tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post115306092060605732..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: De-idealizing Conceptual AnalysisRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1155194460747009972006-08-10T03:21:00.000-04:002006-08-10T03:21:00.000-04:00If I assert that no state of affairs ever matches ...If I assert that no state of affairs ever matches the words, the scenario, anyone espouses then this is contradicting myself in that I must, in order for my statement to be true, assert that in this case at least, my words are in fact an exact match for the<BR/> world such that in effect there is no difference between the world and the words-- the world is<BR/> in some sense identical with the words, the scenario (separation of words from scenario is itself problematic, hence "words/scenario"). if no words/scenario matches the world exactly then the world cannot be known. <BR/> If I state that words and scenario never describe the world exactly, but only generally or vaguely or ambiguously, I do not thereby assert that my words in this statement are vague or ambiguous and so my statement does not describe the world exactly, rather just the opposite, I mean that my words/ scenario should be taken as no different from the way the world is--- is the way the world is, is the world.<BR/> To assert something is to equate world/ state of affairs with words/ scenario.<BR/> If I say that words/ scenario can only approximate to the state of things; I do not thereby maintain that my words in stating this are only approximate to the state of things -- rather I am saying that my words/scenario is accurate of the world. Words/ scenario can be more or less accurate--more accurate is what? --that the world is less different from the words/scenario. If the world is such and such a way this is the assertion that there is identity of words/scenario and world/state of affairs.<BR/> Assertion --is-- no difference between words/scenario and state of affairs. The point is not that words/scenario cannot be considered separate, it is that to assert words/scenario of world/state of affairs is to abandon, to relinquish the distinction. There is no assertion without this abandonment. What say ye?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1153193662744227562006-07-17T23:34:00.000-04:002006-07-17T23:34:00.000-04:00Oh, yes, it's certainly true that our concepts may...Oh, yes, it's certainly true that our concepts may have indeterminate application to <I>some</I> particular ("uncommon") cases. There I merely meant to rebut the more general skepticism based on nothing more than the fact that we're actually non-ideal. My point is that <I>counterfactual</I> facts about non-ideal reasoners can still (in general) offer truthmakers here, despite their non-actuality. But I agree that there will be some cases of indeterminacy. Those cases merely serve to demonstrate the fuzzy boundary areas of our vague concepts. That's no problem. (What would be more of a worry was if all of our concepts were vague everywhere, so that there were <I>never</I> determinate facts about their appropriate application!)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1153154269236759592006-07-17T12:37:00.000-04:002006-07-17T12:37:00.000-04:00You say: "The metaphysical worry is that this leav...You say: "The metaphysical worry is that this leaves us with no fact of the matter as to what people really mean by their terms, and whether disputes are substantive or terminological. But this concern is baseless. We can still appeal to counterfactual facts, about what one would say upon idealization, etc."<BR/><BR/>But how do you know there are at all definite facts about what would "ideal" reasoners say in every circumstance? The metaphysical worry, as I understand it, is that our concepts may be inherently ambiguous in their application to uncommon cases, so there could be simply "no fact of the matter" whether a concept applies or not to a given thought-experiment situation. If this is true, then no amount of ideal reasoning will yield a true answer. Isn't applying to "idealisation" to beg the question against the metaphysical worry?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1153067068066378552006-07-16T12:24:00.000-04:002006-07-16T12:24:00.000-04:00I should also add that our non-ideal grasp of scen...I should also add that our non-ideal grasp of scenarios will also be helped by relaxing two further conditions:<BR/>1) We can consider salient parts of the scenario rather than the entire universe.<BR/>2) The description of the scenario can be specified using plain English terms, including macrostructure (chairs and tables), rather than technical microphysical descriptions on the purely sub-atomic level!<BR/><BR/>Any other suggestions?Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.com