The concerns about subjective truths expressed in my previous post lead naturally to Wittgenstein's 'Private Languages' argument (or at least that version of it which is discussed in Everitt & Fisher's "Modern Epistemology" textbook).
I've tried to formalise the argument as follows:
1) In any genuine language, its words must have genuine meanings.
2) The meaning of a word or sentence is determined by the use which is made of it.
3) Therefore, in any genuine language, there must be a distinction between the correct and incorrect uses of that language. (Else the language would be meaningless)
But suppose there was a private language, one which no-one else could ever possibly understand. Then:
4) Necessarily, the speaker of a private language would be the only person capable of telling the correct from incorrect use.
5) Yet, when evaluating a sentence of the private language, this person would (necessarily) be unable to distinguish between "it seems to me to be so, but really it isn't", and, on the other hand, "it really is so".
6) Hence, necessarily, no-one would be able to distinguish between the correct and incorrect uses of a private language. (From 4 & 5)
7) If it is necessarily impossible for anyone to distinguish between some particular things, then there is no distinction to be made. [premise]
8) Hence, there would be no distinction between the correct and incorrect uses of a private language. (From 6 & 7)
9) Therefore, there could be no genuine private language. (From 3 & 8)
Now, talk about sensations seems to be an attempt at a private language. Your conscious experiences are genuinely private in the sense that nobody else could possibly have access to them. But then, the above argument suggests that you cannot meaningfully refer to those conscious experiences. We can say that 'red' refers to the colour of blood, roses etc, rather than our experience of the colour. But how about the word 'sensation' itself (as used in these contexts)? Is there any way we can save it from pure subjectivity? If not, does that mean that the word 'sensation' is actually meaningless?
That does seem an odd conclusion, since we surely all have at least a rough idea of what 'sensation' means. Presumably we never could have learnt this if it were a truly 'private' word. So it must have some more objective, public meaning. I just can't think what. (Any ideas?)
(Though I'm not entirely certain of premise 2. Maybe we could deny that, to get out of this mess? Dunno. Hopefully I'll be able to add to this after taking Semantics next semester!)
Monday, June 14, 2004
Sensations, Beliefs, & Subjectivity
In my dreams & sensations post, I raised the question of whether sensations were purely subjective things - a question I'd like to pursue further.
Is it possible to have a sensation, yet not be aware of it? I would think not - surely if you're unaware of it, then it's not conscious, and therefore not what I understand 'sensation' to mean. How about the reverse? Could you falsely believe you're experiencing a sensation, when in fact you are not? Again, this seems problematic, unless the word 'sensation' is being used to refer to something beyond subjective conscious experiences, but if so, it's hard to imagine what that something is supposed to be. I'll come back to this in a moment.
How about beliefs? I think I'd take a more objective approach to them. Of course we have a plethora of subconscious beliefs beyond those of which we're aware of at any particular moment. You believe that your 27th paternal great-great-...-grandfather is no longer alive, though you've probably never consciously considered that exact proposition before. But how about once a proposition is made salient - is it possible for you to actively deny a belief that you really have? i.e. Can you believe that P, whilst simultaneously believing that 'I do not believe that P'? That seems trickier. I guess you could go either way, depending on which understanding of 'belief' you're going by:
1) S believes1 that P iff (S would consciously affirm P, were P salient).
2) S believes2 that P iff (S behaves as though P were true).
Those are just rough formulations, of course, but hopefully the general idea is clear enough. We can differentiate between (subjective) belief as affirmation of a proposition, and (objective) belief as an influence on behaviour. You might believe1 that P, yet not believe2 that P, and that is no contradiction (just compare the words and actions of the nominally religious).
I don't think we can divide sensations that way, however, because sensations themselves are just a form of mental event. They only influence our behaviour insofar as they give rise to beliefs. (Your seeing an apple gives rise to your belief that there is an apple, which then - in conjunction with your desires and various other beliefs - causes you to pick it up and eat it.)
Yet, despite what I said earlier, there is a gap between sensation/experience and beliefs. After all, we can imagine a mad scientist or evil demon messing with your mind in such a way that it gives you the false belief that 'I just experienced sensation X'. Thus, it is conceivable that conscious introspection could mislead you, even with regard to your own conscious states and sense data.
I'm not sure what to do about all that. I've almost argued myself into a form of sense-data skepticism. Whether S has experienced sensation X or not is a matter of objective fact, but it seems completely unknowable by anyone, including S himself! What a useless concept that would be! Perhaps we're best to stick with the subjective version: S experienced sensation X iff S believes that this is so. A fairly empty definition then - a somewhat dishonest one, even - but perhaps more practical?
Well, no, I don't like skepticism. Having the belief is (in most cases) pretty good evidence that you did in fact have the sensation. Since we're all forced to be fallibalists about knowledge anyway, there's not really any good reason to deny that we really do know that we've had sensations. It's just that sometimes, we could be mistaken. Sometimes we know, but other times, we only think we know, though in fact we are wrong. And, so far as I can tell, there's no possible way of telling the two apart.
So, I suppose, if Jonathan wants to argue that we're all mistaken when we think we have sensations while dreaming... well, he could just be right. We could also be mistaken that we have them when awake. [That's quite possibly the most insane thought I've ever had.]
P.S. I don't mean to conflate the two hypotheses. As Jonathan points out, there are actually some good reasons to deny that we have sensations whilst dreaming. To deny that we have them even when awake, by contrast, would just be crazy.
Is it possible to have a sensation, yet not be aware of it? I would think not - surely if you're unaware of it, then it's not conscious, and therefore not what I understand 'sensation' to mean. How about the reverse? Could you falsely believe you're experiencing a sensation, when in fact you are not? Again, this seems problematic, unless the word 'sensation' is being used to refer to something beyond subjective conscious experiences, but if so, it's hard to imagine what that something is supposed to be. I'll come back to this in a moment.
