tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post111763142900600011..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Why Be Moral?Richard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger17125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-55517393592432114352007-01-29T21:10:00.000-05:002007-01-29T21:10:00.000-05:00Why be Moral?
Because, it is the right thing to d...Why be Moral?<br /><br />Because, it is the right thing to do. The greatest Moral teacher that ever lived was Jesus Christ. The Bible is chock full of Moral issues. We could debate about Morality till the cows come home. But, what if the Cows don't come home,Where did they go? Vegas, my Friend Vegas! :>D<br /><br />Madniteowl2007Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1122137894169764412005-07-23T12:58:00.000-04:002005-07-23T12:58:00.000-04:00So? Any further thoughts?So? Any further thoughts?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1121529792049758222005-07-16T12:03:00.000-04:002005-07-16T12:03:00.000-04:00Richard, I look at it this way. The main reason pe...Richard, I look at it this way. The main reason people tend to overlook your or mine good reasons is that they have good reasons of their own. The nudist has them, and the amoralist has them too. There is nothing irrational about it, agreed? <BR/><BR/>I have met 2 kinds of amoralists: one is the disillusioned student who has just discovered that none of the reasons given for being moral are Reasons, that is, ironclad. So he goes around mocking morality. The other amoralist is for real. This is the person who is trying to survive in a high-competition environment, and he or she understands that morality can put them at a disadvantage. For example. One athlete has moral qualms about taking performance enhancing drugs. Another athlete does not. All other things being equal, who has the advantage on their side? It seems to me that any full acount of “why be moral” should look at the flip-side of it, and honestly spell out and discuss the disadvantages of being moral.<BR/><BR/>I did not mean to suggest that the choice I was speaking of as existential was somehow inferior (link to your “merely”) – quite the contrary, I see is as one of the most important choices a person makes in life. Perhaps a better term is “fundamental”. A fundamental choice is a premise that cannot be further rationalized without infinite regress. Whether or not to be moral is one such point. Descartes’ cogito ergo sum is another such point. At some point, you have to stop the flow of reasons and make up your mind in the absence of certainty. I think all such fundamental choices are made on trust; they are neither rational or irrational. Rationality cannot illuminate them any further, and a choice must be made. Descartes’s choice is something he was willing to trust and build on. (And frankly, it is no more rational than “I milk this cow therefore I am.”) Same with the moral decision. Does that make sense?<BR/><BR/>You ask whether there is a reason to prefer one fundamental assumption over another. I will give this more thought.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1121472206976141222005-07-15T20:03:00.000-04:002005-07-15T20:03:00.000-04:00I'm not sure what you mean by a "valid" choice. If...I'm not sure what you mean by a "valid" choice. If one ignores "good reasons" then one is, by definition, being irrational. At least in many situations, it's fairly clear that wearing clothes is the better option (given how other people would react) -- and, indeed, it could be downright irrational not to.<BR/><BR/>My essay above tried to show a similar thing for morality: that one who rejects it would thereby be demonstrating a particular form of irrationality.<BR/><BR/>When you suggest that it is merely an "existential choice", you seem to be implying that there is no reason to prefer one option over the other. One could pick either option and be above rational criticism. But you haven't given any argument for this position, you've merely <I>asserted</I> it. And it's precisely the claim which is in dispute. I presented arguments which suggest that it is not <I>merely</I> an existential choice. There are reasons to favour morality. The amoralist is vulnerable to rational criticism. (You might disagree, but in that case you'll need to refute the arguments I made.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1121440424827033022005-07-15T11:13:00.000-04:002005-07-15T11:13:00.000-04:00Richard, good to meet you in person. I appreciate ...Richard, good to meet you in person. I appreciate your response, and only hope that there are many other philosophers who ARE applying themselves to the challenge of the amoralist. This is not an idle challenge, as many more people nowadays are quite open in their mocking of morality, as one prof teaching ethics to business majors recounts online. After all, if all or most mathematicians had no interest in actually offering math that works in the world, then I think they should support their discipline by selling cookies, not by expecting public and private largesse! :-)<BR/><BR/>Are there reasons for someone to be moral even if they don't want to be? Certainly, just as there are reasons for people to wear clothes even if they don't want to. I think the real question is, are there Reasons? Meaning ironclad rational constructs conveying a high measure of certainty. And in that, I think the philosophers are chasing a chimera, and giving weapons to the amoralist. <BR/><BR/>Going naked is a valid choice, despite all the good reasons to wear clothes. So is being amoral/immoral. That's the whole point of morality -- people needing to summon their inner resources to make the choice to be moral, in the absence of Certainty, Reasons, or Proof. It's an existential choice, whether or not to be moral. It's not about the advantages it conveys (sometimes it conveys disadvantages, how come philosophers don't talk about that?), it's about who we choose to be in the world. You know, one of the Big Hard Choices of each person's life. <BR/><BR/>Does morality have any rational grounding? A large question, which I do not think hangs on having to show somehow that choosing immorality is not valid.