(1) Consciousness. It's a common trope that "people" reject physicalism in favour of some form of dualism simply because they want to believe that humans are "special". No doubt this is true of some people. But it certainly isn't true of every critic of physicalism (much though some might like to pretend otherwise -- using a straw-man foil for rhetorical effect). If anything, I would prefer that physicalism be true (as you can see from my 'Wishful Thinking Alert' a few years ago). I've just come to the honest conclusion that the weight of arguments is against it. You can accuse me of bad judgment in this respect, but you can't accuse me of wishful thinking.
(2) Disputing alleged 'obligations'. Eric Schwitzgebel recently wrote:
I suspect that if, indeed, ethicists don't tend to consider voting a duty that may be post-hoc rationalization rather than genuine moral insight.
But, again, I personally enjoy voting and similar political acts (serving on a jury, etc.), so my belief that it is not morally obligatory certainly isn't a rationalization of personal preference.
I find the above quote particularly strange, because you would think the reasonable prior assumption would be to favour the experts over folk opinion in case of disagreement. (Several commenters raised similar concerns about Eric's project, here.) Surely if anyone has reasons worth considering on a controversial moral question, it's going to be moral philosophers! So that strikes me as an especially inadvisable case of alleging rationalization.
Are there any general rules on offer here? Wishful thinking is an epistemic vice -- a form of irrationality -- so I guess one's readiness to make such an accusation should reflect one's prior judgment of how unreasonable (how poor an epistemic agent) one's interlocutor is.