How about beliefs? I think I'd take a more objective approach to them. Of course we have a plethora of subconscious beliefs beyond those of which we're aware of at any particular moment. You believe that your 27th paternal great-great-...-grandfather is no longer alive, though you've probably never consciously considered that exact proposition before. But how about once a proposition is made salient - is it possible for you to actively deny a belief that you really have? i.e. Can you believe that P, whilst simultaneously believing that 'I do not believe that P'? That seems trickier. I guess you could go either way, depending on which understanding of 'belief' you're going by:
1) S believes1 that P iff (S would consciously affirm P, were P salient).
2) S believes2 that P iff (S behaves as though P were true).
Those are just rough formulations, of course, but hopefully the general idea is clear enough. We can differentiate between (subjective) belief as affirmation of a proposition, and (objective) belief as an influence on behaviour. You might believe1 that P, yet not believe2 that P, and that is no contradiction (just compare the words and actions of the nominally religious).
I don't think we can divide sensations that way, however, because sensations themselves are just a form of mental event. They only influence our behaviour insofar as they give rise to beliefs. (Your seeing an apple gives rise to your belief that there is an apple, which then - in conjunction with your desires and various other beliefs - causes you to pick it up and eat it.)
Yet, despite what I said earlier, there is a gap between sensation/experience and beliefs. After all, we can imagine a mad scientist or evil demon messing with your mind in such a way that it gives you the false belief that 'I just experienced sensation X'. Thus, it is conceivable that conscious introspection could mislead you, even with regard to your own conscious states and sense data.
I'm not sure what to do about all that. I've almost argued myself into a form of sense-data skepticism. Whether S has experienced sensation X or not is a matter of objective fact, but it seems completely unknowable by anyone, including S himself! What a useless concept that would be! Perhaps we're best to stick with the subjective version: S experienced sensation X iff S believes that this is so. A fairly empty definition then - a somewhat dishonest one, even - but perhaps more practical?
Well, no, I don't like skepticism. Having the belief is (in most cases) pretty good evidence that you did in fact have the sensation. Since we're all forced to be fallibalists about knowledge anyway, there's not really any good reason to deny that we really do know that we've had sensations. It's just that sometimes, we could be mistaken. Sometimes we know, but other times, we only think we know, though in fact we are wrong. And, so far as I can tell, there's no possible way of telling the two apart.
So, I suppose, if Jonathan wants to argue that we're all mistaken when we think we have sensations while dreaming... well, he could just be right. We could also be mistaken that we have them when awake. [That's quite possibly the most insane thought I've ever had.]
P.S. I don't mean to conflate the two hypotheses. As Jonathan points out, there are actually some good reasons to deny that we have sensations whilst dreaming. To deny that we have them even when awake, by contrast, would just be crazy.
Sunday, June 13, 2004
Category: Essays
A bunch of links to external documents and fiction writings...
Curriculum Vitae
Philosophy Essays:
Rousseau on Freedom - Examines whether the society described within Rousseau's 'Social Contract' is one whose citizens are "free" (according to various interpretations of the word).
Skepticism - Gives an overview of the problem of skepticism, and various possible responses. Includes my own semantic solution, and epistemic externalist responses (e.g. Nozick & DeRose).
Free Will - Critique of Van Inwagen's incompatibilist argument. Much improved from my blog post though! I argue that by adopting a purely logical (i.e. non-causal) understanding of the phrase 'render false', Van Inwagen loses the ability to distinguish between 'rendering false' past vs future propositions. I show why his premises are false according to the hypothetical analysis of 'could', and argue that his defence of these premises unwittingly commits him to espouse an unsound argument for fatalism. [Probably the best essay I've yet written.]
Fiction:
Pyromancer - a short story ('novella' might be more accurate) I wrote a few years ago. Fantasy/horror.
Wishing Well - a poem I wrote a few years ago. Fantasy/horror (just kidding!).
Curriculum Vitae
Philosophy Essays:
Fiction:
Saturday, June 12, 2004
Lewis and im/possible worlds nominalism
I've just been reading about David Lewis' modal realism (in Loux's introductory textbook "Metaphysics"). It's interesting stuff.
The core idea is that if we take possible worlds as basic ontological entities, then we can use them to give a reductive account of many other things such as propositions, properties, and modal concepts. The disadvantage is that to define possible worlds in a basic way (i.e. without appeal to those other things listed, since we want to derive them from possible worlds) requires us to suppose that all possible worlds are just the same sorts of things as the actual world. We have to take them as existing in just the same way our world exists. And that's pretty hard to swallow.
But if we can bring ourselves to believe it, then it seems we have a very neat ontology, where the only ultimate sorts of entities are concrete particulars in these possible worlds, and sets thereof. Properties can be thought of as "functions from possible worlds to sets of objects". That is, the property of 'redness' (for example) is just a set-theoretic structure which assigns to each possible world, the set of concrete particulars which are red in that world. (In a way, it's just an elaborated version of austere nominalism, which defines the property F-ness as simply that set of all F objects.)
Propositions are trickier. They are to be analysed as being a certain set of possible worlds. Saying which set is not so easy. Loux mentions the intuitive answer - "the set of worlds where the proposition is true" - but of course that's circular. Loux suggests that we can remove the circularity though, because a world where P is true is just a world of a certain kind; a "P-ish world". Thus, the proposition 'all swans are white' is taken to really mean 'the set of all [all swans are white]-ish possible worlds'.
I don't like it. Apparently, it's the "all possible worlds are just as real as our world" bit which turns off most people. But I don't mind that so much. Rather, I just really don't like the account of propositions. It doesn't seem to describe propositions at all, but instead something else entirely. Saying that propositions are sets of possible worlds strikes me as the wrong way around. I'd rather take propositions as the basic ontological entity, and define possible worlds as (maximally comprehensive) sets of propositions. Much nicer. Well, more intuitive at least.
But I do quite like the account of properties. One obvious problem with set-based accounts is that properties which are exemplified by all the same objects would refer to the same set, and so, according to this account, would mean the same thing. For example, austere nominalism considers "being a featherless biped" and "being human" to be the same property, which is obviously an unacceptable result. Possible worlds nominalism improves this, since obviously the sets will differ in other possible worlds (where, say, chickens have no feathers). But there will still be some properties which are co-exemplified (i.e. exemplified by the same set of objects) in all possible worlds - Loux gives the example of being triangular and being trilateral (all objects with three angles also have three sides, and vice versa).
