tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post7384568877934775870..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Implicit Bias vs. Implicit MaliceRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-91256101295423818762010-07-19T23:15:11.414-04:002010-07-19T23:15:11.414-04:00I've just started my dissertation on the philo...I've just started my dissertation on the philosophy (especially ethics) of implicit bias so if any of you are still writing/thinking about this stuff feel free to get in touch with me.<br /><br />cheers<br /><br />peter kirwan<br />UCI philosophy<br />Graduate Studentpeter kirwanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15690701663326677969noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-13050438604532694592009-03-02T22:48:00.000-05:002009-03-02T22:48:00.000-05:00Thanks for that elaboration, Richard. I agree tha...Thanks for that elaboration, Richard. I agree that our difference was in terminology.unpopular vegan essayshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01334555481308676471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-47534594135791585342009-03-02T22:21:00.000-05:002009-03-02T22:21:00.000-05:00So the crucial point is that one can exhibit a def...So the crucial point is that one can exhibit a deficiency of good will -- i.e. treat other people with less consideration than they are due -- without <I>intending</I> to act "wrongly" as such. Indeed, this happens all the time.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-54290840032913996602009-03-02T22:14:00.000-05:002009-03-02T22:14:00.000-05:00I think this is a merely terminological difference...I think this is a merely terminological difference. If you treat someone with less consideration than you ought to, then that is - by definition - a "deficiency of good will" towards that person.<BR/><BR/>I agree that it is possible to be in such a state without realizing it (e.g. a self-righteous slave owner), and that such a person is blameworthy. Note that it's possible to exhibit a deficit of good will in this sense without doing anything objectively wrong. One might poke pins into voodoo dolls, for example, in the sincere belief that (i) this will cause great harm to one's enemies, and (ii) that would be a swell outcome. Such an act, though objectively harmless, exhibits what is in fact a kind of ill-will (<I>de re</I> -- though the agent himself doesn't realize this), and so is blameworthy on that count.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-47466252700296180612009-03-02T17:43:00.000-05:002009-03-02T17:43:00.000-05:00I should add to my previous comment that blamewort...I should add to my previous comment that blameworthiness seems to me a function of both ill-will and what the moral agent either knew or should have known about the morality of their act(s). One can be blameworthy for moral negligence, rational ignorance, or rational irrationality.unpopular vegan essayshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01334555481308676471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-9114345454896792742009-03-02T17:12:00.001-05:002009-03-02T17:12:00.001-05:00Richard,If they don’t realize there’s anything wro...Richard,<BR/><BR/>If they don’t realize there’s anything wrong with maltreating certain groups, then they don’t have a deficiency of good will because there’s no *intent* to do wrong. Objectively, they are doing something wrong, but to them, they’re doing nothing wrong, so it is not the case that they act out of ill will.<BR/><BR/>I agree with you that ill will is always blameworthy, but unless I’m misunderstanding you, I disagree that “doing wrong” entails, or is defined by, ill will. I believe people can do wrong (e.g. support the institution of slavery or animal exploitation), but have no ill will to go along with their wrong-doing (i.e. believe (incorrectly) that slavery or animal exploitation is morally permissible).<BR/><BR/>Perhaps we each define “wrong” and “ill will” differently. I define “wrong” as an irreducible, non-natural evaluative/moral property. I define “ill will” as a psychological state where one believes one is doing “wrong”.<BR/><BR/>I am new to your blog, so I don't know what metaethical and moral theories you hold to be right or best. Maybe I'll understand a little more soon. :-)<BR/><BR/>Personally, I'm an intuitionist/cognitivist and realist about morality.unpopular vegan essayshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01334555481308676471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-68722195657642929772009-03-02T16:28:00.000-05:002009-03-02T16:28:00.000-05:00I think it's interesting to consider why such 'rel...I think it's interesting to consider <I>why</I> such 'relativity' might hold. Some philosophers have claimed that people can only be blameworthy in their unwitting prejudice if it's <I>their fault</I> that they are morally retarded. If they grew up in a morally retarded culture, the story goes, we have to excuse them on the grounds that "they couldn't have known any better". Or something like that.<BR/><BR/>I strongly disagree with those philosophers. People are blameworthy whenever they act from ill-will (or a deficiency of good will), even if they <I>don't realize</I> there's anything wrong with maltreating certain groups. (The fact that they don't see anything wrong with such behaviour is part of what makes them bad people!)<BR/><BR/>Having said that, I agree with you that a racist today is probably much <I>more blameworthy</I> than the typical racist of yore. But the 'quality of will' account offers a simple explanation for why this is: to be a racist in today's climate would seem to require a <I>surfeit</I> of malice! An equally hateful person living a couple hundred years ago would, I submit, be equally blameworthy, no matter the difference in social context. There's not anything <I>intrinsically</I> excusing about having one's prejudices be widespread or "culturally accepted". The significance is purely epistemic: chances are, a typical prejudiced person in such circumstances <I>probably</I> doesn't actually harbor as much ill-will as, say, bigots who are considered extremists even by their contemporaries.