tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post1607754534114525223..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Are Prudential Reasons Special?Richard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-65371640882601257582009-01-22T13:31:00.000-05:002009-01-22T13:31:00.000-05:00"wouldn't the average non-philosopher be just as h..."wouldn't the average non-philosopher be just as happy to say that it's prudent to go to the dentist whether I want to or not?"<BR/><BR/>I imagine that many people would accept that it's prudent to go to the dentist now only if it's true that you have some desire satisfied by going - to avoid pain in the future, say.Alex Gregoryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03836914221864280274noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-70056267791751979452009-01-22T11:22:00.000-05:002009-01-22T11:22:00.000-05:00Alex - wouldn't the average non-philosopher be jus...Alex - wouldn't the average non-philosopher be just as happy to say that it's prudent to go to the dentist whether I want to or not? (Maybe your point is just that these cases of 'aprudential' motivation are less immediately obvious to many people than cases of amoralism.)<BR/><BR/>Neil - that's a fair point. I should have specified that by "similarly restricted" I meant "restricted in terms of their <I>content</I>". (I'm interested in the restriction to reasons stemming from internalized values, for example. Current-desire-based reasons could be another interesting case.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-65005034535234211812009-01-22T10:27:00.000-05:002009-01-22T10:27:00.000-05:00Overall, I'm pretty skeptical of the distinctive p...<I>Overall, I'm pretty skeptical of the distinctive philosophical interest of... any similarly restricted class of practical reasons</I><BR/><BR/>I do think there's something mildly interesting about reasons grounded in the satisfaction of one's current desires. These are reasons which are necessarily motivating, just because they come out of a motivational state.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-34225820191191931602009-01-22T04:42:00.000-05:002009-01-22T04:42:00.000-05:00"Sounds false to me."I'm not sure if you mean to a..."Sounds false to me."<BR/><BR/>I'm not sure if you mean to agree that prudential and moral reasons relate to desire in the same manner, or whether you meant to disagree with my suggestion that, at first glance, it seems as though the reverse is true.<BR/><BR/>In the former case, I obviously agree. However, most of the interesting work comes in showing exactly how this is true. I don't think your suggestion (that both relate only to what we ideally would want) is the best way to go, for numerous reasons that I'll probably reprint at my place sometime.<BR/><BR/>In the latter case, my point was simply that the average non-philosopher would probably be happy to say things like: "You ought to look after your mum whether you want to or not! That's the entire point of it being an <EM>obligation</EM>!"Alex Gregoryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03836914221864280274noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-48084417401147672442009-01-21T17:48:00.000-05:002009-01-21T17:48:00.000-05:00I'm inclined to the same sort of skepticism; the d...I'm inclined to the same sort of skepticism; the distinction seems to have been developed in a very narrow context (early disputes over whether utilitarianism properly deals with moral reasons, if I understand correctly) and while people have tried to use it in other ways since then, I'm not convinced it has ever contributed much of lasting value.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.com