tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post1859937372199370592..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Acts and Meta-ActsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-78106152796136505082009-09-17T11:57:16.307-04:002009-09-17T11:57:16.307-04:00Hi Alex,
#1 The "later nihilistic actions&qu...Hi Alex,<br /><br />#1 The "later nihilistic actions" might include ignoring credible threats to your family's welfare -- or an in extreme case, even triggering a Doomsday device to destroy the world. You don't have reason to destroy the world in the circumstance C of someone threatening your family. But you might well have reason to bring it about that you would so act in C, since the deterrent effect of transparently possessing this disposition might help ensure that circumstance C does not arise. As Parfit argues, being a credible threat-fulfiller may be a useful disposition to have, even if actually fulfilling such threats is disastrous.<br /><br />But you might object that the conditional aspect of the disposition is corrupting this case. (Streumer might be understood merely as claiming that actually X-ing is normatively equivalent to bringing it about that you <i>actually</i> X. So conditional acts like 'X-ing if C' may not threaten this more limited thesis.) So the pedestrian examples I give later in the post may be better. (I don't understand how your cases are meant to work. Streumer's view relates X-ing to bringing to about that one Xs; unsuccessfully attempting to bribe someone to X is neither, so doesn't really speak to the thesis in question.)<br /><br />#2 There certainly <i>needs</i> to be an "all else equal" clause, but I'm not convinced that Streumer recognizes this, for it makes nonsense of his argument. He claims that:<br />(1) I ought to perform this act<br />"can be reformulated as:"<br />(2) I ought to bring it about that this act is performed.<br /><br />He uses this to argue that when global consequentialists say that it ought to be sunny (if that'd be for the best), this should be taken to imply, "I ought to it bring about that it is sunny." And this is objectionable because 'ought implies can', and we can't change the weather.<br /><br />This strikes me as a bad argument. The only connection between (1) and (2) is that there's something good about the state of affairs where the "obligation" in (1) is fulfilled, and all else equal we have reason to bring about good states of affairs when we can. But once we note those provisos, Streumer's attempted reductio is rendered clearly invalid. The fact that we <i>can't</i> bring it about that it's sunny is precisely what cancels the implication that we ought to perform or attempt such an action.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-59865054816491432812009-09-17T04:37:23.732-04:002009-09-17T04:37:23.732-04:00Richard,
I'm not entirely up on this stuff, b...Richard,<br /><br />I'm not entirely up on this stuff, but a couple of queries. <br />1) In the first example, what's the act here? Being nihilistic isn't something one <em>does</em>. On the other hand, <em>acting</em> nihilitistically seems to be something you have equal reason to do or to bring about that you do, since both are just as likely to affect the blackmailer's beliefs in the required manner.<br />2) Regardless, isn't there an implicit all-else-being-equal clause in Bart's claim? I think that's all he needs for his more general point, and without it, the claim seems to be subject to more straightforward counter-examples than those you raise: I might pay you to X but not to bring it about that you X, or I might blame you for Xing but not for bringing it about that you X.<br /><br />AlexAlex Gregoryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03836914221864280274noreply@blogger.com