Now, inspired by Allan of FBC, I wonder if we could solve this problem by admitting impossible worlds into our ontology? As always, I don't know much about this stuff, but it does seem like an interesting idea. There is, after all, an impossible world where a 3-sided figure has 4 angles. So if we expand our account of properties so that it also involves sets of objects from impossible worlds, then we will get the desired result - namely, that triangularity and trilaterality refer to distinct properties.
There'd probably be all sorts of nasty side-effects as well, but I'm too tired to think about that right now. Fun stuff, impossible worlds.
The core idea is that if we take possible worlds as basic ontological entities, then we can use them to give a reductive account of many other things such as propositions, properties, and modal concepts. The disadvantage is that to define possible worlds in a basic way (i.e. without appeal to those other things listed, since we want to derive them from possible worlds) requires us to suppose that all possible worlds are just the same sorts of things as the actual world. We have to take them as existing in just the same way our world exists. And that's pretty hard to swallow.
But if we can bring ourselves to believe it, then it seems we have a very neat ontology, where the only ultimate sorts of entities are concrete particulars in these possible worlds, and sets thereof. Properties can be thought of as "functions from possible worlds to sets of objects". That is, the property of 'redness' (for example) is just a set-theoretic structure which assigns to each possible world, the set of concrete particulars which are red in that world. (In a way, it's just an elaborated version of austere nominalism, which defines the property F-ness as simply that set of all F objects.)
Propositions are trickier. They are to be analysed as being a certain set of possible worlds. Saying which set is not so easy. Loux mentions the intuitive answer - "the set of worlds where the proposition is true" - but of course that's circular. Loux suggests that we can remove the circularity though, because a world where P is true is just a world of a certain kind; a "P-ish world". Thus, the proposition 'all swans are white' is taken to really mean 'the set of all [all swans are white]-ish possible worlds'.
I don't like it. Apparently, it's the "all possible worlds are just as real as our world" bit which turns off most people. But I don't mind that so much. Rather, I just really don't like the account of propositions. It doesn't seem to describe propositions at all, but instead something else entirely. Saying that propositions are sets of possible worlds strikes me as the wrong way around. I'd rather take propositions as the basic ontological entity, and define possible worlds as (maximally comprehensive) sets of propositions. Much nicer. Well, more intuitive at least.
But I do quite like the account of properties. One obvious problem with set-based accounts is that properties which are exemplified by all the same objects would refer to the same set, and so, according to this account, would mean the same thing. For example, austere nominalism considers "being a featherless biped" and "being human" to be the same property, which is obviously an unacceptable result. Possible worlds nominalism improves this, since obviously the sets will differ in other possible worlds (where, say, chickens have no feathers). But there will still be some properties which are co-exemplified (i.e. exemplified by the same set of objects) in all possible worlds - Loux gives the example of being triangular and being trilateral (all objects with three angles also have three sides, and vice versa).
Now, inspired by Allan of FBC, I wonder if we could solve this problem by admitting impossible worlds into our ontology? As always, I don't know much about this stuff, but it does seem like an interesting idea. There is, after all, an impossible world where a 3-sided figure has 4 angles. So if we expand our account of properties so that it also involves sets of objects from impossible worlds, then we will get the desired result - namely, that triangularity and trilaterality refer to distinct properties.
There'd probably be all sorts of nasty side-effects as well, but I'm too tired to think about that right now. Fun stuff, impossible worlds.
Pyromancer
I've just put online Pyromancer, a short story (well, 'novella' really, I suppose - it's about 50 pages long) I wrote a couple of years ago.
(Excuse the poor html formatting - the word document linked to is better)
Preview:
(Excuse the poor html formatting - the word document linked to is better)
Preview:
As the flames began to die away, he reached out tentatively, trying to touch the charred corpse, but feeling nothing.
“Come now,” the disembodied voice was the hoarse whisper of wind through dry leaves. “You’ve left all that behind now.”
The voice was familiar, and the words simply confirmed what he already knew. But still he felt reluctant to accept them. “Radament?” It must be him, that voice…so familiar.
Griffith? Griffith? the mocking query assaulted him from all around – quiet, yet powerful, and oh so swift. He felt birds swooping at him, circling around him, battering him with their wings…though none were there. Only the words were really there, that mocking whisper, playing cruelly, toying with him.
“Stop it,” he wanted to shout, but all that came out was a feeble whisper. Curling up into a ball, Griffith covered his head with his hands, and slowly rocked back and forth. “Please stop it.”
Silence filled the night. Griffith licked his lips nervously as his eyes darted from side to side. “Radament? You still there?” Shivering, he huddled closer to the flames for comfort. They seemed to be the only company he had for now, other than his charred and useless corpse. He was startled by a loud pop as a branch of wood splintered, and the fire leapt greedily inside, as if to suck the marrow from its bones.
You chose this path, the voice reminded him, amidst the spluttering hiss of the hungry flames.
Did I?, he wondered, but such doubts were futile now. Aloud, he asked, “What now?”
Join us, the voice hissed, and at its words, an ethereal host was revealed. Floating heavily in the air, wisps of brown and grey smoke condensed to form vaguely humanoid shapes. Looking down, Griffith realised that he was made of the same…insubstance.
You are one of us now, the voice echoed his thoughts.
Griffith got up and took a step forward. Freeing his mind, he began to float slowly upward. Looking down, he watched as the final few flames lay sick and starving, continually diminishing downward until the brief light of their existence went out, forever.
Spread the word, my son. Sharper than a knife, the voice was chill as ice. Nothing lasts eternally – nothing but for us, that is. Spread the word.
The fire may have died, but its smoke continued to drift upward, disappearing into the night sky.
