tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post2971732558195520229..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Accessible Non-Actual FuturesRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-7136110837581874422008-12-08T00:46:00.000-05:002008-12-08T00:46:00.000-05:00To clarify for those not up on the jargon and disc...To clarify for those not up on the jargon and discussion I think one way (of many) of portraying the Eternalist/Presentist debate is as a dispute over whether being actualized is something that happens in time.<BR/><BR/>Given that the Eternalist/Presentist debate also impacts upon the free will debate the issues become tied. Indeed I've seen many arguments for presentism that end up taking Libertarian Free Will as the premise (hidden or otherwise) for the arguing.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-29509802717307820382008-12-08T00:43:00.000-05:002008-12-08T00:43:00.000-05:00Saying that you were assuming eternalism clarifies...Saying that you were assuming eternalism clarifies a lot. I was assuming you weren't making such an assumption.<BR/><BR/>Now I tend to favor eternalism so it's hard to argue to much against you since I think we actually have the same views. It just seems to me that those on the other side just aren't in nearly as weak a position as you portray.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1222843074254804742008-12-07T22:38:00.000-05:002008-12-07T22:38:00.000-05:00"Yet because there is a block universe the univers..."<I>Yet because there is a block universe the universe as a whole (including time) becomes actual at the same moment.</I>"<BR/><BR/>I think that is strictly nonsensical. "Becoming actual[ized]" is not something that happens <I>in time</I>, or "at" a moment. Which world is actual is an atemporal fact. Assuming eternalism (as I meant to all along), then yes all moments exist equally -- the present has no special ontic status. But so what?<BR/><BR/>You claim there is a sense of <I>brute</I> "accessibility" in which other worlds are <I>not</I> accessible (or able to be actualized) on this picture. I do not see why this is so. Suppose there are two block universes, w1 and w2, identical up to the present, that diverge depending on whether or not I φ tomorrow. Suppose I will φ, so w1 is actual, and timelessly so. That seems perfectly compatible with the claim that I (table-thumpingly <I>really</I>) could have done otherwise. I won't. But I could have, and if I had then w2 would have been timelessly actualized in place of w1. The timeless facts depend upon what happens in time, after all.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-8111910017116222302008-12-07T22:19:00.000-05:002008-12-07T22:19:00.000-05:00Hey Richard, I wrote that loose post before readin...Hey Richard, I wrote that loose post before reading the above. I think switching to this sort of possible worlds talk is interesting.<BR/><BR/>I think some compatibilists (say of the religious sort) are open to denying causal determinism but accepting determinism in the sense that there is only one possible work but which is underdetermined by causal law. (Due to say foreknowledge by God)<BR/><BR/>The interesting issue to raise given the way you are framing things is in how to conceive of block universes as in the typical interpretation of GR. (Let us assume for the moment that we allow QM of some sort so we aren't dealing with the strictly causally determinist form of GR but that there still is a block universe due to the relationship of space and time)<BR/><BR/>Now one might say that in possible worlds there are many possible worlds compatible with whatever initial structures there were at the formation of the universe. Yet because there is a block universe the universe as a whole (including time) becomes actual at the same moment. <BR/><BR/>This means that given a particular history this is just a subset of the block universe but that there are other possible block universes with that same history.<BR/><BR/>The problem with foreknowledge is that it logically entails in this scheme that not only a past history but a partial future history be determined. Now what you would say is that all parts of space/time not <I>logically</I> required to be defined entail possible worlds for all those logically undetermined portions. <BR/><BR/>So that I agree with you in. (And I did in the prior post as well)<BR/><BR/>The problem is that while it's true that a possible world is accessible to you in the sense you specify clearly it is also <I>not</I> accessible. That is the possible worlds are accessible in terms of causality but are inaccessible in terms of being actualized. (Which I assume you agree with)<BR/><BR/>For many people, as I'm sure you're aware, the big issue is the ability to actualize a possibility and not whether a possibility is causally open given a particular history.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.com