tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post1505736585715550630..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Williamson on DialecticRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-49886323670503123912010-03-19T22:39:16.216-04:002010-03-19T22:39:16.216-04:00I think Williamson is targeting something fictitio...I think Williamson is targeting something fictitious. Perhaps there are sceptics about reason. And if there are sceptics about reason, I am confident that these sceptics use what we all call reason, but perhaps their use of reason has a different aim. I imagine that they would argue, ad hominem, as follows: 'A fully general understanding of our use of reason cannot be circular, regressive, or presuppose what it aims to explain. But in order to understand reason in a fully general way, we will be either circular, regressive, or pressupose some use for reason. Therefore, a fully general understanding of reason is not possible.'<br /><br />Of course, the sceptic here has appealed to reason. But there conclusion does not refute the use of reason; it does not even refute the use of reason as expressed as an argument. It only claims that a general understanding of reason must fail because of it cannot satisfy criteria that, they would argue, would satisfy us. In brief: the aim of achieving a fully general understanding of reason is impossible by it's own lights.<br /><br /><br />I confess that I cannot imagine a more general but intelligible sceptic than the one sketched above. In order to make a sceptic intelligible, they have to be clear about their aim with scepticism; if not, it becomes far to easy to refute them.CRanallihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01315313786621831511noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-28643270409597913862010-02-26T11:35:45.858-05:002010-02-26T11:35:45.858-05:00That's an interesting suggestion, though it...That's an interesting suggestion, though it's worth stressing that Williamson isn't arguing that dialectic has <i>no</i> value. Certainly, if you can convince someone of your conclusion using only premises (and inference rules) that they already accept, all the better. The point is simply that failure to achieve this isn't necessarily disqualifying. There may be good reasons/arguments against skepticism that the skeptic himself would consider "<a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2008/05/assessing-arguments-and-begging.html" rel="nofollow">question begging</a>".Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-15961283273032784502010-02-26T10:48:26.637-05:002010-02-26T10:48:26.637-05:00But on the other hand, it seems rather self-defeat...But on the other hand, it seems rather self-defeating and contradictory for a anti-skeptic or anti-rationalist to "reason" and try to persuade another through dialectics that dialectics is ineffective. Do anti-dialectics not put of with the contradiction of their action in using dialectics as a catalyst to critique itself and in doing so demonstate a self-defeat argument?Travis Morganhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00474420975853375436noreply@blogger.com