tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post8634979485959755463..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: What's Wrong With 'What Is Marriage?'Richard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger44125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-86818729723802471422012-12-14T15:57:10.959-05:002012-12-14T15:57:10.959-05:00Sorry for leaving this very interesting and illumi...Sorry for leaving this very interesting and illuminating conversation hanging for so long. End of the semester, you know.<br /><br />I like the way you put the question at the end of your most recent comment, and I think I better understand the point of your objection now. It's not clear to me, however, whether you think a correct understanding of marriage depends on (1) what kind(s) of union people care about or (2) what kind(s) of union it would be good for them to care about?<br /><br />I'm not sure how to go about answering those questions myself. Question 1 seems likely to produce a range of answers, depending on whom you ask. Question 2 threatens to run into some serious paradoxes, turning on the question of how to identify a standard of worth that does not rely on actual care in a way that vitiates its independence as a measure. (This is a big puzzle for me that I'd love to see your take on.)<br /><br />I think you would find that many couples approach marriage intending to become literally "one flesh," although I am sure there are plenty of couples for whom marriage is a more supersensible business. Perhaps we need a more fine-grained vocabulary to account for such differences in intention.<br /><br />At any rate, I admit that I can't say precisely why someone who doesn't already care about union along the bodily dimension of personhood should change his attitude, so perhaps we've got as far as philosophy can take us re: our particular disagreement.<br /><br />Thanks again for the exchange. I hope to comment on some other posts soon!Amos Hunthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00262758674894498892noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-85167710001993857102012-12-03T15:34:33.975-05:002012-12-03T15:34:33.975-05:00Thanks Amos, I'm enjoying the discussion. (It&...Thanks Amos, I'm enjoying the discussion. (It's always nice to have an interlocutor who engages with my objections in a clear and logical way!)<br /><br />By 'fetishism' in this context I just mean attributing great moral/normative significance to something that doesn't merit it (and is instead morally irrelevant).<br /><br />Your representation of the argument for caring about biological functions is helpful. My response is to place some critical pressure on premises (1) and/or (3a), depending on exactly what is meant by "union" and dimensions that "belong to one's personhood".<br /><br />I'm not concerned about the "yuckiness" of joint digestion or anything. I'm merely bringing out that it doesn't seem <i>intrinsically significant</i>, merely in virtue of being a joint biological function. Neither is sex, for that matter. What makes either significant to a relationship, if it is, is its psychological and emotional consequences. You seem to implicitly appreciate this when you write that "it seems likely that any joint biological function would be accompanied by a satisfying feeling of integration reinforcing the bond". What matters, on my view, is precisely expressing and "reinforcing the bonds" between people, not simply sharing in biological functions as such.<br /><br />You write: "<i>If you give someone the choice between feeling completely satisfied with his marriage on the one hand, and being really one with his spouse on the other, I think he'll choose unity unless he's a really hard-nosed egoist. Actually being united, not just feeling like it, is the whole point.</i>"<br /><br />I agree. We can imagine a case where two people are not really "comprehensively united" in my (human psychological interests) sense, but falsely believe themselves to be. They think that they know each other well, have developed a shared life plan, etc., but they're actually completed mistaken about this. Circumstances allow them to somehow breeze through life in a subjectively happy way, each doing their own thing and never realizing that they don't actually understand and support each other. That is, on my view, a <i>terrible</i> relationship. But it's not terrible because they fail to be unified according to objective metaphysical functions. It's terrible because they haven't really come together on a <i>psychological</i> level or in terms of (many of) their central human interests.<br /><br />So, we agree that "actually being united, not just feeling like it, is the whole point." The question is <i>what kind of union</i> we care about. Is it a union of our thoughts, plans, values, interests, pleasures, and lives? Or is it "union" in some abstract metaphysical sense that has no necessary connection to human interests and concerns? It seems to me that only the former makes sense to care about.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-13730650058826578052012-12-03T13:57:53.323-05:002012-12-03T13:57:53.323-05:00Thanks for your very quick and thoughtful response...Thanks for your very quick and thoughtful response to such a late comment. This kind of engagement with your commenters is one of the things that makes you exceptional as a blogger (and as a dialectician). <br /><br />If I understand Girgis, et al correctly, the connection between the importance of bodies and the importance of biological function is supposed to be as follows:<br /><br />1. Marriage entails a union of persons along all dimensions which belong to their personhood.