tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post2349151071954570743..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Locating the benefit of future-directed desiresRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-18042419977907819082013-05-15T13:48:41.426-04:002013-05-15T13:48:41.426-04:00[Dale Dorsey writes:]
Hi Richard,
I think I gene...[Dale Dorsey writes:]<br /><br />Hi Richard,<br /><br />I think I generally agree with you that it's fine to say that welfare is not temporally located. But I think your argument here is a good way to reject the time-of-object view in favor of the time-of-desire view, if one's a DS theorist. The worry, I think, is an alternative, viz., concurrentism. Concurrentism holds (actually, this is the view I call in my paper "concurrentism lite", but ignore this) that x is good for A at t1 if and only if A desires x at t1 and x occurs at t1. Basically it's a restriction on temporal welfare: you're only better-off at a time when you desire something at that time and the thing occurs at the time. And so this view could accept Internalism and the "for the sake of" point you make, plausibly in my view. I suppose I think concurrentism lite fails just for the sort of space-time asymmetry reasons I was interested in pressing, but not all find that plausible.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-40053573185323527022013-05-14T17:41:18.111-04:002013-05-14T17:41:18.111-04:00Hi Korey, right, on my preferred understanding of ...Hi Korey, right, on my preferred understanding of the Desire View, if we add that S at t0 desires that not-P, then P's obtaining at t2 is good for S-at-t1 but bad for S-at-t0, so there's a real trade-off there. That seems to me the right thing to say about the case (at least from the perspective of a desire theorist who wants to count future-directed desires at all).Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-86531052027410342582013-05-14T16:21:46.298-04:002013-05-14T16:21:46.298-04:00Richard,
I'm not sure if this is as clear as ...Richard,<br /><br />I'm not sure if this is as clear as you were suggesting (but perhaps I misunderstood your argument!). It seems that you are saying that the desiring at S-at-t1 is the intended recipient of the benefit of the satisfied desire, rather than S-at-t2, when the satisfied object actually is concurrent with a now previously held desire . But if this is true, then desires that become fulfilled at a t2 where there is also an opposite desire than the one at t1 possess benefit and harm for two different timeslices. While possible, this outcome does not seem "desirable" (see what I did there?), due to the complications this causes when deciding which S deserves concern (Do we weigh the desires of S-at-t1 or the desires S-at-t2?. It seems this could be avoided (and also avoid the problem of S-at-t2's benefit not referring to any held desire) by only ascribing a benefit to the time when the desire to be satisfied is present at the timeslice before the actual satisfaction. Is this a bad interpretation of your argument?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04754623186861485220noreply@blogger.com