Friday, June 11, 2004
Dreams and Sensations
Jonathan Ichikawa has a very interesting paper, Fire and the Cogito: Dreams and Imaginings, where he argues convincingly for the counter-intuitive thesis that we don't really have sensations or form beliefs when dreaming - we only imagine that we do. I could probably go along with him on the 'beliefs' issue (at least, I wouldn't be surprised if beliefs in dreams were equivalent to our beliefs about fiction, however it is that they get explained), but I'm more doubtful about the sensations. I should begin by admitting that I don't really know anything much about this field, so all I'm going to do is highlight a few bits of Jonathan's essay which conflict with my own (possibly unreliable) intuitions.
Isn't sensation a purely subjective phenomenon? At least, that's how I'm inclined to think of it. If you believe that you are subjectively experiencing a sensation, then you are subjectively experiencing that sensation. I think it is possible to have visual sensations when imagining. I can (sometimes, not always) imagine a colour so well that I actually believe I'm seeing it - which implies (doesn't it?) that I was subjectively experiencing the visual sensation.
So I don't think there is any subjective difference between real sensations(R) and imagined sensations(I) that seem real. Either we experience a sensation, or we don't. (Though I'm not entirely sure what to do about weak visual imagery, e.g. if you try to imagine a tree, but don't actually experience seeing it. Perhaps the sensation you have is not an imagined visual sensation, but a sensation of imagining. I'm not sure how plausible this is - it may be a fatal flaw in my objection here.) You can, of course, differentiate based on the source of the experience, as is done in the 'laboratory experiments' Ichikawa cites. But that doesn't mean the experiences themselves are qualitatively different. People sometimes mistake sensations R and I, because all the subjects are really doing is guessing at the cause of their sensations (period), and it's no surprise that we're fallible at that!
(Update: See the first two comments of this FBC post for discussion of a similar issue. I guess I would have to agree that most visual imagery does not involve genuine sensations, but I'm not convinced that this is always the case. But, to be honest, I'm getting a bit confused about it all!)
To bolster the plausibility of his argument, Ichikawa appeals to the obvious invalidity of such inferences as:
But these are invalid because they involve objective claims, which depend on matters external to our subjective conscious experiences. This makes them poor analogies for the inference from 'I dream that I have a sensation of X' to 'I have a sensation of X', which still strikes me as eminently plausible - perhaps even tautological.
I have some doubts about the second premise. Just as a general principle, I would have thought that we are not to be held morally accountable for our dreams. So even if S forms an immoral intention while dreaming, that is not to say that S himself has done anything morally blameworthy.
At least, that seems plausible if volitions are understood here has being nothing more than a sort of subjective experience. If, however, they are supposed to involve some external/objective notions also (e.g. the tendency to influence our actual real-life behaviour) - as is probably the case - then I'd agree that we don't form actual intentions in dreams. However, this concession says nothing about purely subjective experiences (such as I understand sensations to be), so I don't think this example helps Ichikawa's case after all. More relevant is the following attempt:
I'm not entirely convinced by either of those premises. As before, I just don't think we are responsible (epistemically nor morally) for anything which happens in our dreams. Furthermore, I think that it would quite often be accurate to describe my dreaming behaviour as "irrational". Jonathan pre-empts the first response:
I don't think this counter works, however. His last sentence is true, not because we are rational while dreaming, but rather, because it doesn't matter that we are irrational while dreaming. This limited irrationality does not adversely affect our waking life, so we have no duty to avoid it. Ichikawa seems to be suggesting that if the orthodox model of dreaming were true, we would have a rational duty to avoid dreaming. This strikes me as highly implausible, even downright bizarre. If anyone really had a desire to avoid all irrational thoughts, even when sleeping, I'd be tempted to accuse them of irrationality!
The phenomenology of Lucid dreaming seems especially problematic for Ichikawa's lack-of-agency hypothesis (quoting Walton):
This should imply that when we have more control, as we do in lucid dreams, our confidence in the 'realism' of our sensations should diminish. But the very opposite is the case. Lucid dreams seem even more real than normal dreams.
Lastly, Ichikawa suggests that this imagination model casts doubt on the certainty of Descartes' "I think, therefore I am".
I haven't properly studied Descartes, so it could be that my understanding of him is mistaken. But I thought the point was that if I am having any mental experience whatsoever (i.e. "think" understood broadly, so it would include imaginings as well), then a necessary pre-condition for this is that I must exist. (Otherwise, who is doing the imagining?) So I don't understand how the possibility of unwitting imaginings are supposed to cause any problems here.
Overall though, it really is a great paper. I enjoyed reading it immensely. I actually think that Jonathan's collective arguments are a lot stronger than the few confused objections I've raised here, but I just wanted to take this chance to try to sort through them. (With any luck, he might leave a comment and let me know how to clear up those confusions! I guess he'd disagree that sensation is a purely subjective phenomenon? Well, second-guessing won't do any good, I'll just wait and see...)
Update: Jonathan has a new blog post summarizing his view, here.
Consider visual imagery. I can close my eyes and imagine seeing, for instance, a tree. I do not have the visual sensations(R) associated with seeing a tree, but I have the associated sensations(I). Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that subjects sometimes mistake one for the other.
Isn't sensation a purely subjective phenomenon? At least, that's how I'm inclined to think of it. If you believe that you are subjectively experiencing a sensation, then you are subjectively experiencing that sensation. I think it is possible to have visual sensations when imagining. I can (sometimes, not always) imagine a colour so well that I actually believe I'm seeing it - which implies (doesn't it?) that I was subjectively experiencing the visual sensation.
So I don't think there is any subjective difference between real sensations(R) and imagined sensations(I) that seem real. Either we experience a sensation, or we don't. (Though I'm not entirely sure what to do about weak visual imagery, e.g. if you try to imagine a tree, but don't actually experience seeing it. Perhaps the sensation you have is not an imagined visual sensation, but a sensation of imagining. I'm not sure how plausible this is - it may be a fatal flaw in my objection here.) You can, of course, differentiate based on the source of the experience, as is done in the 'laboratory experiments' Ichikawa cites. But that doesn't mean the experiences themselves are qualitatively different. People sometimes mistake sensations R and I, because all the subjects are really doing is guessing at the cause of their sensations (period), and it's no surprise that we're fallible at that!