<br />2. Among other things, being a body belongs to the personhood of human beings.<br />3. The only way in which persons can enjoy union along the bodily dimension is coitus. Since: (a) union along the bodily dimension means in some non-wishy-washy sense being really one in body, and (b) the only kind of bodily conjunction that doesn't collapse into wishy-washiness is one that has the same kind of unity that the parts of a person's body have, and (c) the parts of a person's body have unity by virtue of biological functional interaction.<br /><br />I often get hoodwinked by subtle ambiguities in logic, so I may be missing something, but I think that the argument is at least valid, and does indicate a substantial connection between the importance of body (to being a person) and the importance of function (as accounting for real physical unity).<br /><br />Now you're saying that "central human interests" trump such metaphysical considerations of real unity, which are "fetishistic." If I understand this correctly, you are saying that physical realities are only of marginal interest to human beings, who are at heart concerned about feelings and psychological states. But I'm not sold on this hierarchy of interests, which sounds to me like a strictly egoistic interpretation of the motivation behind marriage. If you give someone the choice between feeling completely satisfied with his marriage on the one hand, and being really one with his spouse on the other, I think he'll choose unity unless he's a really hard-nosed egoist. Actually being united, not just feeling like it, is the whole point.<br /><br />You think it's implausible that joint digestion would be sufficient for marriage. I don't know why you would think so unless you were presupposing that the kind of intimacy appropriate to marriage had to have some natural connection to procreation. Maybe you're thinking of how repulsive it sounds, but I distinctly remember having exactly that thought in Sex Ed in 5th grade. From the point of view of natural selection, it seems likely that any joint biological function would be accompanied by a satisfying feeling of integration reinforcing the bond, no matter how icky it is when you think about it.<br /><br />BTW, can you point me to an explanation of what's meant by the term "fetishism?" Maybe somewhere else on your blog? This isn't a concept that figured large in my own education, so I never know *quite* what you mean.Amos Hunthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00262758674894498892noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-747516479340444612012-12-02T16:50:08.707-05:002012-12-02T16:50:08.707-05:00Hi Amos,
You bring out an interesting ambiguity, ...Hi Amos,<br /><br />You bring out an interesting ambiguity, in whether we should understand Girgis' "comprehensive union" as requiring <i>all</i> or merely <i>some</i> forms of "organic bodily union". I previously argued against the former view on the grounds that, in a world with possible joint digestion, it would be absurd to see joint digestion as <i>necessary</i> for marriage. But we can just as well use this case to argue against the latter view too. It is absurd to think that, in the described case, joint digestion would be <i>sufficient</i> for marriage. Sex is special in a way that mere joint digestion would not be. This shows that what they have in common -- being "joint biological functions" -- cannot be what's special about sex. Far more plausibly, it is something to do with the psychological and emotional intimacy thereby engendered that we are responding to. But of course, those effects are shared just as well by other forms of sex besides the kind that constitutes a "joint biological function". Girgis et al's obsession with "biological functions" is just completely bizarre, and his response -- that <i>bodies</i> matter -- does nothing at all to support the fetishitic view that biological <i>functions</i> matter.<br /><br />"<i>I am also left wondering what you think marriage is, and why you think the state should have anything to do with it. Or is it your opinion that it shouldn't?</i>"<br /><br />It is of course often easier to tell that one view is wrong than to determine which of the remaining contenders is right. As I sketched in the main post, I'm sympathetic to a view according to which there's distinctive value to relationships that are "comprehensive" in a sense that relates to <i>central human interests</i> (incl. sexual interests) rather than bio-functional fetishism. As a Consequentialist, I think the state should be involved in marriage just if it does more good than harm by doing so. Plausibly it does, but <b>if</b> it turns out I'm wrong about that, then I'd be okay with marriage becoming a matter for non-governmental civil society and culture.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-90726014739957404042012-12-02T16:18:40.396-05:002012-12-02T16:18:40.396-05:00Richard,
