It is sometimes claimed that central features of our lives -- such as (linguistic) meaning, or even consciousness! -- are "irreducibly social". This is typically accompanied with a wave in Wittgenstein's direction. But it seems to me that the possibility of solipsism suffices to refute such claims.
It's possible that, despite appearances to the contrary, no-one else actually exists besides myself. Then there would be no real "society". But even if it turns out that this bizarre scenario is actual, it doesn't change the fact that I'm certainly conscious and thinking (linguistically) meaningful thoughts. A lot of my beliefs would turn out to be false, of course. But various others would presumably still be true. And even for the false ones, I could imagine scenarios where they would turn out to be true, e.g. wherein the appearances were less deceiving and other people really did exist. So my beliefs have content. And I can express them in English sentences, which I know well enough how to assess. Given a full enough description of the world, I can determine which of my beliefs or sentences are true and which are false. That doesn't change if it turns out that I'm the only person in the world.
So all these claims about language (or any other survivors of the solipsistic possibility) being "irreducibly social" must be false. Long live methodological individualism!