(Update: See the first two comments of this FBC post for discussion of a similar issue. I guess I would have to agree that most visual imagery does not involve genuine sensations, but I'm not convinced that this is always the case. But, to be honest, I'm getting a bit confused about it all!)
To bolster the plausibility of his argument, Ichikawa appeals to the obvious invalidity of such inferences as:
I dream that p.
Therefore, p.
I dream that I have mental state m.
Therefore, I have mental state m.
[e.g. let m be severe depression, or superintelligence]
But these are invalid because they involve objective claims, which depend on matters external to our subjective conscious experiences. This makes them poor analogies for the inference from 'I dream that I have a sensation of X' to 'I have a sensation of X', which still strikes me as eminently plausible - perhaps even tautological.
What about actual conscious states? Consider volitions. Sosa has suggested an ethics-based reductio against that inference:
If I merely dream that I form an intention to succumb to temptation, I haven't done anything wrong. If I actually formed that intention, I would have done something wrong. Therefore, the inference, ‘I dreamed I formed intention X, therefore I formed intention X,’ is invalid.
I have some doubts about the second premise. Just as a general principle, I would have thought that we are not to be held morally accountable for our dreams. So even if S forms an immoral intention while dreaming, that is not to say that S himself has done anything morally blameworthy.
At least, that seems plausible if volitions are understood here has being nothing more than a sort of subjective experience. If, however, they are supposed to involve some external/objective notions also (e.g. the tendency to influence our actual real-life behaviour) - as is probably the case - then I'd agree that we don't form actual intentions in dreams. However, this concession says nothing about purely subjective experiences (such as I understand sensations to be), so I don't think this example helps Ichikawa's case after all. More relevant is the following attempt:
Let e be the experience as if a lion were chasing me. Then if I
have e in a dream, I would be epistemically required to form the
belief that a lion is chasing me, and prudentially required to form
the intention to run away. Failure to form that belief and intention
would constitute irrationality. But I am not irrational in failing to
form the belief and intention, therefore the inference is invalid.
I'm not entirely convinced by either of those premises. As before, I just don't think we are responsible (epistemically nor morally) for anything which happens in our dreams. Furthermore, I think that it would quite often be accurate to describe my dreaming behaviour as "irrational". Jonathan pre-empts the first response:
Dreaming is not like being forcibly drugged with respect to rationality and epistemic blameworthiness. Since rationality is important to me, it is appropriate for me to take measures to ensure that I do not find myself in circumstances in which I am likely to be irrational. I fail epistemically and am also blameworthy if I voluntarily ingest drugs, knowing that they will cause me to acquire false beliefs. Not so for dreaming – my interest in being a rational agent does not require me to take steps to avoid dreaming.
I don't think this counter works, however. His last sentence is true, not because we are rational while dreaming, but rather, because it doesn't matter that we are irrational while dreaming. This limited irrationality does not adversely affect our waking life, so we have no duty to avoid it. Ichikawa seems to be suggesting that if the orthodox model of dreaming were true, we would have a rational duty to avoid dreaming. This strikes me as highly implausible, even downright bizarre. If anyone really had a desire to avoid all irrational thoughts, even when sleeping, I'd be tempted to accuse them of irrationality!
The phenomenology of Lucid dreaming seems especially problematic for Ichikawa's lack-of-agency hypothesis (quoting Walton):
Dreams are spontaneous, undeliberate imaginings which the imaginer not only does not but cannot direct (consciously). This helps to explain why dreaming is often such a powerful experience, why dreams tend to be more compelling, more “realistic” than daydreams in which the imaginer either directs the course of his imaginings or deliberately refrains from interfering.
This should imply that when we have more control, as we do in lucid dreams, our confidence in the 'realism' of our sensations should diminish. But the very opposite is the case. Lucid dreams seem even more real than normal dreams.
Lastly, Ichikawa suggests that this imagination model casts doubt on the certainty of Descartes' "I think, therefore I am".
for anyone who took himself to be asserting the premise could ‘step up’ a hypothetical level and ask, how do I know I’m not just thinking(I) that?
Imaginings, unlike beliefs, are not the kinds of things that can be certain.
I haven't properly studied Descartes, so it could be that my understanding of him is mistaken. But I thought the point was that if I am having any mental experience whatsoever (i.e. "think" understood broadly, so it would include imaginings as well), then a necessary pre-condition for this is that I must exist. (Otherwise, who is doing the imagining?) So I don't understand how the possibility of unwitting imaginings are supposed to cause any problems here.
Overall though, it really is a great paper. I enjoyed reading it immensely. I actually think that Jonathan's collective arguments are a lot stronger than the few confused objections I've raised here, but I just wanted to take this chance to try to sort through them. (With any luck, he might leave a comment and let me know how to clear up those confusions! I guess he'd disagree that sensation is a purely subjective phenomenon? Well, second-guessing won't do any good, I'll just wait and see...)
Update: Jonathan has a new blog post summarizing his view, here.
Wednesday, June 09, 2004
Some Just Can't Take a Joke
The front-page story (available online here) of today's Press was rather depressing. Apparently some public servants circulated an email (while at work) which contained "racially offensive" jokes. So now there's gonna be a big inquiry, and those found responsible will face "disciplinary action".
Some of them are actually pretty funny - especially "Black Eye for the White Guy"! If anyone is offended by such harmless jokes (there was obviously no malice or ill-intent involved), then that's their problem. It's absurd that people are going to get punished because of this.
This is symptomatic of a broader trend within society, whereby anyone feeling "offended" is considered to have been 'wronged' by whoever caused the offence (who should in turn be punished accordingly). This is just stupid. There needs to be some actual basis to the feelings of 'offence' (such as malicious intent), mere subjective unhappiness is not enough.
One of the funniest things about the article was the response of this bureaucrat:
Clearly! Because the email was so clearly intended to be a literal description of the Maori TV channel's content (*rolls eyes*).
