tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post3546313302739196667..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: The Atheism WarsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger43125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-64401634247633599082007-05-04T00:29:00.000-04:002007-05-04T00:29:00.000-04:00Hi Chris, I wouldn't endorse either of those princ...Hi Chris, I wouldn't endorse either of those principles. I think there's a difference between good reasons and bad, but this is separate from the "empirical"/"non-empirical" distinction.<BR/><BR/>And again, just because we're often biased and fail to judge arguments on their merits, doesn't mean we shouldn't try. (Though I'm more optimistic about our <I>capability</I> for critical thinking in any case -- given sufficient training and motivation, at least.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-17432069297915590932007-05-03T21:04:00.000-04:002007-05-03T21:04:00.000-04:00Can't words have meanings independent of proposit...Can't words have meanings independent of propositions? Surely so.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-13856981335761055502007-05-02T15:43:00.000-04:002007-05-02T15:43:00.000-04:00Richard, sorry it too me so long to respond. I sor...Richard, sorry it too me so long to respond. I sorta forgot about this thread, which is a shame, because it's a good one. In the previous discussions about science as <I>the</I> source of truth, there were a couple views expressed, both of which I would classify as positivism, and one of which as scientism more narrowly:<BR/><BR/>1.) Anything that can't be verified by science (using the scientific method) is nonsensical and/or false.<BR/>2.) Anything that can't be verified by empirical evidence is nonsensical and/or false.<BR/><BR/>The former is, obviously, scientism, and was a popular position in previous comment sections. The latter is positivism, and verificationism specifically. The problem is, of course, that theory is what interprets evidence, and evidence is meaningless without an interpretive framework. That's why it's perfectly rational for those who buy non-empirical arguments for theism to interpret certain empirical phenomena as evidence for the existence of God, while at the same time it's perfectly rational for those who don't buy those arguments, or buy the counterarguments, to see no evidence for the existence of God.<BR/><BR/>My larger point is that whether we buy or don't buy those arguments has less to do with the merits of those arguments than it does with our pre-existing biases, representations, and psychological makeup in general. Verificationism has long been known to be internally inconsistent (even in its most recent incarnations, with sophisticated Bayesian techniques, it's still epistemologically problematic), but even if we accept a weak version of verificationism, we're still stuck with the problem of context and interpretation. That makes questions of the rationality or irrationality of religious beliefs highly problematic, in my mind.Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08417970139690159046noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-54609389225402178232007-04-28T02:23:00.000-04:002007-04-28T02:23:00.000-04:00This how/why divide mentioned above has always bee...This how/why divide mentioned above has always been puzzling to me. Note that why-questions often don't have definite answers; you can’t get to the bottom of it. Observe a child asking “But why?” again and again. The person doing the answering eventually resorts to the brute: “It just is, ok?”<BR/><BR/>As for religion having the ‘why’ bits of natural enquiry in its domain, we have “He just is, ok?” Of course, some try to flesh this out in what seem to me to be quite technical ways, and I confess I’m not really sure that I understand the notion of god’s necessity or that sort of thing. <BR/><BR/>As for the meaningfulness of “Why is there something rather than nothing?” and the above mentions of positivist/ verification criterions, I thought that these sorts of things tested the meaningfulness of propositions. Someone else said that they understand the question, and so it’s meaningful. I don’t think ‘meaningfulness’ is the right thing to look for in a question. Propositions are what have meanings. <BR/><BR/>When talking about the nature of the universe, scientists seem to be better at answering “What is the case” than priests. My problem with the alleged sister question: “Why is it the case?” is that while it seems to be understandable, I can’t think of a satisfactory answer which doesn’t make use of a brute proposition. Anyone who can provide such an answer, please do (I don’t mean the right answer, though that would be great too).<BR/><BR/>I see natural enquiry (scientific or religious) as the systematic search for the most concise, unified statement of all the brute things we encounter. E.g. the planets move a certain way, apples fall a certain way, but you can restate all this as gravity. Believe in gravity, and you no longer need to ask how planets move.<BR/><BR/>The God hypothesis is just one postulate too many for the same explanandum (the world), and I don’t see the benefit of keeping it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-63128278938423459992007-04-28T01:33:00.000-04:002007-04-28T01:33:00.000-04:00Ipse, see here for my new post on "the problem of ...Ipse, see <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2007/04/problem-of-unfreedom.html" REL="nofollow">here</A> for my new post on "the problem of unfreedom".