tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post1467098962846378575..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Reflecting on Irrational DesiresRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-60922977082288437282007-09-17T15:02:00.000-04:002007-09-17T15:02:00.000-04:00That's an interesting suggestion, though it doesn'...That's an interesting suggestion, though it doesn't seem to fit with what Parfit says in the section I quote above. Note that DP explicitly includes the requirement that one be "thinking clearly" in addition to being in possession of all the relevant empirical facts. And surely for any sense of "rational" whatsoever (however broad), there must be some sense in which having irrational views entails a flaw in one's <I>process</I> of thought, i.e. one is thinking insufficiently clearly.<BR/><BR/>Yet Parfit says it is "hard to predict" whether "those who were thinking clearly and knew the facts would not have such desires." What grounds are there for calling something 'irrational' if not that it would be rejected by this rational process?<BR/><BR/>So it is this that makes me think that Parfit is mistakenly using the term 'intrinsically rational' when really he means 'intrinsically good', or something along those lines.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-12401462432299074232007-09-17T10:21:00.000-04:002007-09-17T10:21:00.000-04:00This is how I understood Parfit:I imagined the del...This is how I understood Parfit:<BR/><BR/>I imagined the deliberative theory to be one like Railton's: He (roughly) claims that desires are not worth fulfilling if I wouldn't continue to hold them after gaining full factual (non-evaluative) information. Thus desires are subject to deliberation and rational criticism, but no desires are ruled out merely on the grounds that people ought not to hold them.<BR/><BR/>In contrast, the CP-theorist thinks that some desires are, in themselves, irrational. They might deliberate towards this conclusion, but they can do so by appealing to evaluative facts as well as positive ones.<BR/><BR/>It's not that the CP-theorist does not need to deliberate, but rather their conception of deliberation allows greater scope of criticism of desires. Arguably, given this, the deliberative theory is poorly named.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com