(1) Objects in Flux: On this view, objects are taken to be the fundamental building blocks of reality, and they endure as they change. Abstracting from these concrete changes in objects gives rise to the notion of time. But since temporal talk is just a way of regimenting the changes objects undergo, the resulting conception of time is thoroughly tensed and indeed presentist in nature. The objects existing now are, strictly speaking, the only objects that there are; though we can also speak of what was (before certain changes took place), and speculate about what will be.
Laws of nature are generative: they govern how the world changes, and so bring about the future. These changes involve genuine causation.
There are fundamental facts about the identities and essences of things: whether this object will endure through various changes, or whether it will instead be replaced by a different kind of thing. In this way, the view endorses haecceitism and essentialism. De re (or objectual) modality is seen as prior to de dicto (or qualitative) modality, as famously championed by Kripke (ht: Rad Geek):
[W]e do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects. (53)
(2) Timeless Qualities: On this picture, qualities (shape, mass, charge, etc.) are fundamental, and distributed across the four dimensions of space-time. Comparing different moments of time gives rise to the notion of change. Reality is itself tenseless, as all moments of time are metaphysically on a par. ('Now' functions as an indexical, much like 'here'.) They stand in 'before' and 'after' relations to other moments, but there's no privileged location in time that qualifies as objectively present. Each moment is present to itself. The space-time "loaf" as a whole is eternal.
Laws of nature merely describe patterns or regularities in spacetime. They are explanatorily downstream of the space-time "loaf". There's no fundamental causation -- mere "constant conjunction", as Hume taught us.
There are no deep facts about identities or essences -- such talk is purely conventional. We can bundle different qualities (spread through space and time) together into "objects" however we like. There are no deep facts about de re modality, or whether I could have been a poached egg. All is qualitative, as Lewis would have it. So, first we grasp the qualitative possibilities, and then we decide which of the people in those possible worlds are enough like me to qualify as my "counterparts" for our current purposes.
Do you agree that these are the most natural ways to "cluster" the specific metaphysical views discussed? Have I missed anything? For convenience, let's call adherents of the two pictures "Fluxians" and "Humeans", respectively. Presumably most Humeans will be either physicalists or epiphenomenalists about the mind. Any interactionist dualists would surely adhere to something closer to the "objects in flux" picture (though it's not a strict dichotomy, of course; also worth noting that Fluxians need not be dualists). I suspect that Humeans tend strongly towards consequentialism, whereas deontologists are more likely to be Fluxians (or, again, somewhere in that general vicinity).
Geographically speaking, this 'Humean' worldview is strongly associated with Australian philosophy. It seems likely to appeal to those with a penchant for systematization, and a suspicion of extravagant metaphysics. Though rarely discussed together, it seems very natural to say, "Haecceities? Natural rights? Nonsense on stilts, the both of them!"
If you agree with my categorization: which cluster are you more drawn to, and why?