tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post1192044228252602845..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Fissioning in Prospect and RetrospectRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-37913088238546108922010-06-07T23:24:37.501-04:002010-06-07T23:24:37.501-04:00Ah, that makes sense. Thanks for the correction!Ah, that makes sense. Thanks for the correction!Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-76949762903313519382010-06-07T23:16:25.829-04:002010-06-07T23:16:25.829-04:00"On my understanding of the Lewisian 4-d worm..."On my understanding of the Lewisian 4-d worm view, we should think of Lefty and Righty as distinct people who share some temporal parts. As one of the overlapping parts, my present self should have 50% anticipation of ending up as (just) Lefty, and 50% anticipation of ending up as (just) Righty."<br /><br />I don't think this is right. More specifically, I think the first sentence is, but the second sentence isn't. The Lewisian view doesn't leave room for your present self having a 50% anticipation of ending up as just Lefty, and a 50% anticipation of ending up as just Righty. <br /><br />I'd think the natural way of paraphrasing questions about "who you'll end up as" on the Lewisian view is to understand them as questions about which future time slices are part of the same 4d worm(s) as this (current) time slice. So "will I ever see Paris?" is understood as "is there some future person slice that sees Paris and which is part of a 4d person-worm that this (present) person-slice is also part of?"<br /><br />If that's how "who will I be" questions are understood, then there's no room for uncertainty in cases where you know that you will fission. Two person-worms contain your present person-slice, but there isn't some further question about which one "you" are, which we might be uncertain about. The Lewisian view, I think, can say what you want to.<br /><br />There are some variants of his view, however, that are committed to the idea that fission cases should be understood as involving uncertainty/risk (in fact, they embrace it). I'm thinking of Dilip Ninan's "Persistence and the First-Person Perspective." Ninan tries to keep the Lewisian ontology, while making sense of the idea that you can coherently worry whether you'll turn out to be lefty or righty. Personally, I'm with you in thinking that we shouldn't try to make room for coherent worries about whether you'll turn out to be lefty or righty.Danielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17911116321628968901noreply@blogger.com