In 'Can Consequentialism Cover Everything?', Bart Streumer claims that according to consequentialism "there is no normatively significant difference between performing an act and bringing it about that an act is performed." This isn't quite right. It would be more accurate to say that the pro tanto reasons for and against φ-ing count equally for or against bringing it about that one φs. But we must leave open the possibility of the latter ("meta") action being influenced by other reasons in addition. After all, this act may have additional consequences besides just the consequences of the downstream act of φ-ing, for there's no guarantee that all else is equal between the two acts in question.
Standard cases of "rational irrationality" illustrate this nicely. If faced with the prospect of blackmail in the near future, I may have reason to cause myself to become utterly nihilistic and indifferent to the welfare of my family, so that the blackmailer has no incentive to threaten them harm. It doesn't follow that my later nihilistic actions are themselves rational. There's a normatively significant (consequential) difference between φ-ing in circumstances C and bringing it about that I will φ in circumstances C.
Newcomb-like problems might provide another instance of this divergence. Prior to the Oracle making her prediction, I have most reason to bring it about that I one-box. (This increases my chances of winning the bonus million dollars.) But once faced with the actual decision, I arguably have most reason to take both boxes (since whatever is in the first box, taking the second in addition will net me an extra $1000).
Finally, for a more pedestrian example, contrast (i) A thief's freely deciding to return a stolen paperclip, versus (ii) The police department's expending resources to bring it about that the thief returns the paperclip. Obviously there's a consequential difference here, namely that the second action involves additional costs. Although it would be good for the thief to return the goods, it may not be worthwhile for anyone else to expend the resources necessary to bring this about.
Similar remarks apply to other evaluands besides acts. The best character to have might be too costly to be worth bringing about. This explains why, contra Streumer, we should not interpret Global Consequentialism as implying that we ought to bring about 'the right X' (whether X stands for acts, characters, climates, or whatever).