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-64128656001276754942009-03-02T16:06:00.000-05:002009-03-02T16:06:00.000-05:00What I find interesting is how the degree of blame...What I find interesting is how the degree of blameworthiness for a bias or prejudice is relative to the culture in which that bias or prejudice manifests. For example, a strong racial prejudice in the 19th century was more culturally accepted and therefore less blameworthy that the same prejudice would be today. Similarly, species prejudice (e.g. indifference toward the interests of other species in not being slaughtered, for example) is culturally accepted today and therefore less blameworthy (assuming one simply hasn’t been exposed to moral reasoning against such a prejudice). Will it be the case that we develop culturally and morally with respect to speciesism so that 50 or 100 years from now speciesism will be significantly more blameworthy?<BR/><BR/>Please note that I am not suggesting moral relativity here. The morality of a certain prejudice may depend on a given society’s circumstances, but *assuming similar circumstances,* racism, sexism, and speciesism are equally wrong across cultures and eras. They all have the same thing in common: ignoring the morally relevant similarities (such as an interest in not being enslaved or killed) and exaggerating the morally irrelevant differences (such as race or species). But the blameworthiness of the wrongness is less when the entire culture is steeped in the prejudice; again, assuming one hasn’t been exposed to reasons for rejecting the prejudice.unpopular vegan essayshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01334555481308676471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-27780073140988693532009-03-02T11:24:00.000-05:002009-03-02T11:24:00.000-05:00John, I thought I made clear that people do have a...John, I thought I made clear that people <I>do</I> have a positive responsibility to work to mitigate any harmful biases they may have, so I'm not sure why you attribute to me the opposite view. Perhaps you are assuming that we're only obliged to rid ourselves of intrinsically "blameworthy" states. But that is a false assumption. Merely being <I>unfortunate</I> suffices. <BR/><BR/>N.B. A good-willed person will want to rid themselves of any unfortunate dispositions, even if they're not intrinsically blameworthy for those dispositions. Hence, insofar as a person complacently accepts or endorses such harmful dispositions, they may be <I>indirectly</I> blameworthy, i.e. blameworthy in failing to have sufficient good will to work to prevent such harms. But note that it is their failure to <I>rid</I> themselves of the unfortunate state, rather than their simply <I>being in</I> the unfortunate state, which is the source of the blameworthiness here.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-24416813342377171462009-03-02T09:46:00.000-05:002009-03-02T09:46:00.000-05:00Ordinary implicit bias, if purely 'cognitive' as d...<I>Ordinary implicit bias, if purely 'cognitive' as described above, is best understood as merely unfortunate rather than inherently blameworthy. It's not necessarily a sign of hidden racial animus, or any kind of "racism" in the ordinary sense. So people needn't feel too defensive about it, the way they might if their good character were in question.</I><BR/><BR/>I think you're leaping to an overly definitive conclusion unless you have more premises or explanation. Let's take it as a given that people are often racist in this purely cognitive sense, which does seem <I>less</I> blameworthy than the other kind of racism you describe. What's bothering me is: on what grounds do you not think people have an <I>affirmative responsibility</I> to try to figure out through introspection whether they have any inappropriate cognitive racial biases,<BR/>and actively work to eradicate the biases? <BR/><BR/><BR/><I> If we are careful to imagine a hypothetical situation where someone of genuinely good will is raised in such a misleading environment that they innocently come to consciously accept certain prejudices, then yes I think it's clear that such "open, conscious bias without malice" is merely 'unfortunate' rather than 'blameworthy'. But vanishingly few real-life cases are like this.</I><BR/><BR/>I assume you're thinking about views on race in mainstream America. Isn't it plausible that there are many such cases with gender or sexual orientation? Or with race/ethnicity in other cultural contexts?John Althouse Cohenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11703450281424023177noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-17048495876066809852009-03-01T20:13:00.000-05:002009-03-01T20:13:00.000-05:00I'm not sure there are any realistic cases of pure...I'm not sure there are any realistic cases of purely cognitive conscious biases. So-called "benevolent sexism", for example, seems to involve a deficit of <I>respect</I> for women's autonomy, which is a kind of ill-will. Much "acceptance of stereotypes" arguably involves a kind of motivated irrationality. So I think it's those underlying bad motivations (or, at least, a deficit of good motivations) that we are inclined to blame people for.<BR/><BR/>N.B. If we are careful to imagine a hypothetical situation where someone of <I>genuinely good will</I> is raised in such a misleading environment that they innocently come to consciously accept certain prejudices, then yes I think it's clear that such "open, conscious bias without malice" is merely 'unfortunate' rather than 'blameworthy'. But vanishingly few real-life cases are like this.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1947667504746214062009-03-01T19:44:00.000-05:002009-03-01T19:44:00.000-05:00Does any part of your argument depend on these pre...Does any part of your argument depend on these prejudices being implicit/unconscious? Explicit, conscious prejudice sometimes involves ill-will, but it can also be purely 'cognitive', involving the acceptance of stereotypes without any hint of malice (there is even research on <A HREF="http://www.understandingprejudice.org/asi/faq.htm" REL="nofollow">Benevolent Sexism</A>). Do you think that open, conscious bias without malice is similarly merely "unfortunate" rather than "blameworthy" or "racist" in the ordinary sense?<BR/><BR/>I think that most people would use a harsher description than "unfortunate." Perhaps the difference is that we expect people to have control over their conscious biases. But people do have some control over their implicit biases as well - you suggest that people should mitigate them - so perhaps the difference is just a matter of degree rather than a categorical distinction.Blarhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17654557196171228300noreply@blogger.com