Dimensions of Normative Inquiry

There are a number of different 'dimensions' of normativity that call out for investigation. (Below I'll describe three: the criterial, epistemic, and structural.) These dimensions are largely independent of each other, so to make progress on one dimension we might as well make simplifying assumptions about the others, just for sake of exposition. (One could always restate one's point without making any such assumptions, but the result might be more clunky and long-winded.) It's important for readers to understand these differences, so as to avoid raising "objections" that aren't really relevant to the discussion at hand.

Ord on Global Consequentialism

Toby Ord kindly sent a copy of his dissertation on global consequentialism ('Beyond Action'), with permission to quote. Let me begin with a striking passage that exemplifies the kind of rhetoric I think needs deflating:

The potential advantages of global consequentialism are many. The addition of new focal points increases the expressivity of consequentialism. It allows consequentialists to directly answer questions about the best motives, the best system of government, or the best way to decide what to do. This also allows consequentialists to bring consequentialism into the strongholds of deontologists and virtue ethicists: it provides an explanation of the importance of character and of rules of conduct, going so far as to show how many acclaimed virtues and rules have systematically led to good consequences, and even daring to suggest ways in which they might be improved.

Comment Box Woes?

Alex notes:

perhaps this is just me - though I doubt it - but this comment box is weird. I can't move the text cursor around except by mouse, and nor can I cut, copy or paste in it

Anyone else having problems? (Please email if you somehow can't leave comments at all!)

N.B. I sometimes get an error the first time I click 'post comment' (if I'm not already logged in), but a second click always does the trick. I haven't noticed any other problems myself (using Firefox and Chrome). But if enough others are having persistent problems, I guess I'll have to shift back (yet again!) to the awful 'pop up' comments page.

Local Evaluation

Any form of consequentialism begins with an axiology, which tells us the values of things, and it derives from this an account of what we ought to do. Act consequentialism (AC), for example, tells us to perform whatever action would be best. Global consequentialists want to make further claims like, "The best character to have, of those available, is the one such that your having it brings about the best outcome." This sounds to me like a tautology, hence my skepticism about whether Global Consequentialism really adds anything to AC. In this post, I want to explore the (seemingly dim) prospects for making global consequentialism (GC) a substantive view, with coherent "local" AC competitors.

Consequentialist Agents: Fittingness and Fortune

[This is something of a manifesto for my current research project...]

Critics of consequentialism often object to how a consequentialist agent would (allegedly) think. They claim that the consequentialist agent is, in some sense, a bad character. Defenders of consequentialism typically dismiss such objections by citing the distinction between 'criteria of rightness' and 'decision procedures'. (Utility provides the criterion that determines the moral status of an act; it's a further question whether agents ought to attempt to calculate utilities themselves.) This is not entirely satisfactory. There remains a real objection here that needs to be addressed, not just dismissed. As I will explain, consequentialists still need to say something about what a 'rational' or fitting moral (consequentialist) agent would look like -- and when they do, this leaves room for others to object that the agent thus pictured is not in any sense morally 'rational' or non-instrumentally ideal.

Making Suicide an Option

David Velleman offers a fascinating argument in 'Against the right to die'. Sometimes options can reduce our autonomy, e.g. by reshaping the 'meaning' or social significance of our choice. You might most prefer the option of staying home by default, but once someone invites you to dinner, this option is replaced by the very different (and less desirable) option of staying home by refusing their invitation.

Similarly, Velleman argues, establishing a 'right to die' (as per physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia) replaces the option of staying alive by default with the significantly different option of explicitly choosing to stay alive. Velleman continues:

Are Sophisticated Consequentialists Irrational?

The Railtonian 'sophisticated consequentialist' (SC) acquires, maintains, and acts upon whatever first-order desire set would be (expectably) best. So, if a bias towards one's own family is a fortunate disposition to have, SC will possess this and hence be biased towards his own family, rather than impartial like a direct utilitarian. My question: is SC rational?

Callous vs. Caring Consequentialists

My recent post on 'Desirable vs. Rationality-Enhancing Dispositions' contains an important mistake. I began by distinguishing 'rationality-enhancing' dispositions (desirable in virtue of conducing to good actions) from dispositions that have other good effects. I then suggested, mistakenly, that rational status is always transmitted from rationality-enhancing dispositions to the particular actions they dispose one to perform. This transmission principle holds only when the 'rationality-enhancing' disposition serves as a generally reliable 'rule of thumb', like the rule against killing people even when murder might (prima facie) seem to promote utility. But in non-ideal agents, a disposition might also conduce to good actions for a very different kind of reason, as I will illustrate below.