tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post159548148254978387..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: No Utility CascadesRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-7752561168539844842020-03-17T20:09:49.364-04:002020-03-17T20:09:49.364-04:00Hi! TruePath gives a nice example, and yes, that i...Hi! TruePath gives a nice example, and yes, that is right - belief in the probable success of the policy rationalises the actions that will make it true that the policy succeeds. In fact, these sorts of co-ordination cases are /examples/ of increasing marginal utility - the expected value of adopting the fiat currency goes up the more people do likewise. <br /><br />How do coordination problems relate to individual rationality? Because I think that act-utilitarians who think like effective altruists have problems co-ordinating with /themselves/, because they can't bind their future behaviour. I have a longer explanation for why I think that's true which I may post here later. But I might be wrong! If not, I think the interpersonal variant (which is the one I care about more) still stands.<br /><br />I should add, Richard - I don't take my arguments to count against utilitarianism per se. What they challenge is the combination of utitarianism with certain normative claims about how to choose and reason that seem to be embodied in effective altruism. I think that the best outcomes aren't promoted when we think and deliberate in those ways, and hence, there are utilitarian reasons to reject the way of choosing promoted by effective altruists. MKHhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00939912783288890311noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-87947786456740442622020-03-16T11:22:29.834-04:002020-03-16T11:22:29.834-04:00You can find the pre-print on Max's website [h...You can find the pre-print on Max's website [<a href="https://maxkhanhayward.files.wordpress.com/2020/02/utility-cascades-max-hayward-analysis-preprint.pdf" rel="nofollow">here's the PDF link</a>]. He does discuss a variant case that includes co-ordination issues, but the core idea doesn't depend on that, but rather on some interventions having <i>increasing marginal value</i>.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-91192476966449227102020-03-16T00:19:53.742-04:002020-03-16T00:19:53.742-04:00Since the paper isn’t up yet maybe I’m getginv it ...Since the paper isn’t up yet maybe I’m getginv it wrong but is the situation under consideration really a kind of collective action problem in which the widespread belief that the intervention will be succesful is necessary for it to succed.<br /><br />For instance, you might imagine an attempt to introduce fiat currency into a barter economy of utilitarians. If they all believe it will work they will not only vote to adopt it but also actually accept the money and it will improve efficency. If they stop believing it will work they might not accept the money once it’s rolled out making it not even worthwhile to try.<br /><br />But this kind of case also seems to be confusing questions about individual rationality with coordination problems.TruePathhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00124043164362758796noreply@blogger.com