- In light of our fallibility, should we have less credence than would be ideally warranted [arguably: 1] in logical and purely normative truths?
- Is there a difference between rationality and reasonableness? (Might we fruitfully analyze the former as an 'ideal' notion and the latter as a kind of normativity more tailored to 'non-ideal' agents?)
- Can purely normative ignorance affect what's rational? Praise/blameworthy?
- If it is rational to commit to a policy, is it thereby rational to act on the policy in each instance? Is it praiseworthy?
- What is the relation between (ir)rationality, virtue (vice), and (blame/)praiseworthiness?
- Are the above (e.g. rationality or virtue) types of evaluation in conflict with ordinary consequentialist evaluations of character?
- Is consequentialism self-effacing? Is the pluralistic motivational structure of "indirect" or "sophisticated consequentialism" coherent/possible, or does it collapse into crude subjective consequentialism (with its single ultimate aim)?
- Does virtue consist in concern for the ultimate right-making feature [viz., maximizing utility], or just the surface [prima facie] right-making features possessed by typically utility-promoting acts [e.g. promise-keeping, respecting rights and autonomy, helping others in need, etc.]?
Follow the original link for further explanation, and for my first pass at a list of relevant readings. (Some I haven't read yet, so may be removed if they turn out not to be so relevant after all.) Please leave a comment here or email me if you have any further suggestions for readings I should add to my list!
(I'm also open to suggestions for tweaking my topic questions, though I'm less likely to change them in the absence of compelling reasons.)