Sunday, May 21, 2017

Nanoseconds that Matter

Take an arbitrarily short duration -- I'll speak of 'nanoseconds' for familiarity and convenience, but you could use an even smaller measure of time.  Could removing a mere (arbitrary) nanosecond from your life plausibly make your life any worse on the whole?  You might think not, on the basis that "surely nothing of any significance could occur during such a short time."  On the other hand, if you remove all the nanoseconds then we have no life left at all, which is certainly a significant difference.  Is it coherent to think that many individually worthless moments might collectively have value?

I have my doubts, and have previously suggested that such putatively vague goods (as a "sufficient duration to matter") are better understood as graded and/or involving threshold effects.  A friend suggested minuscule scales of time as a challenge to this view, but I think my approach still makes good sense of this case.  Here's how...

Aggregating the Right Moments

Should we prefer to give one person half a million minutes (i.e. one year) more life, or to give a million people one minute more each?  If iterated a million times over (once for each person in the million), the latter repeated choice is clearly better for all (by half a million minutes).  Moreover, as I suggested in comments to that post, if we assume that the million choices are independent of each other in value -- that is, the value of making one such choice does not depend on how the other choices are made -- then it quickly follows that it's better to give the million tiny benefits rather than the one big benefit, even in a one-off choice situation.

However, it's worth flagging that on one very natural (but philosophically distorting) way of imagining the situation, the independence assumption will not hold.

Saturday, April 22, 2017

Universalizing Tactical Voting

I regularly come across two objections to tactical voting, i.e. voting for Lesser Evil rather than Good in hopes of defeating the Greater Evil candidate.  One objection is just the standard worry that individual votes lack instrumental value, debunked here.  More interestingly, some worry that tactical voting is positively problematic, morally speaking, on grounds of its putative non-universalizability.

On one version of the worry, tactical voting involves (something approaching) a contradiction in the will, insofar as even if those who most prefer Good constituted a majority, they could get stuck in the inferior equilibrium point of all (unnecessarily, and contrary to their collective preference) supporting Lesser Evil.  On another version of the worry, tactical voting involves (something like) a contradiction in conception, insofar as it involves responding to how others plan to vote, which might seem to depend upon those others voting non-tactically, i.e. not waiting to first learn how you plan to vote.

Monday, April 10, 2017

Assessing the NMC's Defense of its Independent Midwifery Ban

After receiving much criticism for its effective ban on independent midwifery, the NMC released a document [pdf] that seeks to explain and justify their position (see especially the fourth and final page).

Their central conclusion is that they are simply following orders, and it isn't their responsibility to do anything to mitigate the harms they're thereby causing:

Wednesday, February 08, 2017

Our Zombie Bodies, and Physicalist Epiphenomenalism

Eric Olson has a fascinating paper, 'The Zombies Among Us' (forthcoming in Nous), where he points out that standard constitutional theories of persons imply that our bodies are phenomenal zombies -- physically identical to us but lacking conscious experiences (or indeed any mental properties).

Friday, January 27, 2017

Medical Indemnity: Protection or Compensation?

One of the (many) puzzling elements of the NMC anti-midwifery fiasco is the NMC's insistence that, by shutting down midwives whom they judge to have "insufficient" indemnity cover, they are thereby "mak[ing] sure that all women and their babies are provided with a sufficient level of protection should anything go wrong," and that they "had to act quickly in the interests of public safety."

This rhetoric strikes me as deeply misleading.  Indemnity cover is not a public safety issue.  Not only does it do nothing to prevent bad medical outcomes from occurring in the first place, it cannot even ensure in general that financial support is available when needed for increased caring costs associated with (e.g.) disability.  All that indemnity cover does for patients is ensure that greater compensation can be paid in a malpractice lawsuit -- a very rare and specific set of circumstances.

Indemnity cannot be relied upon to "protect" families "should anything go wrong" because it does not cover anything going wrong, but only things going wrong due to malpractice on the part of the medical practitioner.  If a baby suffers brain damage due to unavoidable complications, for example, indemnity will not help. For that, we need disability support as part of the general social safety net.

Tuesday, January 17, 2017

UK Shuts Down Independent Midwives

A new low for harmful over-regulation: The UK has just regulated independent midwives out of business (at least for the time being).  The Nursing and Midwifery Council decided that they did not consider the indemnity cover of Independent Midwives UK (which has worked fine since indemnity cover was legally mandated in 2014) to be "adequate" after all.  So, as of 11 January last week, independent midwives have been legally barred from attending the births of their clients, severely disrupting the birth plans of these expectant parents (threatening their right to a home birth, disrupting their continuity of care, and generally undermining patient autonomy and the values that led these expectant parents to invest in an independent midwife in the first place).

Saturday, January 07, 2017

2016 in review

(Past annual reviews: 20152014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004.)


Applied Ethics

* The Instrumental value of one vote -- can be much higher than many philosophers seem to assume.

* Pets and Slavery -- explains why domesticated animals are not inherently wronged by their guardians, or morally akin to "slaves".

* Philanthropic focus vs abandonment -- diagnoses some bad reasoning from the CEO of Oxfam, who mistakenly thinks there are reasons of fairness to help people inefficiently.

Thursday, December 22, 2016

Is Consequentialism More Demanding?

People sometimes complain that impartial consequentialism is "too demanding", insofar as it requires us (comparatively) wealthy and fortunate people to do a lot to help the less fortunate.  And it's true that those are non-trivial costs.  But it's hard to take seriously the suggestion that these costs are morally more significant than the costs endured by the less fortunate by our doing less (or nothing).  So-called "moderate" views of beneficence are in fact extremely costly for the worst-off -- much worse than consequentialism is for the wealthy.  So it's an odd objection.

Sunday, December 18, 2016

Illustrating the Paradox of Deontology

One who accepts a "consequentialism of rights" might hold that deliberating killing an innocent person (let's call this "murder", for short) is so morally bad that it isn't justified even to save five lives.  But deontologists go further, suggesting that one should not murder even to prevent five other murders.  This seems puzzling: if murder is so morally horrendous, why should we not be concerned to minimize its occurrence?  This is Scheffler's paradox of deontology in a nutshell.