What if the reader has the misfortune of...Richard,<br /><br />What if the reader has the misfortune of finding Girgis's response fairly convincing, and your paraphrase of it inaccurate? Do you want truly to have persuaded us, or only to seem to yourself to have done all that could be done in that direction? <br /><br />It looks to me like your objection to the joint biological function argument misconstrues the logic of that argument, which is not that a comprehensive union requires union in every possible biological sense, but just that "any union of two people that did not involve organic bodily union [supply:of some kind] would not be comprehensive" (253). If it really were the case that some couples achieved such organic bodily union through joint digestion, this would perhaps be an alternative form of marriage (one in which the state could have no interest), since it would supply another means of organic bodily union, but it would not add a new requirement to marriage. (I am as disappointed as you surely are, by the way, that Girgis did not explicitly respond to this most colorful part of your criticism. We need more high-level conversations about joint digestion in this world.) As a matter of fact, the authors argue, there is only one candidate for organic bodily union. And it is because coitus (which unlike most organic functions has a significant potential effect on the common good) is the only form in which this union can be achieved that the state has an interest in regulating marriage. (Whether this interest translates into an actual power or right I would set aside as a distinct question.)<br /><br />I am also left wondering what you think marriage is, and why you think the state should have anything to do with it. Or is it your opinion that it shouldn't? <br /><br />Thanks for your assiduous work on this blog. I am always enlightened and challenged by what I read here.Amos Hunthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00262758674894498892noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-5938515111361606482012-09-19T22:24:35.535-04:002012-09-19T22:24:35.535-04:00Richard, so is it your position that conservative ...Richard, so is it your position that conservative Christianity, Catholicism, Mormonism, Islam, an orthodox Judaism cannot be held by reasonable people and there validity are not open questions in a modern society. I think that is a pretty big call.dshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03391070527721119070noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-69362983382728945052012-02-12T14:59:58.035-05:002012-02-12T14:59:58.035-05:00Richard what is your answer to the question, What ...Richard what is your answer to the question, What is marriage?<br /><br />You are highly confident, as you said, that it is a type of relationship that .... [fill-in the blank].<br /><br />The challenge posed also entails showing that society may justly draw eligibility lines around the essentials of the type of relationship (that you have in mind). The line against some related people and against polygnous, polyandrous, and polyamorous are specifically mentioned. The boundary would be around whatever distinguishes societal regard for what is in bounds, firstly, and whatever is out of bounds, secondarily or tertiarily.<br /><br />The challenge entails consideration of the reasonableness of coherently making normative such things as sexual (bodily encompasses this) exclusivity and consent and so forth. For instance, marriage entails a default that the husband and wife raise the children they jointly beget; and the sexual basis for that default is part and parcel of their consent to marry; as is the same sexual basis for consummation (sealng or completing the comprehensive union), for annulment (no marriage existed), adultery (grounds for fault and dissoution). Its treatment in custom and law reflects the coherency of what is a deeply private aspect that is also a deeply public aspect of societal regard for this type of union or relationship, as a difference in kind and not just degree of friendship. There is an independant reality that society regards in discriminating between marriage and nonmarriage. Society responds to that when privileging the type of relationship and when drawing boundaries or limits justly. <br /><br />So your answer to the above question needs to identify what would be normative, if anything, by virtue of being integral to the type of relationship rather than extrinsc to it. What is the basis for justly discriminating in favor of this type of relationship, gay union?<br /><br />This challenge does presume that the pro gay union view is one which distinguishes gay union from other types of relationships that are neither gay union nor husband-wife union. That is, presumably gay union and husband-wife union share definitive essentials that are not shared by the rest of the spectrum of relationship types ... before a label and status are affixed on one side of the boundary and denied on the other side. But there is room for rejection of that presumption. Please explain why you'd accept or reject it; and why ought to, morally as your rmarks suggest, follow and follow with the hgh confidence you claim for yourself.<br /><br />The conjugal view is coherent in its own right. The gay union view might be attached to it indirectly, perhaps, by way of metaphor rather than the distant analogy commonly (mistakenly) invoked. But such an attachment would be arbitrary in its own right and arbitrary if it excluded most of the rest of the nonmarriage types of relationships that populate society. It would be unjust 'piggybacking' and ultimately self-defeating.