tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post2791781125172066251..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: A Future Without FatalismRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-46164217682484469972008-12-07T22:17:00.000-05:002008-12-07T22:17:00.000-05:00I think my arguments apply just as well to future ...I think my arguments apply just as well to future existents as to future truths. If 'determined' in the last sentence is meant in some non-trivial sense (i.e. that goes beyond the mere claim that the future really, though perhaps contingently, exists) then it is a non-sequitur. So, again, the claim is either trivial or it doesn't actually follow. You can't get necessity out of mere factuality. (See also my new post '<A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2008/12/accessible-non-actual-futures.html" REL="nofollow">Accessible Non-Actual Futures</A>'.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-75785190612805436132008-12-07T21:54:00.000-05:002008-12-07T21:54:00.000-05:00Well I think there are quite a few good arguments ...Well I think there are quite a few good arguments in this regard.<BR/><BR/>Take the following. Either QM's view of the universe or GR's view of the universe is correct. If foreknowledge is possible then the presentism in QM is false and GR is true. GR entails a block universe for future truths to be possible. Therefore all future events exist. Therefore the future is determined.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-64560078855173589462008-12-05T20:00:00.000-05:002008-12-05T20:00:00.000-05:00I agree that it's "controversial" in the sense tha...I agree that it's "controversial" in the sense that many people have a different view. That's why I take myself to be diagnosing a <I>common</I> mistake -- many people make it. If you mean it is 'controversial' in some stronger sense, i.e. that there are <I>good reasons</I> for taking the alternative view, then that has not been established.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-41437791286928848992008-12-05T19:53:00.000-05:002008-12-05T19:53:00.000-05:00Well since I tend to agree with you I'm not the on...Well since I tend to agree with you I'm not the one to ask that. My point is that this <I>is</I> a controversial claim.<BR/><BR/>I think the question becomes how is it possible that there can be a future truth without metaphysical entailments that go beyond the "merely true." <BR/><BR/>The other points I raise aren't, I think misleading, beyond the trivial point that the <I>words</I> are. (Which was much of what I was saying - so I think we're agreeing there for the most part)<BR/><BR/>Now if you're saying epistemology is merely a logical issue without metaphysical entailment maybe we might disagree more. I'll read your new post which I notice came up before saying more since I suspect a lot rests upon the whole metaphysical/epistemology distinction.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-10378758953265650992008-12-05T17:49:00.000-05:002008-12-05T17:49:00.000-05:00Clark - my point is that mere truth should not be ...Clark - my point is that <I>mere truth</I> should not be thought of as any kind of "constraint" at all. When you mention alternative definitions of "determinism" (or, for that matter, of what's "fated" to be) you are simply offering misleading rewordings of the basic fact that the future event <I>will</I> be. There is no <I>further</I> metaphysical sense in which it is 'fated', 'constrained', 'certain' or 'fixed'.<BR/><BR/>Like I said: "It is true, but utterly trivial, that one cannot hold the truth of Q fixed and at the same time make it false. But there is no <I>substantive</I> necessity here. For all that's been said, it might be entirely within my power whether I φ, and hence whether Q is actually true or false."<BR/><BR/>If you think there is some sense in which the future may be 'constrained' that goes beyond the trivial claim that future truths are true, whilst falling short of making any (false) counterfactual claims, I would ask you to clarify precisely what the claim is supposed to be. I don't see any room left in logical space for such a claim to be coherent.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-65035432898626108142008-12-05T16:48:00.000-05:002008-12-05T16:48:00.000-05:00I think though that a Libertarian free will propon...I think though that a Libertarian free will proponent would still object to the way you phrase it. But I'd be the first to admit that part of the problem is all the language we use here in terms of power, "may," "will," and so forth is muddled and carries both senses.<BR/><BR/>Let's put it a different way. It is possible for there to be a truth of the future without there being causal determinism. That avoids all the problematic terminology. (And I include fatalism in that since it can mean that nothing I do matters for the future - which is wrong as you pointed out - but can also mean that the future state of affairs is fated to be true)<BR/><BR/>But my point is that to say something is certain only in an epistemic sense seems false. Truth entails that the future state of affairs is constrained in a metaphysical sense as well. It may not be constrained in a causal deterministic or fatalistic (in your definition) sense. <BR/><BR/>The interesting question you don't really touch on is whether it is possible to know future truths without the future being fixed. That is does the mere fact one can know entail a certain kind of determinism (not necessarily causal). I tend to lead to the idea that foreknowledge entails at least blocks of determinism between the present and the time period known. But clearly that goes beyond what you are getting at.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-12438160158111437712008-12-04T22:07:00.000-05:002008-12-04T22:07:00.000-05:00Clark, the whole point of my post was that 'future...Clark, the whole point of my post was that 'future truth' does not entail fatalism (or anything along those lines). If Q is true, that simply entails that I <I>will</I> phi tomorrow. It does not entail that there is any stronger sense in which I <I>must</I> do so. To think otherwise is sheer conceptual confusion.<BR/><BR/>See especially my middle two paragraphs beginning 'One may object'...Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-81689412884761365142008-12-03T02:00:00.000-05:002008-12-03T02:00:00.000-05:00To add, I think one can make the distinction betwe...To add, I think one can make the distinction between entailment and what necessitates. But then one is making a claim about causality. Which is why I said the issue is ultimately about equivocation over the meaning of "determinism."Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-92071525522883225792008-12-02T23:58:00.000-05:002008-12-02T23:58:00.000-05:00Because truth has metaphysical aspects.I suppose o...Because truth has metaphysical aspects.<BR/><BR/>I suppose one can have a theory of truth where this isn't true. (Say truth as coherence) So I'll back off somewhat. But typically even those who reject normal "truth as correspondence" as a <I>theory of truth</I> still would accept many of the metaphysical entailments if something about the future is true.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-29814349028130753512008-12-02T23:05:00.000-05:002008-12-02T23:05:00.000-05:00"It is not the case that if I know X and X is a fu..."<I>It is not the case that if I know X and X is a future fact that it has only epistemic and not metaphysical consequences.</I>"<BR/><BR/>How so? (I don't deny that many philosophers have considered foreknowledge to be a special problem for free will. But they seem to me mistaken. Talking about divine foreknowledge, for example, is simply a vivid way of highlighting that the known proposition is a future <I>truth</I>, and I've argued that that is no problem at all.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-4057762954935660222008-12-02T22:48:00.000-05:002008-12-02T22:48:00.000-05:00While I'm sympathetic to much you say here one thi...While I'm sympathetic to much you say here one thing seems wrong. It is not the case that if I know X and X is a future fact that it has only epistemic and not metaphysical consequences. This has long been discussed in the literature and is pretty crucial for a significant aspect of the free will debate. <BR/><BR/>That's not to say we shouldn't distinguish <I>will</I> from <I>must</I>. But the problem is more equivocative senses of the word determinism.Clark Goblehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03876620613578404474noreply@blogger.com