tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post1735748229791975476..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Desiring ThisnessRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-8663837557704710372008-02-29T10:34:00.000-05:002008-02-29T10:34:00.000-05:00Right, this is related to the discussion (in Theor...Right, this is related to the discussion (in <A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2008/02/theorizing-about-desire.html" REL="nofollow">Theorizing about Desire</A>) about whether to count merely instrumental desires. (I think we shouldn't, by this same test.)<BR/><BR/>My thought is that if you truly desire something of the name "coke", in addition to all the underlying features shared by cola substitutes, then upon getting a mere cola you will find that you have not yet gotten everything you wanted.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-4664280013538097072008-02-29T03:33:00.000-05:002008-02-29T03:33:00.000-05:00does your after the fact analysis really provide p...does your after the fact analysis really provide proof about your desires?<BR/><BR/>For example Imagine a fundimental desire of "thisness". I might "desire a coke" as a simple concept in my head which has no form at all besides a desire to have that thing that has coke as it's name.<BR/><BR/>I might in the end have a cola and maybe decide that that was a perfect substitute - but that doesn't change the fact that I wanted (in it's pure form) a coke and not a cola.<BR/><BR/>maybe we want to say that what you want is 'that think that will make you happy', or "I want what an idealized me would want". Which extracts us a bit from the real world and creates some counter intuitive hypotheticals to consider (but I guess is OK if we want to do that).<BR/><BR/>Also I'm also not sure that everyone would not feel 'cheated'. Afterall you WERE cheated in a sense.<BR/>the other part of this is that if we divide these sorts of desires into 'real desires' for lets say 'continued existance' and 'fake desires' for, let's say 'coke' then do we have solid grounds for saying that the desire for 'continued existance' is fundamentally different from the desire for coke? <BR/>that probably sounds strange - but I'm suggesting that you could reasonably have a model where you could desire anything including ceasing to exist or 'not having any cans" and I'm suggesting that whole web of beliefs might be anchored to nothing other than itself. Wanting coke might be one potential first principle and 'wanting to exist another neither being essential or holding a special place.Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.com