tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post6907547791377013687..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: The Best Case for VotingRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-27893349127311289082016-07-24T06:58:36.614-04:002016-07-24T06:58:36.614-04:00That's very different. You discuss a view on ...That's very different. You discuss a view on which we should forego marginal benefits in order to act <i>in the same way others do</i> when a group of people performing that act collectively has good results. I agree this is a bad view. The Reganesque view I propound here does not have that feature. Your role in producing the collectively best outcome could be to perform a <i>different</i> action from what others are directed to do. This will be so if your performing the different act has higher marginal value than your performing the shared act. The only difference from purely individualistic Act Consequentialism is that it has all morally-motivated agents co-ordinate on the optimal equilibrium point, rather than allowing them to possibly fall into suboptimal equilibria. (See <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2010/03/co-operative-utilitarianism.html" rel="nofollow">here</a> for an introductory explanation.)<br /><br />[P.S. The Parfit 'group beneficence' view is motivated by cases whereby it seems "a group of individuals makes a difference even though benefits never diminish when one fewer person than any number of persons in that group contributes." I think <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2013/08/apparent-vagueness-and-graded-harms.html" rel="nofollow">such cases are misdescribed</a> in a way that makes them <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2011/04/puzzle-of-self-torturer.html" rel="nofollow">incoherent</a>. So the view you (rightly) reject is, in my view, unmotivated to begin with.]Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-87641361643424637522016-07-23T17:15:33.595-04:002016-07-23T17:15:33.595-04:00"Then we're disposed to play our role in ..."Then we're disposed to play our role in producing the best collectively possible outcome..."<br /><br />I argued against Parfit's version of that principle here: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265292Michael Otsukahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13863069061785994963noreply@blogger.com