<br /><br />But you owe to the broader disussion your answer to the question, What is marriage? Your answer must be tested by the same measure you have used to test your understanding of the conjugal view. That testing you also owe the discussion, Richard, especially in light of your disclaimer which you described as your expression of high confidence which in effect is a leap of faith in supposed certitude.Chairmhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10485251953071927097noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-32987704018586358552011-08-31T10:59:46.442-04:002011-08-31T10:59:46.442-04:00That's an irrelevant point, Souza. I am raisin...That's an irrelevant point, Souza. I am raising the issue of same-sex reproduction using stem cell derived artificial gametes, which I think should not be allowed. Marriage is approval of procreating together and should remain so, so if we prohibit procreation we should prohibit marriage.John Howardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15367755435877853172noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-20438102460008442022011-08-03T13:52:27.220-04:002011-08-03T13:52:27.220-04:00I would strongly recommend not engaging with John ...I would strongly recommend not engaging with John Howard. He is a troll who frequently pops up in discussions of gay marriage and attempts to redirect the discussion into one of "procreation rights." What are "procreation rights," you ask? Well, according to Mr. Howard, only married people have the right to procreate or even have sex together; sex outside of or before marriage is "mutual rape," according to him. Yes, he actually said this at the Family Scholars blog. Seriously, do not engage.Souzahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18350614079264190044noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-31990141980700228092011-07-29T13:20:15.571-04:002011-07-29T13:20:15.571-04:00John Hanna - You conflate dogmatism with high conf...John Hanna - You conflate dogmatism with high confidence. It is quite possible to have high confidence in a proposition (that unicorns don't exist, or that there aren't any remotely sensible arguments against same-sex marriage) as a result of judiciously assessing the available evidence, and while remaining sensitive to any new contrary evidence that might (unexpectedly) later come to light.<br /><br />Are you not similarly confident that some moral views (e.g. "that black people should be enslaved") are so clearly and seriously wrong that there is something wrong with a society where they're seen as an open question? I am simply offering another moral judgment of that same kind.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-34597291616629581922011-07-29T12:12:51.288-04:002011-07-29T12:12:51.288-04:00"(P)lease don't interpret this as in any ..."(P)lease don't interpret this as in any way legitimating the paper or indicating that the arguments merit engagement. I think that in a morally sensible society this would not be considered an open question, any more than (say) whether women should be allowed to vote."<br /><br />What I find so interesting about the above “disclaimer” is the dogmatic epistemic certainty, especially considering the writer’s vocation. From where does it come? How can it be justified?<br /><br />This certainty requires two levels of justification. First, is the writer’s certainty concerning his own position. Then, there’s the additional level of certainty pertaining to all others – that they too should hold the same views on this issue as the writer. In other words, the writer is certain of his own belief and certain that all others should have that same belief. As a matter of fact, he also seems certain that others should hold to that same belief with the same certainty he does. That’s why it ought not to be an open question. <br /><br />Abdelsayed (I don't intend to sign in as 'anonymous')John Fouad Hannahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00395690315827704703noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-36757283464290177342011-07-27T02:53:22.731-04:002011-07-27T02:53:22.731-04:00Nope, not a separate issue, procreation rights is ...Nope, not a separate issue, procreation rights is the same issue as marriage rights.<br /><br />I know that most gay couples don't plan to conceive offspring together, that's my point: why demand a right that most people don't even want?<br /><br />Adoption and gamete donation are not marriage rights, conception of offspring is a marriage right.<br /><br />You might find creating people from whatever to be a right, but I don't think people have a right to create people from whatever they feel like.<br /><br />IVF at least joined natural gametes, with no genetic engineering or deriving them from stem cells.John Howardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15367755435877853172noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-63246466497763399012011-07-26T17:13:29.403-04:002011-07-26T17:13:29.403-04:00John - that seems a separate issue (most gay coupl...John - that seems a separate issue (most gay couples who are married or want to marry do not thereby plan to conceive offspring together, though many may want to adopt or have a child to which at least one partner is biologically related). Though I will say that your claim that modifying gametes is "unethical" does strike me as similarly baseless (and akin to the knee-jerk conservatism that greeted the invention of IVF).Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-36096448604035009812011-07-26T15:23:42.117-04:002011-07-26T15:23:42.117-04:00It's about the right to conceive offspring tog...It's about the right to conceive offspring together. The practical public policy question is "should we approve and allow people to conceive offspring with someone of the same sex?"<br /><br />And yes, it is possible using stem cell derived genetically modified gametes, or using computer synthesized DNA. Mice have already been created using cruder methods. None of these methods should be allowed, because it is unethical to manufacture a human being, the only ethical way to create people is by the union of a man and a woman using their unmodified natural gametes, so that we are all created equal.