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1121386409928191802005-07-14T20:13:00.000-04:002005-07-14T20:13:00.000-04:00Hi Vera, thanks for the comment. I think you are m...Hi Vera, thanks for the comment. I think you are misunderstanding the philosopher's motives. You ascribe to him the practical goal of getting amoralists to behave morally. But that's not really what we're about. At least in my own case, I'm more interested in the <I>theoretical</I> question of whether there really do exist reasons for someone to be moral even if they don't want to be. I just want to know if those reasons are there. I'm not necessarily going to make <I>use</I> of them.<BR/><BR/>Further, so long as we are convinced that the reasons we find are good ones, it does not matter (to us) whether the amoralist listens. If he just keeps saying "nope, not good enough," then he is being irrational. I would simply stop talking to him.<BR/><BR/>To reiterate: my aim is not to <I>persuade</I>, but to find theoretical <I>reasons</I>. The task is to show whether morality has any rational grounding. This would be worth examining even if no amoralists actually existed. I examine the question for my own sake, not for theirs.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1121385850288587742005-07-14T20:04:00.000-04:002005-07-14T20:04:00.000-04:00Richard, have you considered that answering the am...Richard, have you considered that answering the amoral person is really not about giving the various possible reasons for being moral? These reasons are valid for the convinced anyways. (And IMO would be more honest and effective if they were given as "these are my own reasons for being moral, as much as I understand them, which is probably imperfectly.)<BR/><BR/>Have you wondered why it is that philosophers spend so much effort to pour into the tauntings of the amoral? Should they not rather put those energies into the moral community and its concerns?<BR/><BR/>The amoral should be told to work out the reasons for themselves; the answers cannot be given them on a silver platter, nor should they be. The decision of being moral has to be worked out by each human being for him/her self -- it's one of the Big Hard Questions in life. <BR/><BR/>It is NOT the job of the moral philosopher, IMO, to keep thinking up reasons to be moral for those who are not interested, or who have flat out decided to align themselves with the immoral. It's almost a sort of co-dependency... all the amoral have to do is taunt, and the philosopher springs into action, working hard, thinking for them, and they have to do nothing. It takes no work to just keep saying "nope, not good enough."<BR/><BR/>Just a few thoughts. Cheers.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1118131360670251522005-06-07T04:02:00.000-04:002005-06-07T04:02:00.000-04:00I cover all of that in the linked post (and indeed...I cover all of that in the linked post (and indeed the appropriate sections of my essay above). If you read them, you will see that part of my argument is that the prudent person will be forced to cultivate an <I>intrinsic</I> (rather than merely instrumental) concern for others. Once he does so, the grounds are open for the inconsistency attack, as you granted in your previous comment.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1118130890425410382005-06-07T03:54:00.000-04:002005-06-07T03:54:00.000-04:00Blogger was misinterpreting my quotation marks:I t...Blogger was misinterpreting my quotation marks:<BR/><I><BR/>I think there are cases where arbitrariness is not equivalent to irrationality. I talk about this in my <A HREF="http://illusivemind.blogspot.com/2005/05/evolution-altruism-and-ethics.html" REL="nofollow">essay</A>. <BR/><BR/>However I absolutely agree with you in that there is a definite place for reason in assessing our desires as I talk about <A HREF="http://illusivemind.blogspot.com/2005/05/subjectivism-some-problems.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>.<BR/><BR/></I><BR/><BR/>It is clearly not in people’s best interests to be amoral. However the argument that we should be moral as it is in our interests extends only so far.<BR/><BR/>I should be moral and not lie to my friend because I want him to continue to be my friend and be honest with me, do favours for me etc. <BR/><BR/>But if I don’t want that friend around anymore it’s ok if I do hideous things to him. But then there are the consequences that come from the breaking of law. But if I think I can get away with it, then reason doesn’t compel me not to cut up his body and bury it in my backyard.<BR/><BR/>This account isn’t giving amoralist a reason to be moral but to obey the law, and manipulate everyone else so as to suit his interests. This may mean conning people and being minimally decent as many psychopaths usually are. <BR/><BR/>If the amoralist cares about his own best interests this gives him just as much reason to not get caught being immoral as he does to not be immoral.Illusive Mindhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05077172398731952774noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1118109647183844512005-06-06T22:00:00.000-04:002005-06-06T22:00:00.000-04:00If "the amoralist is consistent in his application...If "the amoralist is consistent in his application of a lack of empathy", then he's probably acting against his own best interests, as argued <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/05/good-life.