<BR/><BR/>For discussion of the epistemic status of "religious experience", see <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2006/10/experience-and-testimony.html" REL="nofollow">here</A> and <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/02/religious-experiences.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-79614198633165602412007-04-28T00:06:00.000-04:002007-04-28T00:06:00.000-04:00Richard,Well, I certainly don't want to make the c...Richard,<BR/><BR/>Well, I certainly don't want to make the case for 'pop' theism. I'm a psycho-physicalist of Thomistic persuasion. I think libertarian free will is incoherent. And I believe that the divine law (i.e., revealed commandments) are specific complements to the generic natural law are complements. As for miracles, I've never seen one, but I see no reason to rule them out.<BR/><BR/>Concerning the main supports for your position.<BR/><BR/>(1) The possibility of evil is a consequence of choice, it seems to me. Choice is necessary for moral agency, and a world with moral agents is better than one without.<BR/><BR/>(2) Humans could be more free? In what sense?<BR/><BR/>(3) As a Catholic, I believe in the incarnation. Religious experience is also a kind of disclosure.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-24022310837959035622007-04-27T23:30:00.000-04:002007-04-27T23:30:00.000-04:00Clark, I thought the common understanding placed s...Clark, I thought the common understanding placed supernatural beings as somehow "outside the natural order", not subject to scientific study, nor bound by the laws of nature, even as they run around making mischief for us. Even if it's coherent, we have no reason to believe in such exceptional claims. It's like the <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/05/challenge-to-agnostics.html" REL="nofollow">faeries and orbiting teapots</A>, again -- hard to disprove, perhaps, but still not reasonable to affirm. But again, I should emphasize that my main point rests with the positive reasons for disbelief provided by bad design, evil, and divine hiddenness.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-81732605366263327732007-04-27T23:09:00.000-04:002007-04-27T23:09:00.000-04:00BTW - while I'm dubious about libertarian free wil...BTW - while I'm dubious about libertarian free will, I find it odd that you see it as so obviously mistaken. It seems, judging by the literature, that not all or even most adopt those views for religious reasons and further it's not obvious that they are wrong.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1575258251406401252007-04-27T23:08:00.000-04:002007-04-27T23:08:00.000-04:00Richard, out of curiosity, why couldn't the "super...Richard, out of curiosity, why couldn't the "supernatural" be grounded as natural? That is it seems that you are taking a de dicto claim and turning it into a de re claim. Now certainly major theologians do make claims where perhaps the "supernatural" is philosophically opposed to the natural. Of course I'd argue both terms are problematic philosophically.<BR/><BR/>However relative to regular lay belief I just don't see how they are intrinsically anti-natural. And thus I don't see how your argument works. They may not line up with known laws or entities. But that's a considerably different issue.<BR/><BR/>Now one can falsify some claims. (i.e. claims of the effectiveness of prayer on heart attacks) But even there one must be careful.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-35643001603786490032007-04-27T23:02:00.000-04:002007-04-27T23:02:00.000-04:00Thanks Ipse,The pop theistic commitment to superna...Thanks Ipse,<BR/><BR/>The pop theistic commitment to supernatural interventions (e.g. intercessory prayer, "miracles", possession, etc.), conflict with the well-supported thesis that natural causes are the only causes operating in the natural world. Further, pop theism often goes along with such dubious views as substance dualism, ghostly "souls", libertarian free will, divine command theory of ethics, etc. We have ample reason to think those views all false. (Though of course some can be reasonably disputed in a philosophy classroom.) Most of all, there's the problems of evil, of bad design (humans are not as free as we could be), and of divine hiddenness, as discussed in the <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2006/01/god-hypothesis.html" REL="nofollow">linked post</A>.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-40506943788927964942007-04-27T22:37:00.000-04:002007-04-27T22:37:00.000-04:00Richard,Apologies about being anonymous. I think I...Richard,<BR/><BR/>Apologies about being anonymous. I think I'll go with 'Ipse' for my uniquely referring expression.<BR/><BR/>What features of "reality as we know it" are inconsistent with belief in a personal deity?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-17865087410522363252007-04-27T22:27:00.000-04:002007-04-27T22:27:00.000-04:00(To clarify: my second paragraph was responding to...(To clarify: my second paragraph was responding to Anonymous. P.S. Please choose a unique name if you wish to comment here! Much appreciated.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-71612707201457279582007-04-27T22:24:00.000-04:002007-04-27T22:24:00.000-04:00Michael, I think it's meaningful. See my post Why ...Michael, I think it's meaningful. See my post <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2006/02/why-does-universe-exist.html" REL="nofollow">Why does the universe exist?