At least John Tamihere is showing some sense:
Titled "Maori television line-up for June", the email listed a parody schedule of television programmes, including The Young and the Jobless, Unmarried with Children, Little State House on the Prairie, Black Eye for the White Guy and H*A*S*H.
Some of them are actually pretty funny - especially "Black Eye for the White Guy"! If anyone is offended by such harmless jokes (there was obviously no malice or ill-intent involved), then that's their problem. It's absurd that people are going to get punished because of this.
This is symptomatic of a broader trend within society, whereby anyone feeling "offended" is considered to have been 'wronged' by whoever caused the offence (who should in turn be punished accordingly). This is just stupid. There needs to be some actual basis to the feelings of 'offence' (such as malicious intent), mere subjective unhappiness is not enough.
One of the funniest things about the article was the response of this bureaucrat:
Maori Television spokeswoman Sonya Haggie said she had seen the email and was not impressed.
"I don't think it deserves comment. Whoever's written it clearly hasn't been watching our programmes and witnessed the quality of our programming."
Clearly! Because the email was so clearly intended to be a literal description of the Maori TV channel's content (*rolls eyes*).
At least John Tamihere is showing some sense:
Associate Maori Affairs Minister John Tamihere said some of the spoof titles in the email were very "witty" and he did not find them offensive.
"Hell, let's wake up and grow up. I find a number of those comments to be awfully witty, clever and humorous.
"Personally I think it's OK to be witty and have a go at one another. I don't have a problem with it," Tamihere said.
His only concern was that the email was sent by a "well-paid" public servant during work hours when they "didn't have anything better to spend their time on".
Friday, June 04, 2004
The Truth Behind Religion
I just came across a really fascinating article which delves into the psychological underpinnings of religious beliefs and concepts.
But I guess it goes both ways. Perhaps it is unreasonable of skeptics to disparage religious people for their credulity and irrational superstitions. At least, blame seems inappropriate. But I don't think most skeptics do blame theists, in any case. Rather, I think the idea is that people should be encouraged to critically examine their beliefs - and I don't think the article provides any good reason to doubt the worth of this goal.
That second part is interesting too. I wonder if the notion of 'God' arises from our tendency to anthropomorphise? In particular, I wonder if 'God' is really just the concept which results from humans applying their theory of mind to nature itself. That is, we could be thinking of Nature (or perhaps Society) as just another agent (albeit with some fairly special properties added on!). The key point, then, would be that religious reasoning involves the same mental modules we use to reason about other people. In the case of religious morality, it seems that we might just be personifying the society at large, and then asking whether this society-person ('God') would approve of our actions or not.
The article is basically suggesting that religious concepts arose by co-opting pre-existing (non-religious) mental modules, and applying them to a new situation:
Update: Cf. Mixing Memory's evidence that human and God concepts diverge from a very young age.
[P]eople do not have beliefs because they somehow made their minds receptive to belief and then acquired the material for belief. They have some beliefs because, among all the material they acquired, some of it triggered these particular effects.I've often thought that I really don't have any choice about not being religious - the whole thing just strikes me as nonsensical, and I can't help that. So if God were real, he surely couldn't justly blame atheists for their honest disbelief. Yet some Christians seem to do just that; they think that if we just 'opened our minds' to religious possibilities, then we would see the light. Hmph.
But I guess it goes both ways. Perhaps it is unreasonable of skeptics to disparage religious people for their credulity and irrational superstitions. At least, blame seems inappropriate. But I don't think most skeptics do blame theists, in any case. Rather, I think the idea is that people should be encouraged to critically examine their beliefs - and I don't think the article provides any good reason to doubt the worth of this goal.
[E]xperimental tests show that people's actual religious concepts often diverge from what they believe they believe... For instance, psychologist Justin Barrett showed that Christians' concept of God was much more complex than the believers themselves assumed. Most Christians would describe their notion of God in terms of transcendence and extraordinary physical and mental characteristics. God is everywhere, attends to everything at the same time. However, subtle experimental tasks reveal that, when they are not reflecting upon their own beliefs, these same people use another concept of God, as a human-like agent with a particular viewpoint, a particular position and serial attention. God considers one problem and then another. Now that concept is mostly tacit. It drives people's thoughts about particular events, episodes of interaction with God, but it is not accessible to people as "their belief." In other words, people do not believe what they believe they believe.That's a very interesting (and surprising) finding. But hasn't that judgement I put in bold, got the conclusion exactly backward? They've shown that, deep down, most Christians conceive of God as merely a super-powerful invisible man. Surely this is far less complex than their professed notion of God as transcendent, omni-present, and capable of multiple (indeed, infinite) simultaneous thoughts.
Although people often state that their moral rules are a consequence of the existence (or of the decrees) of supernatural agents, it is quite clear that such intuitions are present, independent of religious concepts. Moral intuitions appear long before children represent the powers of supernatural agents, they appear in the same way in cultures where no one is much interested in supernatural agents, and in similar ways regardless of what kind of supernatural agents are locally important. Indeed, it is difficult to find evidence that religious teachings have any effect on people's moral intuitions.So much for religion being the source of all morality!
Religious concepts do not change people's moral intuitions but frame these intuitions in terms that make them easier to think about. For instance, in most human groups supernatural agents are thought to be interested parties in people's interactions. Given this assumption, having the intuition that an action is wrong becomes having the expectation that a personalized agent disapproves of it. The social consequences of the latter way of representing the situation are much clearer to the agent, as they are handled by specialized mental systems for social interaction. This notion of gods and spirits as interested parties is far more salient in people's moral inferences than the notion of these agents as moral legislators or moral exemplars.
That second part is interesting too. I wonder if the notion of 'God' arises from our tendency to anthropomorphise? In particular, I wonder if 'God' is really just the concept which results from humans applying their theory of mind to nature itself. That is, we could be thinking of Nature (or perhaps Society) as just another agent (albeit with some fairly special properties added on!). The key point, then, would be that religious reasoning involves the same mental modules we use to reason about other people. In the case of religious morality, it seems that we might just be personifying the society at large, and then asking whether this society-person ('God') would approve of our actions or not.