<br /><br />George et al fail to explain why siblings are not allowed to marry, since they are fully capable of bodily union. It is because society doesn't approve of them conceiving offspring together, it would be unethical. Same is true of same-sex couples.John Howardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15367755435877853172noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-71253738317093883222011-07-13T22:12:53.836-04:002011-07-13T22:12:53.836-04:00J.R., that's an interesting point about fertil...J.R., that's an interesting point about fertility. I would anticipate a reply of the following sort. Infertility is sometimes stigmatized. Therefore, the state should respect (where possible) the privacy of would-be newlyweds, and grant them marriage licenses without asking about their fertility status.<br /><br />I would counter: Many gender identities are also stigmatized. Therefore, the state should respect (where possible) the privacy of would-be newlyweds, and grant them marriage licenses without asking about their genders. <br /><br />Now it's true that gender, unlike fertility, is usually a matter of public knowledge. But of course, as Americans learn that their genders are often complex and sometimes stigmatized, that's increasingly not so.Raffihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10109665159697838835noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-9005145624599625272011-06-27T14:26:31.003-04:002011-06-27T14:26:31.003-04:00Zena8,
If their argument is that the production o...Zena8,<br /><br />If their argument is that the production of offspring is massively important, and marriage has the specific purpose of extending legal protection/rights to relationships towards that end, why can infertile couple get married?<br /><br />They're arguing that "comprehensiveness" is a necessary condition of marriage, and biological union is a necessary condition of comprehensiveness (253-254). They also argue that the biological union can be achieved in infertile opposite sex couples. This to me seems to indicate that, according to their own argument, offspring are not a necessary condition of marriage. So either we shouldn't extend marital rights to any couple incapable (or unwilling) of producing offspring, or the production of offspring has no leg to stand on in this argument.<br /><br />It seems to me that at this point it is more important for humanity writ large, and a duty of industrialized countries in particular, to raise already existing children, rather than produce more. In the U.S. alone over 100,000 children are adopted annually. Our population will increase by half in the next 40 years. Producing children is hardly an issue, raising them and supporting the massive amount of people we have now is. Same sex couples can provide a great benefit in this regard by adopting, but they can also produce their own offspring in-vitro.J.R.https://www.blogger.com/profile/10182878747724860064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-15815148011332055892011-06-26T17:39:05.699-04:002011-06-26T17:39:05.699-04:00Gergis, George et al are not arguing that everythi...Gergis, George et al are not arguing that everything that has a natural function ought to be legally protected. They are arguing that the specific natural function of heterosexual sex, the production of offspring, is massively important for human communities and so justifies a social and legal institution in order to secure the various social benefits they explain in the article.<br /><br />As for the alternative functions of human genitalia that Kenny mentions, it ought be noticed that the article does not claim to make any argument for the immorality of gay sex. Not every natural function warrants legal protection, and neither does every use of natural organs. This is explicit in the article with their test cases of sexless friendships and other forms of important human companionship.Zena8https://www.blogger.com/profile/03337266970309362570noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-20276732546455202772011-06-23T03:30:31.934-04:002011-06-23T03:30:31.934-04:00But Richard, a person might think that there is a ...But Richard, a person might think that there is a moral order implicit in the normal order of biology, if that person believes the order of living things has somehow been approved by God. I suppose the interesting question is whether biological norms (for example health) have any moral force in the absence of divine approval. (If God wants things to be healthy, that would be a reason to pursue health, I suppose -- but otherwise, you might wonder if health has anything to recommend it, in the final analysis -- if, for instance, for some reason, one does not prefer it.)firezdoghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11473050286104950159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-42395405048811407952011-06-22T16:56:40.445-04:002011-06-22T16:56:40.445-04:00Firezdog - moral 'fetishism' is when one m...Firezdog - moral 'fetishism' is when one misattributes intrinsic moral significance to something that doesn't warrant it. (For example, rule consequentialists and certain kinds of deontologists are sometimes accused of "rule fetishism" when they treat moral rules as more important than welfare outcomes.)<br /><br />Concerned - I think that human welfare matters, so obviously biology matters insofar as it makes a difference to people's wellbeing. What's fetishistic, I claim, is to attribute intrinsic moral significance to biological "functions" as such. One could try to give a consequentialist argument against gay marriage based on the importance of encouraging reproduction, but that would be a very different argument from the metaphysical one found in these authors (and it would face obvious problems of its own).Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-11055586421210923232011-06-21T11:41:59.087-04:002011-06-21T11:41:59.087-04:00No. I'm agreeing that marriage is a comprehens...No. I'm agreeing that marriage is a comprehensive relationship, and that it's comprehensiveness necessarily includes the possibility of acts that are connected to sexual reproduction. My argument, such as it was, was directed to the objection that there's nothing special about the biology of sexual reproduction, which seems as odd to me as saying that there's nothing special about breathing or eating food. Really? It's only our entire survival as a species that depends on those bodily functions, so maybe it isn't just a "fetish" to think there's something special about them and that other things people like to do with their bodily organs (whistle, blow bubbles, etc.) aren't quite as important. <br /><br />Another observation to add to the point I made about asexual reproduction: If human reproduction had evolved to require 15 people engaged in a complicated biological ritual, and if groups of 15 then started forming everywhere to live in a common house as a community, then human society would have evolved some sort of title for the 15-member communities that were associated with reproduction. That wouldn't be surprising at all, and it wouldn't be just a fetish to think that reproductive communities were somehow important.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-3269732880288492792011-06-21T04:54:09.875-04:002011-06-21T04:54:09.875-04:00Concerned, it looks like your point actually helps...Concerned, it looks like your point actually helps the case against the argument of Girgis, et al.<br /><br />They drew a connection between marriage and comprehensiveness, and then between comprehensiveness and biology. Richard challenged the second connection. And now it looks like you're challenging the first connection: you're saying that marriage has some deep connection to biology as such, independently of anything to do with comprehensive relationships.<br /><br />Now, your argument seems to presuppose a connection between the historical origin of a practice and its proper legal definition, and I doubt anyone will grant that connection without a fight. But leaving aside your argument, it looks like you would have to agree that the argument of Girgis, et al. isn't any good.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02048004230871749807noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-77916523674571696902011-06-20T18:26:54.449-04:002011-06-20T18:26:54.449-04:00I tried to be as open minded as possible and to gi...I tried to be as open minded as possible and to give it a charitable interpretation but it became hopelessly obvious to me after the 10th page that the paper is an abomination. The paper is atrociously poorly argued. I guess the standards for academic rigor is not the same in legal journals as it is in major philosophy journals. The paper also does not speak well for the institutions where the authors are employed.NChenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925449187109030870noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-16104454745122662282011-06-20T17:48:08.375-04:002011-06-20T17:48:08.375-04:00J.R.: "Bodies coordinating toward a single b...J.R.: "Bodies coordinating toward a single biological function for which each alone is not sufficient are rightly said to form an organic union."<br /><br />What other things would they say "form an organic union"? Does an ant-colony form an organic union?<br /><br />I think it's going to be very hard to give hypothetical counter-examples in these sorts of cases, because there won't be any agreement as to what features of a case must stay fixed and what permit of variation (after all, if a man had a vagina and a uterus and all that, perhaps he could bear children -- but then would he still be a man?)...<br /><br />But perhaps there is some agreement that we can whittle down this view to the proposition that marriage is a union between two people for the sake of THEMSELVES bearing and raising children?<br /><br />This is the one strong point that can be made, that gay couples cannot produce children on their own in the traditional way. Maybe that's what marriage has been or was supposed to be -- our quarrel is if that is what marriage should be.<br /><br />But what marriage is does seem to me to depend a little bit more on what those who are married are prepared to call it, than what eating is depends upon what those who eat call it, and so I am inclined to agree that marriage is more a part of custom than nature. (Like all culture, it is between natures -- the nature of the one cultivating, and the nature of the thing cultivated.)<br /><br />But having granted that, I think my only argument against traditionalists is that I do not accept their principles and I do not like their customs. That is not satisfying, and perhaps they will take advantage of my doubts and snatch me back into the fold, but sometimes it is enough to show that the tradition lacks force, even if one cannot show it lacks foundation. (There's always a foundation -- but foundation is a matter of degree, at least in the case of buildings!)firezdoghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11473050286104950159noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-85920167577842472092011-06-20T16:44:34.661-04:002011-06-20T16:44:34.661-04:00" Suppose an old heterosexual couple get lega..." Suppose an old heterosexual couple get legally married, and spend the rest of their lives together. They are dedicated to each other's welfare, and share all that they consider important in life. Maybe they even adopt a child to raise together. They kiss, buy each other flowers on occasion, and are sexually intimate in various ways. But, for some reason (perhaps the woman suffers from severe vaginism), they just never have vaginal intercourse. Does anyone really want to say that they aren't really married, or that their relationship somehow fails to fall under the same normative category as a similarly nurturing and (humanly-)comprehensive relationship that happens to involve sharing a "biological function" in addition?"