Many theists seem to treat the 'logical' problem of evil as refutable simply by establishing that God's existence is compatible with (some possible instance of) evil. They then infer that the only real challenge is from the 'evidential' problem of evil, which even if it works merely shows there is some (pro tanto, defeasible) evidence against God's existence. So, nothing too threatening.
But this is poor reasoning. The mere fact that God's existence is compatible with some possible evils does not establish that we have only probabilistic evidence against his existence. For, obviously enough, it does not entail that God's existence is compatible with the particular evils we actually observe. Indeed, I think there's a very strong case to be made that God's existence is logically incompatible with the particular evils we observe.
Since my conclusion is that God's existence is impossible, not merely improbable, it would seem misleading to call this an 'evidential' argument from evil. It is properly considered a logical argument from evil. But it certainly isn't refuted by yelping, "free will! free will!" So it's a mistake for theists to claim that the logical argument from evil has been refuted. (At best, all they've refuted is the most simple, straw-man version of the argument.)