tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post114041316711530939..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: The Meaningful LifeRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140775763198443642006-02-24T05:09:00.000-05:002006-02-24T05:09:00.000-05:00On the latter point, my premise is not merely that...On the latter point, my premise is not merely that projects could be unjustified if outweighed by moral and personal costs. You rightly note that this claim is far too weak to support my position uniquely. Rather, my claim was that a personal project <I>could not possibly</I> be justified if it were clearly both egoistically and impersonally disadvantageous. This is a much stronger claim, and seems to count against pluralism. (At least, I would expect pluralists to hold that any one type of value can potentially outweigh other types of values. You lack an explanation of why personal values could never outweigh both egoistic and impersonal values simultaneously.) But I expect you will want to deny this stronger claim of mine.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140760247693130502006-02-24T00:50:00.000-05:002006-02-24T00:50:00.000-05:00I agree with Richard that activities like caring ...I agree with Richard that activities like caring for a loved one, or struggling to improve a philosophy paper - which don't seem at first glance to be justifiable either from an egoistic or an impartial consequentialist perpsective - may be justifiable either on indirect utilitarian grounds or on indirect egositic grounds (having to do with the paradox of hednosim). There is a further question, though, as to whether the existence of such indirect justifications are necessary, in order for these actions to be justified at all. The existence of such indirect justifications in particular cases are often very uncertain, and it's not obvious to me why the justifiability of my caring for my friend must hang on the availability of an indirect justification of one of these other types. Of course, the independent plausibility or implausibility of indirect utilitarianism will have a lot to do with the plausibility that these meaning-contributing activities require justification by that theory (or with the plausiblity of the claim that these indirect-utilitarian justifications illuminate, rather than distort our understanding of our own values).<BR/>A separte point: If I understand him, Richard claims that if one agrees that sometimes the fact that an action will contribute to the meaning of someone's life by enhancing one of his personal projects (caring for a loved one, pursuing his vocation as a creative artist or whatever)is not justified because the moral or personal costs are too great, then one is committed to the indirect theory of justification. But I don't see why. Rampant pluralism, of which I am a fan, does not commit one to the view that no amount of one type of disvalue can outweigh any amount of another type of value - at least if it does, I don't see why.<BR/>--Susan WolfAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1140510293103497202006-02-21T03:24:00.000-05:002006-02-21T03:24:00.000-05:00I dont really get Susan's position - it seems to b...I dont really get Susan's position - it seems to be based on nothingness (gets an image of a blackness swallowing up fantasia). I guess I am particularly unsure about things being "obviously justified".Geniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11624496692217466430noreply@blogger.com