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>. If he doesn't care about his own best interests, then he's not human and can't be reasoned with. (But, granted, if you truly care about <I>nothing at all</I> then there is nothing to ground one's rational criticisms upon.)<BR/><BR/>P.S. Be sure to include the 'http' bit or your links don't work.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1118109150063026742005-06-06T21:52:00.000-04:002005-06-06T21:52:00.000-04:00what would be incoherent is to fail to desire a fo...<B>what would be incoherent is to fail to desire a food you admit you would enjoy eating just as much, unless some further reason can be given for the differential treatment.</B><BR/><BR/><BR/>I think there are cases where arbitrariness is not equivalent to irrationality. I talk about this in my <A HREF="”" REL="nofollow" HTTP://ILLUSIVEMIND.BLOGSPOT.COM/2005/05/EVOLUTION-ALTRUISM-AND-ETHICS.HTML”>essay</A>. <BR/><BR/>However I absolutely agree with you in that there is a definite place for reason in assessing our desires as I talk about <A HTTP://ILLUSIVEMIND.BLOGSPOT.COM/2005/05/SUBJECTIVISM-SOME-PROBLEMS.HTML” HREF="”" REL="nofollow">here</A>. <BR/><BR/>Let’s say I love guitars except red guitars. (Which happens to be true)<BR/><BR/>For our desires to be rational that must cohere or accord with our beliefs about the world. So if I believe that red guitars are actually the best guitars in the world, it is not rational that my desire doesn’t accord with my belief, (unless there was some other reason why I didn’t like red guitars).<BR/><BR/>To whatever extent we can know, the beliefs which our desires are based on should accord with the world to be considered rational.<BR/><BR/>So if I believe that painting the colour red on a guitar actually alters the sound of the instrument and that belief is false (which I think it is) then my aversion to red guitars is irrational.<BR/><BR/>But what about the idea that our desires and moral judgements are reducible or entailed by first order principles. In order for them to be rational they must accord with those principles (which is similar to a coherent desire set).<BR/><BR/>So if my aversion to red guitars is derived from a aesthetic aversion to all red ‘status symbols’ then it is coherent. (I don’t like red cars either but I don’t mind red T-shirts).<BR/><BR/>If I did like red bass guitars then there would need to be a reason why I regarded lead guitars and bass guitars as meaningfully different in this context. Otherwise my desire is not in accord with my principle (i.e. the belief or desire about red status symbols).<BR/><BR/>Of course the aversion to red status symbols may itself by reducible to a further belief or desire, but as long as it is consistent that the desire is rational. And yet it is arbitrary in the sense that it might have been any other colour were it not for the cultural and perhaps physiological associations with the colour red.<BR/><BR/>But I don’t think you are using arbitrary in this way, you are right to use it in terms of inconsistency. <BR/><BR/>So if the amoralist cares about the welfare of his friends but not anyone else, there may be a consistent explanation for this. The amoralist may only care about the people who are loyal to him et al. If he doesn’t care about family member who are also loyal to him, just because he is related to them (and no other reason) then we can charge him with irrationality.<BR/><BR/>However an intelligent amoralist (a sociopath like Hannibal Lecter) may very well avoid these inconsistencies in his desires and beliefs. Certainly even the most moral people may have irrational desires in some aspect of their lives. <BR/><BR/>So if the amoralist is consistent in his application of a lack of empathy, (and perhaps his disregard for his future self) then how is his immorality irrational?Illusive Mindhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05077172398731952774noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1117772819750767532005-06-03T00:26:00.000-04:002005-06-03T00:26:00.000-04:00"Surely by liking dogs just as much as cats I woul..."<I>Surely by liking dogs just as much as cats I would be making my desire set more unified and coherent.</I>"<BR/><BR/>Not necessarily. There are non-arbitrary reasons why I prefer cats to dogs, and I assume the same is true of you. Perhaps it would be arbitrary to only care about the <I>welfare</I> of cats but not dogs, but that's quite a different matter from preferring the company of one or the other creature.<BR/><BR/>Michael Smith discusses a similar objection to yours, which is of someone complaining that it's absurd to hold that, because they desire coffee ice-cream, so they ought to desire all flavours of ice-cream. Smith denies that this is what coherence requires. Instead, as I describe <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/05/coherence-and-rational-desires.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>, what would be incoherent is to fail to desire a food you admit you would enjoy eating just as much, unless some further reason can be given for the differential treatment.<BR/><BR/>As for why it's bad to be arbitrary, that's just the same as asking why it's bad to be irrational. Arbitrariness just is a form of irrationality (on this conception). Cf. <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/06/why-be-moral.html#_ftn12" REL="nofollow">note 12</A> above, quoting Michael Smith: “the only decisive point we can make about normativity is that arbitrariness, as such, always undermines normativity.”Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1117769699699682722005-06-02T23:34:00.000-04:002005-06-02T23:34:00.000-04:00We tend to consider it irrational for an agent to ...