Perhaps my favourite of the mind-boggling Big Questions is the one that asks, "Why am I me and not someone else?"
Note that this is not really a question about ontological identity. It's not like asking why this chair is not instead a table, or anything silly like that. I'm not asking why the physical object denoted by 'Richard Chappell' is not instead some other object. That would be silly. Rather, it is a question about the location of my consciousness. I am asking why I (the Cartesian 'pure ego') happen to have my 'camera of consciousness' located in Richard Chappell. Why isn't my camera located somewhere else? Why don't I instead see the world from some other perspective?
Nor is it a question about access consciousness per se. Richard Chappell can only access the information that is stored in his brain. He doesn't have direct access to the brains of other people. He isn't surprised by this (and nor am I). What is surprisingly is the locative fact that I = Richard Chappell. Again, why am I - the disembodied metaphysical subject of experience that I am - not somebody else instead?
It seems that the only sensible answer is that I am not a disembodied metaphysical subject of experience! There does not exist any 'pure ego' above and beyond the physical object that is Richard Chappell. I am reducible to him. No doubt Dennett would dismiss my 'camera of consciousness' metaphor as every bit as pernicious and misleading as the Cartesian Theatre (you know, that place where consciousness 'happens'). But it's so difficult not to think of consciousness and selfhood in terms of these 'pictures', misleading though they may be. It's especially difficult to reject them when we lack sufficiently clear and developed alternative pictures to replace them with. *sigh*