</A><BR/><BR/>I think it could be reasonable to believe in a First Cause. (I'm no verificationist.) But the personal "God" of pop theism is an entirely different matter. <I>That</I> <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2006/01/god-hypothesis.html" REL="nofollow">God Hypothesis</A> -- the one most people in society affirm -- simply doesn't square with reality as we know it. There are plenty of orbiting teapots in most religions today.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-83936724460240112142007-04-27T21:23:00.000-04:002007-04-27T21:23:00.000-04:00Michael, note that I don't buy the whole separatio...Michael, note that I don't buy the whole separation of "why" vs. "how" to demarc between science and religion. Clearly religions make claims about "how" such as fundamentalist Protestants and the young earth claims. So I actually agree with Dawkins that science, to the degree it can, ought take up religious claims.<BR/><BR/>However where folks go wrong is in making religion far more monolithic than it is. <BR/><BR/>Regarding the existence of God and philosophical proof. I don't think there are any valid proofs from pure logic. (Indeed I'd ridicule any such <I>a priori</I> argument for anything real) That doesn't mean there isn't evidence for God. Just that it isn't of the sort typically engaged with in these debates.<BR/><BR/>As for whether the question "why is there something rather than nothing" is a meaningful question. Certainly I can understand the question even if I can't answer it fully. So long as we don't buy into the positivist conception of what is meaningful I don't see any problem with it. I'd argue it's one of the more important questions in philosophy.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-11624913883434107452007-04-27T20:51:00.000-04:002007-04-27T20:51:00.000-04:00I'll be curious to hear what other think, but a qu...I'll be curious to hear what other think, but a quick question first.<BR/><BR/>Michael, you write "if that's the case, I'm not sure that it really counts as a meaningful question anyway." Are you using a verifiability criterion of meaning?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-14322979439032477112007-04-27T20:27:00.000-04:002007-04-27T20:27:00.000-04:00clark,I agree with your emphasis on religion as a ...clark,<BR/><BR/>I agree with your emphasis on religion as a social practice, rather than a direct function of metaphysical commitment. That's a *much* simpler way of stating my ramblings above, and I think there's something to it.<BR/><BR/><BR/>clark and anonymous [popular name, that one],<BR/><BR/>I'm a bit suspicious of the idea that 'science answers the how but not the why questions.' I take your point that 'why is there something instead of nothing' doesn't seem scientifically tractable in the way that 'why do I have blood in my veins?' is, but it's not clear that we can answer the former question without literally just making something up... and if that's the case, I'm not sure that it really counts as a meaningful question anyway.<BR/><BR/>What does everyone think about this? Do you consider "why is there something instead of nothing?" to be a meaningful question?underajunipertreehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00591750712949437054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-15350851201026771542007-04-27T17:43:00.000-04:002007-04-27T17:43:00.000-04:00I am also curious as to the definition of 'rationa...I am also curious as to the definition of 'rational'. If a 'rational' belief is one that can be empirically verified (tested, whatever), then we all have 'irrational' beliefs, viz., that our cognitive faculties are reliable (for the most part), that events have causes, etc. It seems to me that these beliefs are not 'irrational,' but perfectly <I>rational</I>.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps the existence of a deity cannot be proved, empirically or otherwise, but it could still be a rational postulate. For example, science cannot answer the question, 'Why is there something, rather than nothing,' but a philosophically minded theist has some answers worth considering, answers that serve an explanatory purpose. Such a purpose separates them from silly comparisons to unicorns and tea-cups floating around planets.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-63306868149596745352007-04-27T16:11:00.000-04:002007-04-27T16:11:00.000-04:00The question, "Does God exist," has been asked and...The question, "Does God exist," has been asked and answered by philosophy, whether it is Mackie's "Miracle of Theism," Hume's "Concerning Natural Reason," Kant's "Critiques," or Smith's "Atheism."<BR/><BR/>From a strictly philosophical perspective, only six arguments have been advanced for the Proof of the Existence of God: Anselm's "ontological argument," and Aquinas's five "teleological" arguments, and each falls woefully short of proof of anything.<BR/><BR/>Smith, at least, also addresses the "revelation" claims and shows each to be deficient.<BR/><BR/>Unless someone proffers a better case, the Theodicy of the past is buried in the Ash Heap of Metaphysics and is the rightful domain of religion, not philosophy. Whether or not a god exists is ultimately a matter of faith, not of wisdom.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-34172769358275842962007-04-27T15:53:00.000-04:002007-04-27T15:53:00.000-04:00I'd largely agree with Chris and Blar's comments. ...I'd largely agree with Chris and Blar's comments. Religion as typically lived is best seen as a social practice not necessarily that tied to the metaphysical beliefs. We can discuss such theology, of course, but it doesn't really seem to dominate behavior. Further outside social influences seem to trump metaphysics in most people. (Witness American Catholics and their family planning)<BR/><BR/>By focusing on the metaphysics I think folks who want a change in behavior are simply going about things the wrong way.