Now, far be it from me to dispute any movement's decisions about how to define its terms. But these rather strong criteria [for who qualifies as a real feminist] strike me as incompatible with the expressions of frustration we sometimes hear about people's reluctance to self-apply the label "feminist." The criteria in those cases seem rather looser: "Don't you support gender equality? Don't you think people doing equivalent work should be paid the same? Aren't you opposed to rigid gender roles and double-standards? Well, then you're a feminist!" If that's the standard, then I am a feminist, and so are the vast majority of people I know. If the standard is the wholesale acceptance, in practice as well as theory, of the ideology held by the modal Feministe commenter, I suppose I'm not and probably don't aspire to be. But by that standard, neither are most women I know.
The problem generalizes: any movement or ideology will face conflicting pressures towards both inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, a "big tent" is required to attract people to your tribe. But on the other hand, you also want to persuade these people to adopt your more specific (and controversial) views. It's easy enough to apply social pressure once they've signed up, as nobody wants to lose their tribal identity. What better way to manipulate people into agreeing with you? Force a choice between "The Patriarchy is oppressing women everywhere!" and "Bah, then you oppose gender equality!", and hope no-one notices the false dilemma.
I guess that's a reason to be suspicious of labels in general. Their equivocation is avoided if we tackle the issues directly. It hardly matters what we call our resulting view. But there's a sense in which such definitional squabbles may be more substantive than they seem. Most charitably, arguments about the "true meaning" of an ideological label may be interpreted as questioning what is the most coherent and compelling version of that ideology, i.e. what position the diverse adherents would eventually converge upon, given ideal epistemic conditions. Importantly, such claims then stand in need of real argumentative support, rather than mere definitional stipulation.
Having said that, if stipulation is called for, I would recommend going with a narrower position for sake of enabling debate. There's no point taking a stand when nobody disagrees with you in the first place!