tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post6079271798555566412..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Normativity for Value RealistsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-23631200841452383042019-08-18T15:03:19.607-04:002019-08-18T15:03:19.607-04:00Hi Mark! You're right that, as a scalar conse...Hi Mark! You're right that, as a scalar consequentialist, Alastair rejects threshold deontic notions like 'right'/'wrong' -- a view I push back against <a href="https://www.philosophyetc.net/2019/04/deontic-pluralism-draft-paper.html" rel="nofollow">elsewhere</a> -- but I see that as separate from the present issue. Even just using degreed notions like 'better' and 'more reason', we can ask the question of what normative significance moral betterness has. (If the most we can say is that it's morally better to choose the morally better option, that would seem a bit limited. I think it's important to also be able to say that the morally better option is <i>better supported by normative reasons</i>, or more <i>choice-worthy</i>, or some such. <br /> There's no barrier to a scalar theorist making these additional comparative judgments: they don't commit us to any deontic binaries or threshold concepts.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-47920013386064252952019-08-18T13:34:57.954-04:002019-08-18T13:34:57.954-04:00Isn't Alastair going to try to do it all with ...Isn't Alastair going to try to do it all with better and worse, so it would be better if you chose the better option? I may be wrong, but I think of Alastair as a deontic skeptic (he doesn't believe in the things I think 'right' and 'wrong' pick out)and trying to do most of the work with better than.<br /><br />Markmvrhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01868916139090410375noreply@blogger.com