tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post1463337760404321767..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Verification and Base FactsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-40218818071149831132007-05-18T17:24:00.000-04:002007-05-18T17:24:00.000-04:00No, I meant that I don't know what you all mean by...No, I meant that I don't know what you all mean by "understanding" states of affairs that are in principle undetectable. You were perfectly clear!Jim Ryanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00053203362792999895noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-38297709340191269212007-05-16T20:10:00.000-04:002007-05-16T20:10:00.000-04:00Jim, What do you mean? What was confusing about w...Jim,<BR/><BR/> What do you mean? What was confusing about what I said?<BR/><BR/>JWAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-64408957718863701122007-05-15T09:17:00.000-04:002007-05-15T09:17:00.000-04:00Thanks, Richard, for the reply. I've replied, as w...Thanks, Richard, for the reply. I've replied, as well.<BR/><BR/>Goodness, I just can't tell what you and JW mean!Jim Ryanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00053203362792999895noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-44886701102172091072007-05-10T22:43:00.000-04:002007-05-10T22:43:00.000-04:00Richard, Right. That's sort of what I figured. I ...Richard,<BR/><BR/> Right. That's sort of what I figured. I suppose I'm a little worried that we're inferring 'this is a world with no phenomenal properties' directly off of a (supposedly coherent) set of descriptions which contains 'there are no phenomenal properties [in this world]' (or something equivalent).<BR/><BR/>JWAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-6448230507851106252007-05-10T21:42:00.000-04:002007-05-10T21:42:00.000-04:00Hi JW,Granted, we can't "tell" in the sense of bei...Hi JW,<BR/><BR/>Granted, we can't "tell" in the sense of being able to <I>detect</I> the difference. But we can at least understand what the difference consists in. So we can tell whether our zombie claims are true, <I>given</I> the (undetectable) base facts about the world. That's close enough for my liking, though I guess the verificationist might find it less satisfying. *shrug*<BR/><BR/>p.s. Ditto! And thanks for dropping by in the meantime...Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-3550398537841414102007-05-10T20:06:00.000-04:002007-05-10T20:06:00.000-04:00Richard, How does one tell the difference betwee...Richard,<BR/><BR/> How does one tell the difference between a world w/conscious experience and a zombie world? <BR/><BR/><BR/>Jack Woods<BR/><BR/>p.s. Looking forward to hanging out at Princeton next year.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-21663206722648389082007-05-10T07:41:00.000-04:002007-05-10T07:41:00.000-04:00You're right, I don't think scrutability by itself...You're right, I don't think scrutability by itself can play much of a limiting role, though I do think it moderately reflects Jim's core intuition that "if a person has no idea how to tell whether what he's saying is true, then he doesn't know what he's saying and doesn't mean anything by it." So it's more just to (neutrally) set up the structural comparison between our views.<BR/><BR/>The real work is done by my added requirement that "the base facts be <I>comprehensible</I>, in the sense that someone could understand the difference between scenarios where they do or do not obtain."<BR/> <BR/>Is objective mereological structure -- independent of all detectable physical qualities -- comprehensible? That can be reasonably disputed. But the answer will determine whether these are real facts or not. (Which seems appropriate enough, either way.)<BR/><BR/>To clarify the dialectic: I'm not proposing any sort of argument against someone who finds objective structure to be perfectly comprehensible. Rather, I hope to show Jim (or others in his position) how his most compelling intuitions <I>can</I> be retained without full-blown verificationism.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-24413055235417550022007-05-10T02:12:00.000-04:002007-05-10T02:12:00.000-04:00A quick question, Richard:I am worried that you're...A quick question, Richard:<BR/><BR/>I am worried that you're "scrutability of truth" condition is far too lenient to do the work that you want it to. <BR/><BR/>Take the mereology case, and a chair, far off in space away from any other particles. One piece of information about this world is that there is a single thing with many, many parts in this region of space (or that there is not a single thing with many, many parts in this region of space). If there is a single thing with many, many parts in that region of space, then it is almost assuredly our chair in question. We thus find that given enough information about the world, we can tell whether there are chairs or merely simples-arranged-chair-wise. All we need is information about what parthood relations hold in particular regions of space.<BR/><BR/>Moreover, to say that this is not a possible piece of information about a world would seem to beg the question against the person who finds the difference between 'chair' and 'simples-arranged-chair-wise'. Why is this not a piece of information about a world, I would ask.<BR/><BR/>There will still be some cases where the scrutability of truth condition will do some work. For instance, if I say 'I need a asdkjfasdkfj' it might be that there is no piece of information about the actual world that will help us determine what an asdkjfasdkfj is, or if there are any. But will there be any non-trivial uses of the scrutability condition? Are there any terms that we might think are, or at least might be meaningful that are ruled out by the scrutability of truth condition?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com