The article is basically suggesting that religious concepts arose by co-opting pre-existing (non-religious) mental modules, and applying them to a new situation:
To sum up, we can explain human sensitivity to particular kinds of supernatural concepts as a by-product of the way human minds operate in ordinary, non-religious contexts. Because our assumptions about fundamental categories like person, artifact, animal, etc., are so entrenched, violations of these assumptions create salient and memorable concepts...Paul Kurtz's article on The Science of Religion is also interesting, though less insightful, IMO.
Although the [supernatural] agents are said to be very special, the way people think about interaction with them is directly mapped from their interaction with actual people...
A variety of mental systems, functionally specialized for the treatment of particular (non-religious) domains of information, are activated by religious notions and norms, in such a way that these notions and norms become highly salient, easy to acquire, easy to remember and communicate, as well as intuitively plausible...
People do not adhere to concepts of invisible ghosts or ancestors or spirits because they suspend ordinary cognitive resources, but rather because they use these cognitive resources in a context for which they were not designed in the first place. However, the "tweaking" of ordinary cognition that is required to sustain religious thought is so small that one should not be surprised if religious concepts are so widespread and so resistant to argument. To some extent, the situation is similar to domains where science has clearly demonstrated the limits or falsity of our common intuitions. We now know that solid objects are largely made up of empty space, that our minds are only billions of neurons firing in ordered ways, that some physical processes can go backwards in time, that species do not have an eternal essence, that gravitation is a curvature of space-time. Yet even scientists go through their daily lives with an intuitive commitment to solid objects being full of matter, to people having non-physical minds, to time being irreversible, to cats being essentially different from dogs, and to objects falling down because they are heavy.
Update: Cf. Mixing Memory's evidence that human and God concepts diverge from a very young age.
Thursday, June 03, 2004
Category: BlogRoll & Links
(See also Useful Links for free sites and services that I highly recommend.)
Meta-blogging:
Philosophers' Carnival - showcasing the best recent philosophy blog posts from all over the net.
Tangled Bank - the science carnival that inspired the above.
Carnivalesque - a new carnival on the early-modern period of history.
Poetry Carnival
Philosophical Weblogs - a list compiled by David Chalmers.
More Weblogs - a huge multi-disciplinary list compiled by politicaltheory.info
Enwe's meta-blog - a daily list of interesting philosophy links.
MelbournePhilosophy.com - a philosophy wiki.
University Group Blogs:
Fake Barn Country (Brown)
Desert Landscapes (Arizona)
Orange Philosophy (Syracuse)
This is not the name of this blog (Rochester)
Undetached Rabbit Parts (Western Michigan)
Third Floor (Mississippi)
FSU Philosophy Blog (Florida State University)
Topical Group Blogs:
Garden of Forking Paths (Free Will / Agency Theory)
Experimental Philosophy
PEA Soup (Ethics)
Metatome (Teaching Philosophy)
Philosophy of Art
Certain Doubts (Epistemology)
Philosophy of Biology
American Journal of Bioethics Editors' Blog
Prosblogion (Religion)
Left2Right - (Politics)
Crooked Timber (mostly politics, economics, sociology, and some philosophy).
Information Sources (i.e. sites which are full of good links, and updated regularly):
Butterflies & Wheels - Interesting links on a range of topics. Ophelia's 'notes & comments' are always worth reading too.
Arts & Letters Daily - links to articles on a wide range of topics, updated daily. (And edited by the University of Canterbury's own Denis Dutton.)
Ektopos - philosophy links.
Ephilosopher
New Scientist
Philosophy:
Thoughts, Arguments and Rants - Brian Weatherson. Leiter Reports - Brian Leiter. Wo's Weblog Mixing Memory (cognitive science) Jonathan Ichikawa - (See also Fake Barn Country, above). Emiratio - Shieva Kleinschmidt. Noumenon - Jonathon Martin Doing Things With Words - Dan Quattrone. Siris - Brandon. Mormon Metaphysics - Clark Goble Mumblings of a Platonist - Michelle Jenkins Prosthesis (+ technology & science) Scottish Nous
Studi Galileiani - Hugo Holbling E.G. Melbourne Philosopher - Tennessee Leeuwenburg Blogosophy The Ethical Werewolf - Neil Sinhababu Opiniatrety - Matt Weiner. Clayton Littlejohn Objections - Lenhart Oohlah's Blog-space - Joe Ulatowski Maverick Philosopher - Bill Vallicella. Illusive Mind Hot Abercrombie Chick
Science:
The Loom - Carl Zimmer. Pharyngula - PZ Myers Preposterous Universe - Sean Carroll Science Blog 3 Quarks Daily Evolving Thoughts - John Wilkins.
Politics / Culture:
Fafblog - Brilliant political satire. Positive Liberty Majikthise (+ some philosophy) Dispatches from the Culture Wars Blargh Blog Philosoraptor The Fly Bottle Parablemania (Christianity) Easily Distracted - Timothy Burke In Medias Res - Russell Arben Fox The Enlightenment Project Peter Levine's Blog (Civics)
New Zealand political blogs:
No Right Turn David Farrar Just Left Philosophically Made The Grey Shade John Tamihere Kiwi Pundit Hard News Genius NZ Sock Thief NZPundit Holden Republic The Whig
Meta-blogging:
University Group Blogs:
Topical Group Blogs:
Information Sources (i.e. sites which are full of good links, and updated regularly):
Philosophy:
Science:
Politics / Culture:
New Zealand political blogs:
Tuesday, June 01, 2004
But What Purpose God?
Supernatural explanations are no explanation at all.
I think it intellectually dishonest, the way some people take a Big Question, and pretend to provide an answer to it through religion. For that is all it is. Pretending. If you dig a little deeper into the so-called 'solution', it turns out to be little more than a dressed up admission of ignorance. Surely it would be better to just cut to the chase and admit ignorance right from the start, thus avoiding all the superfluous (and sometimes downright harmful) window dressing.
Lest I be accused of floundering in baseless generalities, I want to focus on three particular examples of this rhetorical masquerade: origins, meaning, and morality. These are (in my experience) perhaps the most common arguments people appeal to in order to justify their belief in a deity.
