Philosophy, et cetera

In a rare online appearance, Helen  is interviewed on Mind Chat  by Philip Goff and Keith Frankish about her book-in-progress,  The View Fro...

... by the brilliant Helen Yetter-Chappell  [forthcoming in T. Goldschmidt & K. Pearce (eds.)  Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics , Oxf...

"How is it possible for creatures like us to chart the realm of possibilities? Of course, this is a curious question, to the extent tha...

I've long thought that a shared virtual world  could, in principle, be just as "real" (in any sense that matters) as the mater...

While there are any number of logically consistent combinations of metaphysical views that one could  hold, it seems to me that there are tw...

Here 's a fun "interactive survey" (ht: Joshua Rasmussen ) that asks you about a bunch of general metaphysical principles, and...

Explanations come in various different forms. Sometimes we are interested in strictly causal " actual sequence " explanations, wh...

Oh dear -- Reason Online has just (re)published a morass of philosophical confusion : The brain is a physical organ. As such, it follows th...

In Chapter 31 of On What Matters , Parfit defends a view he calls 'non-metaphysical cognitivism': There are some claims that are ir...

[Some thoughts inspired by Shamik 's recent talk 'On the Plurality of Grounds'...] Suppose comparativism about mass is true, ...

Some consider virtual reality to be akin to mere hallucination, whereas others see it as potentially on a par with physical reality. Both s...

Kenny Pearce has an interesting post contrasting Locke's and Berkeley's diverging approaches to common sense: Locke's goal, it ...

Background: we define 'grue' such that it applies to any object satisfying the disjunctive condition: either the object is first o...

Rachael remarks on the ' structure and similarity ' discussion: Should we distinguish between predicates that are projectable and pr...

It is important to separate the two kinds of intuitions. Suppose you are initially inclined to intuit thus: "the property of being a do...

After my uncharacteristic espousal of some form of metaphysical realism, I feel a more deflationary argument is in order. In particular, I ...

I once thought that all possible ways of categorizing the world were metaphysically on a par. We may find it more useful to talk of tables ...

Is consciousness ontologically irreducible? Richard Brown thinks that the question is incoherent: What [the identity theorist] says is that...

Follow-up to: Logical Subtraction and Partial Truth Yablo proposes that (1) the real content of a statement S is what it says as opposed to...

Stephen Yablo gave a very impressive series of lectures here last week. His core insight was that often we can communicate important truths ...