<I>We tend to consider it irrational for an agent to disregard their future interests. If we are right about this, then that would support rational altruism.</I><BR/><BR/>I agree with this, it would make the amoralist who doesn't care about the consequences of his actions irrational. Or as I said in the other post, "the amoralist who wants to be happy, and is happy to go around chopping people’s heads off, knowing full well that he will suffer the consequences if caught."<BR/><BR/>However the problem with this, is that possible consequences resulting from my moral judgements are empirical and not a priori. If I love spending time in prison but not being executed by lethal injection, then my amorality may be deemed rational or irrational depending on which country I'm in. It is arbitrary.<BR/><BR/>But you admit that the argument from prudence is hardly the strongest one. It is worth considering though that it may be common in psychopaths to have the false belief that their immorality won’t cause negative consequences for themselves when living in a ‘moral’ society who punishes immoralists (there may be studies done on this, I don’t know). If this is true, then they clearly are irrational, (providing they are interested in avoiding such consequences) and the philosophical debate is about an imaginary amoralist.<BR/><BR/>Still, such an argument would mean that it is not irrational for the amoralist to commit immoral acts in which he knows (or believes) he won’t get caught. Hardly a pleasing conclusion.<BR/><BR/><B>The amoralist must thus retreat to the fully-relative theory of rational non-cognitivism, according to which even aprudentialism is beyond rational criticism.</B> I think this is right, "tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the world to the scratching of my finger" (only if I don't desire to continue living)<BR/><BR/><BR/><B>It seems plausible to hold that his overall desire set could be made more unified and coherent by adding in a more general desire for human well-being. </B><BR/><BR/>This is the part, I think your argument hinges on and I am unconvinced by. Surely by liking dogs just as much as cats I would be making my desire set more unified and coherent. You're saying it is irrational to have arbitrary desires. Why?<BR/><BR/>BTW if you agree that moral judgements are ultimately reducible to desires, how are you also rejecting non-cognitivism?<BR/><BR/>Perhaps you think like I do that non-cognitivism, understates the role reason plays in assesing moral judgements. If so do you know what, (if there is one) the name of this doctrine of morality would be?Illusive Mindhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05077172398731952774noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1117767542127397252005-06-02T22:59:00.000-04:002005-06-02T22:59:00.000-04:00Note, that when I say virtue and vice, I mean the ...Note, that when I say virtue and vice, I mean the decision to empathise or not. It isn't rational for someone who empathises with other people, who cares about their interests as if they were their own (in a sense), to then in the same breath completely disregard their interests.Illusive Mindhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05077172398731952774noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1117767181076867262005-06-02T22:53:00.000-04:002005-06-02T22:53:00.000-04:00I agree with your explanation. However, that we ge...I agree with your explanation. However, that we generally take virtuous action as the default can be seen as the general ability of most people to empathise, rather than there being a general reason for people to empathise. <BR/><BR/>I think that generally we also expect only a certain level of virtue, we would expect the motorist to stop and help the man bleeding to death on the side of the road into his car and drive him to a hospital, but we don’t expect (at least not yet) the man to donate half of his income to charity. We don’t expect people (generally, utilitarians, might) to be moral saints.<BR/><BR/>You’re right the amoralist must see virtue and vice as rationally equivalent, I don’t think he’d have a problem with this.Illusive Mindhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05077172398731952774noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1117709176751663392005-06-02T06:46:00.000-04:002005-06-02T06:46:00.000-04:00Yes, their help is unsurprising given their contin...Yes, their help is unsurprising given their contingent values (or "personal whim"). What I was trying to get at is the idea that we generally take virtuous action as the 'default' -- it needs no further reason. Viciousness, by contrast, seems to stand in need of further explanation. But the amoralist must see them as rationally equivalent - there is no more reason for someone to wish you well than ill. Generosity stands in need of explanation, and thus any instance of it is more "surprising" than it would be on the agent-neutral view.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1117699262386139162005-06-02T04:01:00.000-04:002005-06-02T04:01:00.000-04:00he knows they cannot truly wrong him, because he i...<I>he knows they cannot truly wrong him, because he is in no respect entitled to their help; they have no reason to help him unless it happens to suit their personal whim</I><BR/><BR/>Wouldn't it be the case, that an amoralist would only be surprised is another amoralist relieved his suffering? Isn't he justified in expecting a rational moralist in helping him, if they are to be consistent with their view of the impartiality of suffering?Illusive Mindhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05077172398731952774noreply@blogger.com