Woodruff, p.15.

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