tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post3065281719582825195..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: A reason by any other name...Richard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-18481283134767008582011-03-30T12:48:36.550-04:002011-03-30T12:48:36.550-04:00Hi Jack, sure, I think this is a worry to take ser...Hi Jack, sure, I think this is a worry to take seriously: an acceptable metaethical theory cannot render it <i>unintelligible</i> to care about normative properties, or to see them as normatively significant. (After all, if something has no normative significance what claim does it have to being a <i>normative</i> property?)<br /><br />What I reject is just the claim that non-natural properties couldn't be normatively significant. In other words, I wonder about the "because...?..."Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-12518946050110108822011-03-30T11:40:10.762-04:002011-03-30T11:40:10.762-04:00Richard,
Do you think that analyses of moral pro...Richard, <br /><br />Do you think that analyses of moral properties must be, for lack of a better term, caring conservative? Consider an analogy. <br /><br />I regard the matter of WHETHER I COULD HAVE WON THE ELECTION as a matter worth caring about, even though I lost the election. Then, Lewis offer his counterpart theoretic account of modality on which individuals are worldbound. I conclude conditionally: If Lewis's theory of modality is correct, then the matter of WHETHER I COULD HAVE WON THE ELECTION is not worth caring about (because my counterparts are not *me*). So I reason modus tollens to the falsity of counterpart theory. Counterpart theory is not caring conservative: learning about counterpart theory, supposing that it is true, alters which modal facts I care about. <br /><br />The same sort of objection might be put to the non-naturalist. I regard the matter of WHETHER IT IS GOOD TO HELP PEOPLE as a matter worth caring about. Then, the non-naturalist offers her account of goodness. I conclude conditional: If non-natural is true, then the matter of WHETHER IT IS GOOD TO HELP PEOPLE is not worth caring about (because...?...). I reason modus tollens to the conclusion that non-naturalism is false. The threat is that non-natural is not--I hate this name--caring conservative, and hence false.Jack Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01560248410206874289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-72942910478220958752011-03-21T17:56:10.874-04:002011-03-21T17:56:10.874-04:00It's not generally the case that people "...It's not generally the case that people "ignore" normative claims until such a time as they have secured a naturalistic metaethics. My point is that, prior to doing any metaethics at all, most folks have the normative concept of something's being <i>good</i> or <i>worth caring about</i>. Such people are often (and quite intelligibly) motivated by the thought that something is worth caring about; and this thought is not cognitively or analytically equivalent to any thought involving purely naturalistic, non-normative concepts. (Here I assume you're not an <i>analytical</i> naturalist.)<br /><br />So, I dunno, maybe you're an exception to the rule, and you really never have been motivated by a normative thought that wasn't transparently (to you) reducible to a descriptive thought. But that would be most unusual. And this standard practice strongly suggests that it's really not any kind of pre-theoretic datum that only natural facts could ever be relevant to choice and deliberation. You could keep on insisting on such a principle nonetheless, of course, and there's probably not much I could say in the face of such insistence. But I must confess to finding it rather baffling.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-38996284184255759242011-03-21T17:36:32.897-04:002011-03-21T17:36:32.897-04:00I'm not really sure how we go about appreciati...I'm not really sure how we go about appreciating the abstract and not transparently natural fact that such-and-such is <i>worth</i> caring about. Unless you can tell me something about this fact that makes it reasonable for me to care about it (e.g. that it reduces to the judgment that my fully informed self, with a maximally coherent desiderative set, would advise me to care about it), I'm inclined to ignore it altogether. The naturalist can give me such a theory, the non-naturalist cannot. <br /><br />The non-naturalist might say: but you've just committed yourself to the view that, possibly, you have no reason to care about what is worth caring about (if it turns out that the property being worth caring about is non-natural), which is absurd. But if it <i>cannot</i> turn out that the property being worth caring about is non-natural (for example, because if it were non-natural it would not warrant us in the belief that we have reason to care about the natural feature on which it supervenes) then this reply is a non-starter.Angushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11692562500798180624noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-46295691902551399932011-03-20T17:54:10.982-04:002011-03-20T17:54:10.982-04:00Angus, once we put aside the moral fetishism point...Angus, once we put aside the moral fetishism point, I'm not sure what further objection remains. I agree that <i>the things that are worth caring about</i> are natural -- health, happiness, etc. And the ordinary way of being reasons-responsive is to just directly respond to these natural reason-giving features. But we can also appreciate the significance of a more abstract (and not transparently natural) fact, namely that such-and-such natural feature is <i>worth</i> caring about. (And similarly, I think, in the epistemic case. I could tell you that a proposition <i>warrants</i> belief, without telling you the natural features in virtue of which it is so warranted.)<br /><br />Given that our normative concepts do not (as per the Open Question Argument) <i>appear</i> to pick out any (independently identifiable) natural property, why would it be such a problem if <i>this appearance turned out to be accurate</i>? It's a puzzling objection.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-51762226995981911422011-03-20T16:27:10.810-04:002011-03-20T16:27:10.810-04:00"[L]et me restate the previous questions in a..."[L]et me restate the previous questions in a more transparent way: "Why care about those natural features that have the property of being worth caring about? Isn't possession of the property of being worth caring about just completely irrelevant...?" When stated this way, the questions seem silly."<br /><br />I'd think for those who doubt non-natural properties can be normatively relevant the questions seem silly just as long as the property "being worth caring about" is natural. Presumably learning that X is worth caring about tells us there is reason to care about X (even if - the moral fetishism point - X's having the property "worth caring about" is not <i>itself</i> the reason to care about X). But if "worth caring about" is a non-natural property, different in kind from the properties we learn about through the sciences, then why should learning that fact about X (as opposed to the fact that X increases happiness or health) persuade us there is a reason to care about it? Analogously: if there were some non-natural property "being the best scientific theory" and I learned Y instantiated it, I would not thereby be persuaded to accept Y; I'd need to know what it predicts, how simple it is, and other natural facts. Those would do <i>all</i> the work, just as they do in the moral case.<br /><br />Of course, it is absurd to think that learning that X has the property "being worth caring about" should not persuade us that there is reason to care about X. But that just goes to show that the property "being worth caring about" <i>isn't</i> non-natural.Angushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11692562500798180624noreply@blogger.com