tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post6716956303058691765..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Reasons and Rule ConsequentialismRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-44484573894411117172009-09-28T15:51:07.623-04:002009-09-28T15:51:07.623-04:00Richard, your comment here seems very reasonable t...Richard, your comment here seems very reasonable to me. Tout court undesirability is something about which I need to think more. It isn't a concept that seems to me to play a major role in common practical thought. But maybe I'm mistaken about this.Brad Hookerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989027149657409734noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-32504491278604673562009-09-25T21:24:41.176-04:002009-09-25T21:24:41.176-04:00Hi Brad, thanks for commenting! I should stress t...Hi Brad, thanks for commenting! I should stress that I'm interested here in whether the right action could be undesirable <i>tout court</i>: whether decisive reasons for desire can conflict with decisive reasons for action. (You're certainly right that there's no puzzle in holding that a right act is merely undesirable in some respect, or "in terms of" one kind of reason for desire, when there are other normative reasons being artificially excluded from consideration.)<br /><br />Deontologists and others face a similar dilemma. But perhaps it's easier for them to embrace the second horn, and simply say that outcomes in which the agent acts as they ought to are thereby <i>better</i> outcomes -- outcomes the [current temporal slice of the] agent should prefer, or hope for. (N.B. While the implied account of value will be agent- and time-relative, it needn't be <i>limited</i> to agent-relative considerations.)<br /><br />You could also go this route (I would be interested to hear if you think this is the way to go, or if you think it better to say that our reasons for action and desire diverge here). It seems a bit more <i>awkward</i> for self-identified consequentialists, for the reasons set out in the main post (the structure of the theory starts to look a bit odd -- just in theoretical terms). But it's certainly not a decisive objection or anything.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-9775683496666049112009-09-25T19:09:50.235-04:002009-09-25T19:09:50.235-04:00Doesn't every moral theory except agent-neutra...Doesn't every moral theory except agent-neutral act-consequentialism (and global consequentialism, if that is a different theory) hold that doing what morality requires *can*, at least sometimes, fail to produce the most agent-neutral good, or best history of the world, impartially considered? Keeping an important promise, telling an important truth, indeed even avoiding killing an innocent person can in some circumstances result in less impartial value than some alternative would, and foreseeably would. We might crystalize this point by saying that only act-consequentialism makes the right *necessarily* coincide with maximum possible good. Every other moral theory holds that doing what is morally required *can* conflict with maximizing the good.<br /><br />Now, if Bill Bloggs says "that agent complied with the best moral code but what the agent did was undesirable, on balance", what are the most natural interpretations of this remark?<br /><br />One natural interpretation would be that Bloggs is expressing the observation that the agent's complying with the best moral code was undesirable in terms of agent-neutral value, or, we might say, undesirable considered impartially.<br /><br />Another natural interpretation would be that Bloggs is expressing the observation that the agent's complying with the best code was undesirable in terms of its effects on Bloggs (i.e., the speaker), or at least on people or projects especially connected to Bloggs. Note that this interpretation is not that Bloggs meant the agent's action was undesirable in terms of its effects either on the agent or on people and projects especially connected to the agent. The most natural interpretations of "undesirable" are "undesirable in terms of agent-neutral value" and "undesirable in terms of speaker-relative value".<br /><br />A remark such as Bloggs's isn't particularly surprising — and certainly not paradoxical — on either of these two natural interpretations.<br /><br />If a fitting-attitudes (buck-passing) analysis of goodness is correct, then some complications to the above statements may be required. But I suspect that such an analysis cannot *convincingly* undermine any particular normative moral theory. And thus my hunch is that such an analysis should not take sides in substantive debates between rival moral theories.Brad Hookerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989027149657409734noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-62054465850237303482009-09-25T12:22:51.492-04:002009-09-25T12:22:51.492-04:00Hi Murali, I'm afraid you've missed my poi...Hi Murali, I'm afraid you've missed my point. It's true that Rule Consequentialists don't appeal directly to the desirability of an action in determining whether or not it ought to be done. But we can <i>still ask</i> whether the state of affairs in which you act according to the rules is more or less desirable than some alternative. As a complete moral theory, Rule Consequentialists must offer some answer to this question. Hence the dilemma noted in my post.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-46991793517866578242009-09-25T06:47:41.500-04:002009-09-25T06:47:41.500-04:00Should rule consequentialists take themselves to b...<i>Should rule consequentialists take themselves to be advising undesirable actions?</i><br /><br />I'm not sure desirability enters into the equation in the act stage. Per Rawls, the act rule consequentialist proposes that a certain practice/rule produces better consequences than other possible / available rules. The very notion of a practice/rule defines acts falling under them to be right/wrong. <br /><br />For example, under the practice of private property, taxation is right, but theft is wrong, because they are so defined under its practice. The rule consequentialist question is consequentialist because it asks ought we to institute the practice of private property. The question of whether any particular forcible wealth transfer is right or wrong is entirely and only dependent on whether it is taxation or theft as defined by the practice.<br /><br />The fact that one particular act of theft may in fact be desirable does not have any bearing on the right-making properties of the action. <br /><br />Although, the rule consequentialist can allow incomplete practices. i.e. practices which do not cover every situation. In such cases, the rule consequentialist would have to evaluate the act like an act consequentialist.<br /><br />Rawls draws an analogy to baseball where there is a rule about three strikes and you're out. The question of whether an act is right or wrong is dependent on whether or not it falls under the rules of the game, not on whether or not that rule could be better. i.e. the question of whether or not the referee should give you a chance and not let you go out is not dependant on whether baseball would be a better sport if it were three strikes and you're out.<br /><br />This of course makes the fact about the rightness or the wrongness of an action very trivial. i.e. what is its status as defined by the best rule?Muralihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08036249483538443818noreply@blogger.com