Tuesday, May 05, 2015

Wronging for Utilitarians

Mark Nelson's 'What the Utilitarian Cannot Think' (forthcoming in ETMP) argues that utilitarianism cannot account for person-directed wronging: "According to utilitarianism, moral offenses are offenses against global utility, right reason or the totality of sentient beings, but never against individual victims, yet this aspect of the action – that it is an offense against a particular person –is highlighted when we say that this action wronged that woman." (p.1)

I naturally disagree.  Nelson here commits the common mistake of assuming that utilitarianism entails a "token-monistic" conception of the good, according to which there is just one thing that matters, viz. the aggregate utility.  But, as I argue in my 'Value Receptacles' paper, a much more attractive utilitarian view is token-pluralistic in form, holding that each person's welfare is a distinct intrinsic good.  And that makes it easy to see how particular persons can be wronged, for the token-pluralistic utilitarian: an agent may fail to give adequate weight to their interests in particular, and so act in a way that harms them unjustifiably.  In such a case, the wrongness of one's action (its failure to maximize utility) is partly explained by the action's wronging (unduly harming) this individual.

Monday, May 04, 2015

Moral Priorities

Robin Hanson notes that people generally don't like "ranking the sacred" (his example: "fighting cancer" vs. "working for racial justice").  This is a big part of what Effective Altruism is all about -- not just aiming to do some good, but seriously taking an evidence-based approach to doing the most (expected) good that one can (for a given level of investment, be it of time, money, or whatever).  This seems to rub some people the wrong way, which is frustrating since we should surely prefer that people allocate their moral efforts wisely, doing more rather than less good when possible.

Saturday, April 25, 2015

The Best Case for Voting

To follow up on my last post, let's consider a Regan-esque case for voting.

The set-up: Suppose there are two candidates, Good and Bad, and a large population (e.g. several million voters).  90% of the population are unreasoning voters, and suppose that each such voter is (independently) 0.55 likely to vote for Bad, and 0.45 likely to vote for Good.  Suppose that the remaining 10% of the population consists of utilitarians, who are initially disposed not to vote (unless their voting will be instrumental to changing the result from Bad to Good).  I am one such, and I wonder whether I should bother voting.

Wednesday, April 22, 2015

Valuing Unnecessary Causal Contributions

In 'Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach', Alvin Goldman argues that (i) there's a sense in which each vote for the winning party causally contributes to their victory, even if they receive many more votes than are necessary for victory (and similarly each vote against the winning party serves to causally "counteract" them), and (ii) you are morally responsible for outcomes that you are, in this way, causally responsible for.  So you get moral credit for voting for good parties, and against bad ones, and on this basis have (non-trivial) reasons to act accordingly.

I'm happy to grant this talk of "causal contribution", but I wonder about its normative significance. I'm more inclined towards Donald Regan's account of the ethics of cooperation and coordination. Roughly: we should be disposed to coordinate with like-minded others to bring about the best collectively possible results. But if others are not disposed to coordinate with you, then there's no point in pretending otherwise, or in valuing things (such as unnecessary "causal contributions") other than good consequences.

Saturday, April 11, 2015

Must Research Talks present Work in Progress?

I gather the norm is that research talks (colloquia, etc.) are meant for presenting unpublished work; work that is, at least nominally, "in progress".  But is there a good reason for this norm?  Just off the top of my head, I would have thought that research talks served two main purposes: (i) feedback, and (ii) dissemination.  Moreover, "read in advance" workshop-style events aside, I expect the main benefits for all involved stem from the latter: the audience gets exposed to (hopefully interesting) new ideas, and the speaker gets to disseminate her ideas, perhaps build up her academic reputation slightly by becoming better known to the audience members, etc.

And while opportunities for feedback are no longer such a priority for published work (though it surely never hurts to hear new objections, etc.), I would think the benefits of dissemination would be all the greater when it comes to presenting one's published work, as selection effects mean it is likely to be of higher quality than one's current work-in-progress. The audience would benefit more from being exposed to your most interesting ideas (assuming you aren't so famous that they'd heard it all before), and you too would presumably benefit more from disseminating your best ideas rather than simply your most recent ones.

So, why doesn't this happen? (Or, if it sometimes happens, just without my being aware of it: why not more often?)

Friday, April 10, 2015

Questioning Moral Equality

[Warning: the post below raises questions that may be morally corrupting.  Engage with them at your own peril!]

If there's one thing that pretty much all moral theorists these days agree on, it's that all persons are moral equals in some important sense.  Not that all people are equally morally good, of course -- there's as much variation in our ethicality as there is along any other dimension of human life.  But the thought seems to be that, nonetheless, we are all equally worthy of moral consideration, our interests should be counted equally, or something along those lines.  But is this platitude really so plausible, on reflection?