Where did the universe come from? It's a tough question, and I haven't a clue what the answer is. Some religious people think that positing a supernatural creator (i.e. God) provides the answer. But surely it is clear that this achieves nothing - it merely pushes the question back a step, so that we must ask "where did God come from?". He is usually conceived of as being eternal, but why not skip over him altogether and just apply that very same answer to the natural universe? As Raymond Bradley put it: "I find only fallacious inference in the supposition that we can explain why anything at all exists by hypothesizing that something else exists in addition; for that supposition starts one on the path of infinite regress."
Questions of meaning & purpose are other favourites of the religious. But again, so far as I can tell, it amounts to nothing more than pushing the problem back one step. They say that without God, our lives have no (ultimate) meaning or purpose, and that God provides that purpose. But how exactly is that supposed to work? After all, what is the meaning of God's existence? If God has no ultimate meaning (and it is difficult to see how he could), then clearly he cannot pass it on to us. But if you want to stipulate that he does have an 'ultimate meaning', then what does that achieve? Could you not (once again) just skip out this pointless intermediate step, and simply apply the stipulated meaning directly to human existence?
I think part of the appeal here is the desire for your life to be part of something bigger than yourself. But, of course, religion has no monopoly on meta-personal goals. Any sort of mass movement (e.g. political or social movements) has this very same property. So how is being a Christian any more meaningful than being a Communist? One presumably ends up appealing to the special 'meaning' provided by God, which brings up those problems discussed in the previous paragraph.
Morality is a closely related matter. Some suppose that without God, there is no reason why you really ought to do one thing rather than another. But how does adding God into the equation help things here? (Short answer: it doesn't!) Suppose God wants you to do X. Why should you do what God commands? Surely this is just as troubling a question as the original "why should you do X?" was? Even supposing that a benevolent God exists, one must still face the old Euthyphro dilemma: "Is X good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?" We must surely choose the latter, but this demonstrates that God is superfluous to morality, which exists (or not) quite independently of God.
I'm sure you can see the general pattern here: We have an unexplained problem. The religious suggest that God can explain this problem. What they fail to realise is that the concept of God has at least as many problems of its own. Whatever we didn't understand about the universe, we still don't understand about God!
So, I must conclude, the explanatory usefulness of God is nil.
Disclaimer: I do not here make any claims about whether God does or does not exist. [Of course he cannot be 'disproved', any more than you can disprove that there is an invisible intangible dragon in my garage. Though I do think there is precious little reason to believe either!] I am merely drawing attention to the fact that positing his existence does not serve to explain anything (or at least, not those 3 things discussed above).
A 'God of the gaps' is inevitably full of gaps himself. I find it remarkable how rare it is for people to acknowledge this fact.
I think it intellectually dishonest, the way some people take a Big Question, and pretend to provide an answer to it through religion. For that is all it is. Pretending. If you dig a little deeper into the so-called 'solution', it turns out to be little more than a dressed up admission of ignorance. Surely it would be better to just cut to the chase and admit ignorance right from the start, thus avoiding all the superfluous (and sometimes downright harmful) window dressing.
Lest I be accused of floundering in baseless generalities, I want to focus on three particular examples of this rhetorical masquerade: origins, meaning, and morality. These are (in my experience) perhaps the most common arguments people appeal to in order to justify their belief in a deity.
Where did the universe come from? It's a tough question, and I haven't a clue what the answer is. Some religious people think that positing a supernatural creator (i.e. God) provides the answer. But surely it is clear that this achieves nothing - it merely pushes the question back a step, so that we must ask "where did God come from?". He is usually conceived of as being eternal, but why not skip over him altogether and just apply that very same answer to the natural universe? As Raymond Bradley put it: "I find only fallacious inference in the supposition that we can explain why anything at all exists by hypothesizing that something else exists in addition; for that supposition starts one on the path of infinite regress."
Questions of meaning & purpose are other favourites of the religious. But again, so far as I can tell, it amounts to nothing more than pushing the problem back one step. They say that without God, our lives have no (ultimate) meaning or purpose, and that God provides that purpose. But how exactly is that supposed to work? After all, what is the meaning of God's existence? If God has no ultimate meaning (and it is difficult to see how he could), then clearly he cannot pass it on to us. But if you want to stipulate that he does have an 'ultimate meaning', then what does that achieve? Could you not (once again) just skip out this pointless intermediate step, and simply apply the stipulated meaning directly to human existence?
I think part of the appeal here is the desire for your life to be part of something bigger than yourself. But, of course, religion has no monopoly on meta-personal goals. Any sort of mass movement (e.g. political or social movements) has this very same property. So how is being a Christian any more meaningful than being a Communist? One presumably ends up appealing to the special 'meaning' provided by God, which brings up those problems discussed in the previous paragraph.
Morality is a closely related matter. Some suppose that without God, there is no reason why you really ought to do one thing rather than another. But how does adding God into the equation help things here? (Short answer: it doesn't!) Suppose God wants you to do X. Why should you do what God commands? Surely this is just as troubling a question as the original "why should you do X?" was? Even supposing that a benevolent God exists, one must still face the old Euthyphro dilemma: "Is X good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?" We must surely choose the latter, but this demonstrates that God is superfluous to morality, which exists (or not) quite independently of God.
I'm sure you can see the general pattern here: We have an unexplained problem. The religious suggest that God can explain this problem. What they fail to realise is that the concept of God has at least as many problems of its own. Whatever we didn't understand about the universe, we still don't understand about God!
So, I must conclude, the explanatory usefulness of God is nil.
Disclaimer: I do not here make any claims about whether God does or does not exist. [Of course he cannot be 'disproved', any more than you can disprove that there is an invisible intangible dragon in my garage. Though I do think there is precious little reason to believe either!] I am merely drawing attention to the fact that positing his existence does not serve to explain anything (or at least, not those 3 things discussed above).
A 'God of the gaps' is inevitably full of gaps himself. I find it remarkable how rare it is for people to acknowledge this fact.
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