It takes considerable faith, for example, to believe that the very same laws of nature apply throughout reality and that those laws are remotely accessible to the human mind... It also takes faith, and considerable devotion, to believe that reality is worth knowing, and that it's therefore worth struggling to discover a coherent, unified theory of everything (which we certainly don't have now). Without those dogmas, "science" only names a compendium of sometimes useful techniques and partial hypotheses which we have no reason to expect to be coherent or of any more general interest than stamp collecting. The question must then be: what sort of universe must we think this is if those dogmas are to be believable? And the answer, perhaps, is that Christian theism provides a more plausible metaphysics than currently fashionable materialism.
There's a curious narrowing of the options implicit in that closing sentence. I'm reminded of adolescents who turn to religion after deciding that the "party lifestyle" is not for them. (Drunks are tedious, therefore God exists?) At least in that case there's a kind of social reason for limiting one's consideration to the most common/conventional options: if one's project is to belong to an agreeable social group, and one finds a higher concentration of agreeable folks in the local religious tribe, then that may be more appealing than 'going it alone' in an area with few sober secular types.
But when we're engaged in an explicitly epistemic project of truth-seeking? There I find the focus on conventional religions utterly baffling. ("Materialism is false, therefore Jesus rose from the dead" is not a great improvement over the argument from drunkards.) Don't get me wrong: I find deism pretty reasonable, and am sympathetic to worries about fine-tuning and contingent existence. I can see why those worries could lead one to reasonably posit some sort of creator deity (though I am not myself persuaded that this is the best response). That's fine. What I can't understand (except in terms of non-rational social influences) is why anyone would think to supplement this minimal deistic hypothesis with one of the bundles of absurd historical claims made by established religions.
(One finds even more egregious examples of such 'bundling', e.g., in those who don't realize that one can accept moral realism, or dualism about the mind, without thereby committing oneself to theism!)