Suppose Gandhi and Hitler are both dying in agony before you, and you have but a single dose of pain-relief you can administer.  Is it really plausible that you should flip a coin to decide who to help?  Surely the fact that Gandhi was (let's suppose for sake of argument!) an all-things-considered good guy, whereas Hitler was a vicious monster, gives us reason to prefer to help the former. (One could even go so far as to suggest that virtue-welfare mismatches are intrinsically bad, such that it's a positively good thing for Hitler to suffer.  But for now I'm just appealing to the weaker claim that it's more important to relieve the suffering of good people than it is to relieve the suffering of bad people.)

Friday, April 03, 2015

Forthcoming in Bioethics

... is my paper, 'Against "Saving Lives": Equal Concern and Differential Impact' [pdf].

It draws on many of my previous blog posts on the ethics of allocation, especially:
* Are QALYs Discriminatory? -- The basic argument against Harris's "discrimination" objection: It isn't objectionably discriminatory to prioritize greater harms/benefits over lesser ones, and that's all that QALYs are about.
* The associated mistake of conflating the worth of and to a person.
* Where Harris' Double Jeopardy objection goes wrong.
Lives Can't be Saved -- why person-numbers saved have no intrinsic significance, over and above maximizing life-years or other general welfare measures.
* QALYs, DALYs, and Complete Lives -- Why some life-years are worth more to us than others.
* Where QALYs go wrong -- More on why not all life-years (even in perfect health) are equal.

Here's hoping it will lead bioethicists to rethink their lazy reliance upon Harris' objections to QALYs...

Monday, February 16, 2015

Cancelling Schroeder's "Implicature" Response to Parfit's Trivality Objection

According to Parfit's Triviality Objection, metaethical naturalism can't adequately capture our ability to make substantive positive normative claims.  For example, suppose a subjectivist naturalist wants to hold both:

Normative Subjectivism: You have reasons for action just when that act would fulfill one of your desires; and

Reductive Thesis: What it is to have a reason for action just is for that action to be such as to fulfill one of your desires.

Parfit responds that, if the Reductive Thesis were true, Normative Subjectivism could no longer state a positive substantive normative fact, since it would not be attributing any further normative property to acts that fulfill one of your desires.  It would just be to re-attribute that same property under another guise, and so the only real normative fact in the vicinity would be the negative one that there is no further normative property of being a reason that acts may have when they have the property of being such as to fulfill your desires (or whatever).

Schroeder responds, in 'What Matters about Metaethics' (forthcoming, pp.7-8), that on his view positive normative claims are still possible because the attribution of reasons pragmatically implicates that the reasons in question are relatively weighty ones.  And the property of being a weighty reason is a further normative property, just as Parfit asked for.

I have a couple of worries about this response.  Firstly, Schroeder is relying on pragmatic implicatures from normative claims in order to explain their status as positive substantive normative claims, but implicature is cancellable.  So consider the following putatively positive substantive normative claim:

Friday, February 13, 2015

Thoughts on 'Non-Consequentialism Demystified'

'Non-Consequentialism Demystified' is a really interesting new paper in Phil Imprint by Nye, Plunkett & Ku.  It makes two moves, in particular, that I want to focus on in this post.

First, it proposes an interesting analysis of distinctively moral normativity (something that has puzzled me before) in terms of the fittingness of feelings of obligation.  While there's clearly an intimate connection here, it's natural to wonder about the direction of explanation: If you are morally obligated to Φ, that would provide a straightforward explanation of why it's fitting to feel obligated thus. On the other hand, if the distinctive phenomenology is meant to explain what it is to be morally obligated, we might feel that some other explanation is needed of when and why such phenomenology is fitting.  Insofar as emotions (like fear) have fittingness conditions, these seem derivable from their cognitive content: the implicit claim being made by the emotion in question (e.g. that you're in danger).  But what is the cognitive content of a feeling of obligation?  Surely not just the vacuous reflexive thought that this very feeling is fitting.

Tuesday, February 03, 2015

Information and Parfit's Fact Stating Argument

In Chapter 26 of On What Matters (vol 2), Parfit sets out his (comparatively neglected) 'Fact-Stating Argument' against non-analytical moral naturalism.  This begins by distinguishing the referential and informational senses of "same fact".  Consider the following three claims:

(J) Shakespeare is Shakespeare
(K) Shakespeare and the writer of Hamlet are one and the same person.
(L) Shakespeare wrote Hamlet.

Parfit explains:
In the referential sense, (J) and (K) state the same fact, since both claims refer to Shakespeare and tell us that Shakespeare has the property of being numerically identical to himself.  In the informational sense, however, (J) and (K) state different facts. Unlike (J), (K) refers to Shakespeare in a way that also tells us that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet. In the informational sense, it is (K) and (L) that state the same fact.

Parfit then goes on to consider the moral naturalist's thesis:
(Q) moral rightness is the same as some particular natural property