tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post8750661169193591547..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Co-operation vs. BenevolenceRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-17630418179268397992010-02-17T21:17:58.238-05:002010-02-17T21:17:58.238-05:00Richard, what you described was rule utilitarianis...Richard, what you described was rule utilitarianism, which is kind of odd. What I'm proposing is different. <br /><br />Lets take act consequentialism: Act so as to maximise utility/welfare/desire satisfaction/value. We will call this principle A.<br /><br />With (what I call) a contractualist framework, we should ask whether it is desirable that everybody act on principle A, or whether anyone can reasonably object to acting on principle A. maybe some things will have be further specified and defended, but the purpose of the contractualist approach is to test out particular principles to see whether they are self defeating in particular important ways.Muralihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08036249483538443818noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-8492292639515553142010-02-16T14:12:14.832-05:002010-02-16T14:12:14.832-05:00Oh, right, one could combine the two views and so ...Oh, right, one could combine the two views and so be revisionary both in prescribing certain ultimate ends <i>and</i> in one's instrumental reasoning about how to achieve those ends. (I think that'd be a bad idea though. It could be disastrous -- i.e. bad -- to act in ways that, if only <i>everyone</i> were to follow suit, <i>would</i> be good. Counterfactual benefits are no justification for actual harms.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-67974302904977053152010-02-16T00:01:18.655-05:002010-02-16T00:01:18.655-05:00It's merely a label for the instrumental, Hobb...<i>It's merely a label for the instrumental, Hobbesian view that I go on to describe. </i><br /><br />OK, so I should probably go and (in my head at least) find/replace all instances of contractualism with contractarianism.<br /><br />The thing that was bothering me is that because morality refers to principles that apply to everyone (and not just Murali and Richard) that the moral rightness of a principle pertains to the desirability/objectionableness of everyone acting (or desiring) according to said principle. On the face of it, this too seems like <i>"reasoning as if the other will decide as you do, no matter that in fact the other agent's decision procedure is (by stipulation) completely independent of your own."</i>Muralihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08036249483538443818noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-25237928950805174102010-02-15T23:24:17.798-05:002010-02-15T23:24:17.798-05:00Hi Murali, you seem to have misread my post. My u...Hi Murali, you seem to have misread my post. My use of the word 'contractualism' here is <i>stipulative</i>. It's merely a label for the instrumental, Hobbesian view that I go on to describe. If you don't like the label, feel free to mentally replace it with another. (I'm certainly not referring to Scanlonian contractualism here!)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-5408570488802381012010-02-15T23:05:14.092-05:002010-02-15T23:05:14.092-05:00Richard, I think you have a false dichotomy going ...Richard, I think you have a false dichotomy going on here. Particularly, its not that having a contractualist approach precludes the axiological route. Also, it kind of mischaracterises contractualism as using some kind of means ends reasoning.<br /><br />Its more the case that contractualism is a kind of framework (the only or the best or possibly just one of the essential ones) from which to evaluate general categorical claims. Axiological claims, according to buck passing accounts, are categorical claims.<br /><br />i.e. if the axiological route is one where you can criticise various final ends and argue that certain axiological claims are more reasonable than others, it seems that the contractualist framework is precisely one of the ways in which this criticism of axiological claims may be carried out. As a contractualist, I would say that the contractualist framework is indispensable in the analysis of general axiological claims. And all the deontologist has to say is that there are true categorical claims that are not parasitic on axiological claimsMuralihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08036249483538443818noreply@blogger.com