<BR/><BR/><B>Michael:</B> <I>Basically, I can't think of any meaningful proposition off the top of my head that isn't in some way scientifically tractable.</I><BR/><BR/>Why is there something rather than nothing?<BR/><BR/>There's lots of stuff not in anyway scientifically tractable.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-43135758399368634012007-04-27T15:44:00.000-04:002007-04-27T15:44:00.000-04:00Wow. How did I miss this thread?Richard, clearly ...Wow. How did I miss this thread?<BR/><BR/>Richard, clearly I reject (1) since I think one can accept religion rationally. However I actually am sympathetic to the view since there are a lot of reasons for religion that seem epistemologically suspect. I do think one has to distinguish between whether an individual ought reject religious truth claims and whether <I>everyone</I> ought rationally reject religious truth claims. Often the two are tied together but I don't think they ought to be.<BR/><BR/>For instance I strongly disbelieve in UFOs because I don't think there's any public evidence for them, there are good reasons to reject testimonial accounts of them, and because I feel their existence violates the known laws of physics. However if I were to see a space ship flying around, I'd be quite justified in believing event though my friend who didn't see it would not.<BR/><BR/>Regarding (2) I actually agree with it. I'm surprised some don't.<BR/><BR/>It seems to me that what is ultimately in debate by Chris isn't whether one ought criticize irrationality (or at least what one perceives as irrationality) but <I>how</I> one criticizes.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-58942211155886070532007-04-26T07:32:00.000-04:002007-04-26T07:32:00.000-04:00Ugh. Misplaced apostrophe in the above. Dawkins. B...Ugh. Misplaced apostrophe in the above. Dawkins. But in response to the original post...<BR/><BR/>There are lots of things to say here. First, I think that the potential 'points in dispute' [(1) religious belief is irrational and (2) we should criticise irrationality in the public arena] are incomplete. I would like to add (3) points (1) and (2) are not in dispute, but that the Dawkins camp is deploying bad tactics in its critique of religious irrationality.<BR/><BR/>I'd like to go through these one by one.<BR/><BR/>(1) religious belief is irrational and it's rationally correct to reject [pop] theism.<BR/><BR/>This is really really messy. In some ways, I think that philosophy faces a big problem. Yes, it is concerned with big topics which are strongly relevant to the lives of most people, such as ethics and religion. But I wonder if philosophy is concerned with them in the same way. [Some speculative meta-philosophy follows. Any serious phil. of language debate will result in fatal beatings, cf. Plato.]<BR/><BR/>For most philosophers, the referents of disputed terms [e.g. God] are abstract concepts, which describe the world in a true way. And once these terms and their referents are defined and agreed upon, they are often considered centrally important to the way we live our lives. Thus, a philosopher's conclusion about God has a direct downstream effect, which may change the way he lives his life. In other words, such concepts are 'online' for philosophers, and have a hot link to their lives and actions.<BR/><BR/>However, I don't think that this is true of all people. Specifically, I don't think that the referents of some 'big question' terms are online concepts in the same way. My hunch--and it is a hunch--is that, for many non-philosophers, the referent[s] of 'God' are in some way a set of strong emotional connotations, generated through a particular brand of socialisation in the child's formative years. The term is associated with a feeling or set of feelings, which likely includes a sense that the world would be a much worse place without a God. [Which makes no sense; if you are a theist and you change your mind about God, the world in no way changes. There is no evidence of impending destruction which arises in the absence of God; either that evidence was there before or not.]<BR/><BR/>If this is right--or even ballpark--then the question of whether or not it's rational to believe in God is in some ways irrelevant to the role that God will play for many purported believers. I suppose I'm basically saying that many people who claim to believe in God actually don't--at least, not in the way they believe that the sharp knife will cut them if they slip in the kitchen, or don't stop nagging me when I've had a long day--but that it's rather some strange association with a strange, vague, and powerful set of emotions. However, if those emotions are present and the true referent of 'God' for many, then they're probably not subject to truth conditions in the way that a philosophically rigorous belief--term referring to abstract concept with clear definitions--is. From there, it becomes a question of appropriate or right naming of those emotions; it no longer seems to be a question of wrong conclusions bastardised in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence.<BR/><BR/>(2) We should criticise irrationality in the public arena.<BR/><BR/>This can be defended in at least two ways, and doesn't seem vulnerable to the semantics of my analysis of (1). First, in the public arena we're doing concrete things with our beliefs. The beliefs we adopt as facts drive our public policy, and it strikes me that public policy needs to be grounded in the way in which we actually best see the world. Second, third parties are involved in the public arena. It's madness to refuse your kid a blood transfusion after an accident on the grounds that you identify as a Jehovah's Witness, because our best grounded knowledge tells us that this is simply neglect.