People sometimes seem to have 'absolutist' deontological intuitions. For example, they may object to consequentialism on the grounds that there are possible circumstances in which it would mandate murdering innocent civilians (if this would in fact serve the greater good). A standard consequentialist response is to say, "I'm glad you're so strongly opposed to murdering innocent people. I am too. This is a good (utility-promoting) attitude for people in our world to have, and I suspect it is really this 'local' (contingent) moral fact that your intuition is latching on to. So that's no reason to doubt the consequentialist's claim that there are other possible worlds, wildly different from ours, in which this norm would no longer apply." Is this a legitimate response?
There seems something a bit suspicious about reinterpreting someone else's intuitions for them. (Anne: "You're not really intuiting that murder is necessarily wrong." Bill: "Eh? Since when did you become a mind-reader?") Each individual is, of course, the final authority when it comes to their own intuitions. Still, there's nothing wrong with highlighting the differences between two easily conflated claims, and so encourage others to carefully re-assess whether their intuition is really of the one or the other. I think that the sorts of scenarios discussed in my post 'The Contingent Right to Life' should convince most people that the ordinary norms they've internalized only hold contingently, just as indirect utilitarians claim.
(There might be the odd absolutist holdout, but you can never convince everyone. The important thing, I take it, is to explain how consequentialism needn't be at odds with ordinary intuitions, which I think mostly just concern what moral norms apply in ordinary circumstances.)