The Moral Relevance of Non-Natural Properties

I've been thinking about the "ethical idlers" objection to non-naturalism recently, especially in light of Matt Bedke's really interesting forthcoming paper “A Menagerie of Duties?: Normative Judgments are not Beliefs about Non-Natural Properties”.  As Bedke introduces the problem:

What things are like non-naturally is not relevant to our normative judgments in the way we would expect them to be if such judgments were beliefs about those sorts of properties. Non-natural properties would belong to a menagerie of curiosities if we could map and catalog them, but our deepest normative convictions do not hang on how they are arranged.

Birthday Fundraising

To celebrate turning 29, I'm asking friends / readers / anyone who's feeling generous to donate $29 to Deworm the World, a top-rated charity recommended by both GiveWell and Giving What We Can.

(For larger donations, I still recommend giving to the meta-charities themselves.  But for smaller amounts like this, I think there's a lot to be said for the movement-building potential of these kinds of social media campaigns.)

Also, if you haven't already: Join Giving What We Can!  By donating 10% of your income to the most effective charities, you can expect to save hundreds of lives over your lifetime (or significantly benefit thousands).  And that's just the direct impact.  If your example encourages others to follow suit, your indirect impact could be even greater.  The financial cost is insignificant in comparison, and members generally report increased personal happiness and life satisfaction.  It's pretty neat to be able to make such a big difference, so easily.