<BR/><BR/>I don't think that this point is very controversial, though I got distracted whilst writing this and I'm sure I had more to say. Oh well.<BR/><BR/>(3) The Dawkins approach is bad tactics.<BR/><BR/>I pretty much agree with this. It's well-known that you persuade no one by shouting at them or belittling them, and it's almost as well-known that you just come across looking like a dick if you try. I do understand the sentiment that a strong response is needed to American Bible-Thumpers who won't listen to reason, but if they won't listen to reason we might as well just shoot them--yelling facts at them won't make a blind bit of difference.<BR/><BR/>One of the professors who taught me a little at university reviewed Dawkins' 'A Devil's Chaplain.' He mentioned a policy of "never apologise, always explain." The problem with getting militant about these things is that you actually cover less ground of the debate. You come across as biased and unreasonable, and any omissions on your part come across as weaknesses in your argument/refusal to engage in some areas. Moreover, people will give you less notice because they'll think you're a jerk. <BR/><BR/>One of the Roosevelts implored us to speak softly, but carry a big stick. I think that this is the best tactic here, too. Engage in all situations and have arguments to destroy all theistic claims. Do this politely but thoroughly and unyieldingly. This shows that you are willing to engage, that you are willing to reason things out, that atheists aren't all arrogant and horrible; more generally, it comes across as a cooperative action, which can't be used against you and the wider atheist community as slander.<BR/><BR/>...this is a bit more jumbled than I'd really hoped. I do hope that the first section of this, regarding referents, makes some kind of sense. I find it very difficult to word my thoughts on that topic, and the thoughts themselves are still very crude. But I suppose it must all start somewhere.underajunipertreehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00591750712949437054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-14130109018968747352007-04-26T05:12:00.000-04:002007-04-26T05:12:00.000-04:00don, I think that the line you're drawing between ...don, I think that the line you're drawing between the natural and the metaphysical is suspect. At its root, science deals in the phenomena that manifest in the world. But it is silent on whether these phenomena are natural or metaphysical. By the very nature of science, our notion of the natural is incomplete. We still do not know how quantum binding works, for example. At the moment it is very mysterious; some would say supernatural. But this does not mean that a subsequent and more complete notion of the natural world cannot account for it.<BR/><BR/>Basically, I can't think of any meaningful proposition off the top of my head that isn't in some way scientifically tractable. Even if God is a priori beyond space and time [and what on earth does that mean, when you really think about it?], he must be able to exert an effect on the world if he is to be worthy of investigation. But once he is interacting with the world, he is dealing in phenomena with which we can interact and observe. I think that Dawkins' is right--if there is a God [in any meaningful sense] he would have an impact on the natural world. And insofar as he is and does, he seems to be subject to scientific scrutiny.underajunipertreehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00591750712949437054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-21259029310763264522007-04-26T01:51:00.000-04:002007-04-26T01:51:00.000-04:00Ebonmuse,For one, "Does God exist?" is a question ...Ebonmuse,<BR/><BR/>For one, "Does God exist?" is a question asked in philosophy books, not science books. And to clarify, I never said, nor believe, that science doesn't have an impact on philosophy. But, even so, that science may impact an issue is altogether different from an issue being scientific. "Does God exist?" is by its very nature a philosophical question since God, if he exists "in any meaningful sense," isn't contained in or confined by nature, which is the scientist's realm of investigation; he studies the <I>physical</I> world. Thus when a scientist attempts to draw <I>metaphysical</I> conclusions he no longer, it appears to me, speaks as a mere scientist. But it seems like we're just going to have to disagree on this one.Donhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09864160448940312836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-77406206346472508602007-04-26T00:31:00.000-04:002007-04-26T00:31:00.000-04:00Indeed -- cf. The God Hypothesis.Indeed -- cf. <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2006/01/god-hypothesis.html" REL="nofollow">The God Hypothesis</A>.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-52093283186594585662007-04-25T23:54:00.000-04:002007-04-25T23:54:00.000-04:00Don - Why on earth do you say that the question of...Don - Why on earth do you say that the question of God's existence is philosophical and not scientific? If God exists in any meaningful sense, he must have some detectable, empirical impact on the world. Searching for such an impact, and measuring it if it is discovered, is indisputably the domain of science.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com