In particular, one cannot just assume that the spectrum of views in the general populace is privileged and ought to be reflected proportionally in academia, (or anywhere else, for that matter). As we know from history, morally abhorrent views can enjoy substantial popular support. There was once widespread support for slavery, fascism, etc., amongst certain populations. Otherwise decent and "reasonable" people held, and advocated for, these abhorrent views. That doesn't mean that they were actually reasonable in doing so, or that the views are ones that (ever) merited representation amongst the intelligentsia.
There's no a priori reason to expect our moment of history to be uniquely enlightened, or lacking in morally abhorrent perspectives and ideologies. Just because a view is held by some, or even many, does not establish that it is morally respectable. There's really no alternative to using one's moral judgment to attempt to discern which views are reasonable (even if false) and which are truly beyond the pale.
Having looked closely at the arguments offered against gay marriage, for example, I think they are utterly lacking in intellectual merit. These views are morally abhorrent, irrational, and betray their proponents as (in this respect) bad people who have let motivated reasoning corrupt them. (Again, they may be otherwise decent people, just as many past slaveholders were presumably otherwise decent people.) We should no more want (or expect) to find anti-gay views represented in academic philosophy than we should want (or expect) to find racist or fascist views being defended. Representation of rationally indefensible views is not a worthwhile kind of diversity to seek, especially when the views in question are also deeply morally abhorrent, betraying a lack of sufficient respect and concern for one's fellow beings.
So there can be reasonable political/ethical "dogmas". (I put this in scare quotes since commonly "dogmatism" is understood to involve holding a belief in a way that's resistant to any countervailing evidence. But in this sense we do not "dogmatically" believe that grass is green, or that slavery is wrong: rather our extreme confidence stems precisely from our rational responsiveness to the overwhelming weight of reasons suggesting that the contrary view is untenable.) If their negations would be truly indefensible, then widespread academic consensus on this point is obviously not a problem. Of course, which views thus qualify is a judgment call. But again, just because judgment is required, it doesn't follow that any possible judgment on the matter is equally reasonable or legitimate.
On to the big question, then: Which political "dogmas" of academia really are reasonable ones, and which admit of reasonable questioning? Here are a few moral theses that I think can't be reasonably denied (despite many people actually denying them):
* There is nothing morally wrong, or inferior, about homosexuality or same-sex relationships. Gay couples should be allowed to marry just as straight ones can.
* Current immigration policies are unjustly restrictive. (Individuals born in other countries matter morally, and it is wrong to prevent them from escaping a dysfunctional society in pursuit of the far greater opportunities available to them in our country.)
* Animal suffering matters morally, and as a result much (esp. factory-farmed) meat production is morally atrocious.
Of course, if anyone in comments wishes to dispute these suggestions, you're welcome to try! You're also welcome to suggest other plausible candidates that I've left out.
More interestingly, perhaps, which contra-party-line views should academic philosophers take more seriously? Some proposals:
* Abortion: While pro-life views are, I think, ultimately misguided, I think it's also pretty clear that one can hold (some) pro-life views reasonably.
* Free markets: I suspect that many academics are unreasonably biased against libertarian economic views (though less so in philosophy than in many other arts & humanities disciplines, I imagine).
* Utilitarian policy proposals that may seem prima facie "discriminatory" e.g., QALYs, procreative beneficence, non-random asylum allocation proposals, etc.
Other suggestions welcome!
More generally, I think, the focus of political/ethical concern amongst many philosophers (at least on social media, etc.) strikes me as troublingly parochial. There's a lot of concern about (i) economic inequality within a country, and (ii) various injustices regarding the local treatment of minorities. The consensus view on these matters doesn't strike me as wrong exactly, but I think there are much more important humanitarian matters that end up being comparatively neglected.
As Scott Alexander puts it:
The moral of the story is that if you feel an obligation to give back to the world, participating in activist politics is one of the worst possible ways to do it. Giving even a tiny amount of money to charity is hundreds or even thousands of times more effective than almost any political action you can take. Even if you’re absolutely convinced a certain political issue is the most important thing in the world, you’ll effect more change by donating money to nonprofits lobbying about it than you will be reblogging anything.
There is no reason that politics would even come to the attention of an unbiased person trying to “break out of their bubble of privilege” or “help people who are afraid of going outside of their house”. Anybody saying that people who want to do good need to spread their political cause is about as credible as a televangelist saying that people who want to do good need to give them money to buy a new headquarters. It’s possible that televangelists having beautiful headquarters might be slightly better than them having hideous headquarters, but it’s not the first thing a reasonable person trying to improve the world would think of.