tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post2251236163225307856..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Review of Parfit, On What MattersRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-85125212534388073432012-05-16T19:40:16.135-04:002012-05-16T19:40:16.135-04:00Thanks. I'm unlikely to get around to reading...Thanks. I'm unlikely to get around to reading a book of this length any time soon. Yet I'm aware of Parfit's reputation and was hoping somebody would provide a good summary. Let me ask you a couple of questions. First, it seems from your discussion that Parfit's talk about the three mountain trails converging is a bit misleading. He seems to see consequentialism as the paradigm, and hikers on the other two trails are urged to imitate those on THAT one. Is that observation unfair? <br /><br />Second, does he mention William James anywhere? I ask not in re: James' epistemological views but in re: James on ethical and meta-ethical questions. I'm personally of the opinion that WJ's brief essay "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" is a sadly neglected masterpiece. And if anyone could correct the neglect it would be Parfit in a work like this.Christopherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17755575167245729981noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-13205346556019894752012-05-13T11:22:47.754-04:002012-05-13T11:22:47.754-04:00Yeah, that's an objection I address in the ref...Yeah, that's an objection I address in the referenced paper (also: <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2010/12/ideal-disagreement.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>).Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-2921611545572979332012-05-13T08:16:03.374-04:002012-05-13T08:16:03.374-04:00> If a possible pro-agony agent is no threat to...> If a possible pro-agony agent is no threat to our normative knowledge that pain is bad, why should actual Kantians be any threat to our knowledge that (say) we ought to lie to the murderer at the door? We already know that there are internally coherent normative views that conflict with ours, and hence could be reached by procedurally rational agents engaging in reflective equilibrium, should their starting points happen to differ enough from ours. What epistemic difference does it make whether those views should happen to have actual advocates?<br /><br />I think it is fully general that actual disagreement has different evidential relevance than possible disagreement. I would be a lot more concerned to learn that a bunch of actual mathematicians disagreed with me about p than to learn that a bunch of merely possible mathematicians disagreed with me about p. Likewise for just about any kind of disagreement.Nick Becksteadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16561745593227211371noreply@blogger.com