<br /><br />This is a test case for your own position. If we human beings reproduced asexually, and if the most intense human relationships that existed were what is described in your paragraph above, marriage would never have been invented. It would never have been seen as necessary. The very notion of pair-bonding would never have had privileged status. <br /><br />If biological functions are as irrelevant as you claim, there should be no such thing as "marriage." You need to start to think about why marriage should exist at all -- as some officially named relationship with legal duties attached to it -- and why it has been seen as different from every other form of relationship (roommates, best friends, nephew-ship, etc.). Once you come up with a theory for THAT, then you will be prepared to say why the concept of "marriage" should be broadened. <br /><br />Otherwise, your arguments seem merely confused, like someone who says, "I can't see why the title 'eating' shouldn't be applied to the act of listening to music. Listening to music is a great thing, it's as pleasurable as eating, and it even serves some of the same purposes (encouraging community, entertainment, etc..). I just can't tell the difference, and it's only a fetish to say that the biological function of consuming calories has anything to do with 'eating.'"Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-71933093537141835332011-06-20T16:00:36.392-04:002011-06-20T16:00:36.392-04:00Benjamin,
I find their rejoinder to the infertil...Benjamin, <br /><br />I find their rejoinder to the infertility argument to be pretty weak. Here is a snippet:<br /><br />"Similarly, the behavioral parts of the process of reproduction do not lose their dynamism toward reproduction if non‐behavioral factors in the process—for example, low sperm count or ovarian problems—prevent conception from occurring, even if the spouses expect this beforehand. As we have argued, bodies coordinating toward a single biological function for which each alone is not sufficient are rightly said to form an organic union." (267)<br /><br />Notice firstly that they use examples that do not elicit in the reader a sense of certainty. Why not use an example like a woman that had a hysterectomy at age 12? Why not use examples where it is clear that it is physically impossible for them to procreate? Why use words like "expect this" rather than "know"? I think this is an oblique way of influencing the reader. Maybe that is a bit ticky-tack, but it does bother me.<br /><br />But if we look at the substance of it, ignoring the deliberate choice of examples, there are pretty obvious problems. For one, how is the behavior of heterosexual sex between two people that know for a fact that it is physically impossible for them to procreate towards the end of the biological function of procreation? If two men or two women having sex is a behavioral factor that precludes procreation, it is only so because of non-behavioral reasons (physiology and anatomy). Why can't we make the same move with infertile opposite sex couples? If the reason gay sex is a 'behavioral factor' is because of non-behavioral factors, why doesn't the same hold for opposite sex infertile couples? It is just as possible for them to procreate as gay couples. Using their argument, I fail to see how two knowingly infertile people of the opposite sex having sex isn't a behavioral factor in the same way gay sex is.<br /><br />Now your response about the equipment is, as Richard rightly pointed out, an ad hoc. What equipment fulfills this requirement? Certainly a woman with no uterus and no ovaries lacks the 'proper equipment' to procreate, yet if these figure in it just re-raises the infertility problem. If having a vagina is necessary, but more importantly sufficient to fulfill the 'proper equipment' requirement, then there are chromosomal male couples that fulfill this requirement(see Swyer syndrome)! <br /><br />I also fail to see how the fact that heterosexual sex is the only kind of sex (though you can get pregnant without heterosexual sex) that can result in pregnancy imbues that end onto heterosexual sex that cannot possibly result in pregnancy. It seems weird to me to say "The reason infertile heterosexual sex is still towards the end of procreation is that if they had the anatomical and physiological requirements to procreate, they could then procreate." You can say the exact same thing about gay sex. It seems like a silly conflation, it conflates heterosexual sex with possibly-procreative sex. They clearly are not the same thing.<br /><br />As one last comment. Their paper is forced to take an extremely myopic stance towards both sex and gender, as well as the teleology of marriage. If we want to raise a metaphysical problem, how about what is a 'man' and what is a 'woman'? This might seem obvious to most people, but I don't think it is quite so obvious.<br /><br />I apologize if I am unclear anywhere, I typed this up in one fell swoop, so if anyone wants clarification on a point let me know. <br /><br />Oh and Richard, dead on critique, well done!J.R.https://www.blogger.com/profile/10182878747724860064noreply@blogger.com