tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post4566931587396104298..comments2021-09-15T09:59:44.957-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Error-Adjusted Expected ValueRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-41673571900553222282011-08-18T23:42:52.919-04:002011-08-18T23:42:52.919-04:00Using imprecise probability to model rational cred...Using imprecise probability to model rational credence should help with this. In the "rough estimate" type cases we should have very spread out credences. In the case of more reasoned or evidentially established cases credences may be more precise. See James Joyce's recent paper "A Defense of Imprecise Probability in Inference and Decision Making" for an explication and defense. I have some subtle differences with Joyce, but my understanding and writing is still in progress.<br /><br />I would not put it in terms of how moved we should be from our (presumably precise) prior, but rather in terms of how confident we should be that given odds are advantageous based on objective updating of imprecise priors. I have been thinking in terms of the choice of variance in the Imprecise Dirichlet Model. Here is a preliminary sketch of an application of that model to the pragmatic encroachment question in epistemology:<br />http://uiowa.academia.edu/JeremyShipley/Papers/328946/Varying_Variance_Invariantly_essay_on_pragmatic_encroachment_and_thick_credence_slides_jrshipleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05991272871497674850noreply@blogger.com