tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post110853015722334521..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Morality as MeansRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1109027807304568412005-02-21T18:16:00.000-05:002005-02-21T18:16:00.000-05:00Hi Matt,
Parfit actually pre-empts that objection....Hi Matt,<br />Parfit actually pre-empts that objection. He presents an analogous case where Othello, an otherwise good man, will kill someone whom he falsely believes to have betrayed him. You can either prevent Othello from acquiring this false belief (and therefore prevent him from ever forming the evil intentions), or save the forest fire victim. As before, the latter mission is slightly more likely to succeed, and Othello is about to die anyway, so considerations for his later welfare do not cloud the picture. Again, most of us would choose the fire victim. Preventing an evil intention from forming does not in itself add value to the world.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1109008158544611142005-02-21T12:49:00.000-05:002005-02-21T12:49:00.000-05:00If a person is going to die in either the murder o...If a person is going to die in either the murder or the forest fire, then it seems to me the judgment of greater intrinsic evil has to do with the motives of the person doing the killing. Otherwise it's just a death, and no different.<br /><br />That being the case, my prevention of the murder or the forest fire has no moral distinction, because even if I prevent the murder, I still have not prevented the motive, which is the real evil. Not the death of itself, but the intention of the murderer. So I could prevent the murder, and the evil which was present is still just as present.<br /><br />I think this is why most of us would choose the accidental victim. We would maximize the chance of us doing good, recognizing that the evil is not truly susceptible to elimination by my actions.Matt Powellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13897429041255136652noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1108623410260094242005-02-17T01:56:00.000-05:002005-02-17T01:56:00.000-05:00Your latter interpretation sounds more like what I...Your latter interpretation sounds more like what I was thinking of. I guess we are assuming that the best action is that which maximises value, which non-consequentialists might not accept. Fair criticism.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1108566792774761302005-02-16T10:13:00.000-05:002005-02-16T10:13:00.000-05:00Richard,
I don't quite see how the argument is su...Richard,<br /><br />I don't quite see how the argument is supposed to work at all; it is possible, of course, that the reason for that is just that I'm not quite catching your meaning (always a potential problem in these sorts of arguments). <br /><br />If by 'intrinsically evil' you mean that simply by considering it in itself we have a reason to prevent it, then I'm not sure on what basis we are drawing the <I>comparative</I> conclusion. Simply that we have a reason to prevent murder doesn't entail anything about whether this reason is greater or less than our reasons for doing some other thing. (Although there might be 'intuitive contamination' here from another issue; one could argue that on this gloss of 'intrinsically evil' it makes sense to consider any human death intrinsically evil, since of any human death in itself we could say we have reason to prevent it. This evens the playing field between the murder and the accidental death; and even if the murder is more intrinsically evil, it isn't clear how this would weigh against the accidental death's being easier to prevent, if the accidental death is also intrinsically evil.)<br /><br />If, on the other hand, we meant by 'intrinsically evil' that simply in virtue of itself it makes any state of affairs of which it is a part worse than it would be if it were not a part -- then I don't see that the Parfit argument goes through here either. For on this gloss, it seems to me that it would make more sense to consider the goodness of the act of prevention rather than the badness of what is being prevented; there might be a relation between the two, but there's no reason to think it would necessarily be straightforward.<br /><br />But it's entirely possible that I'm just not quite getting a point somewhere.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1108549582302129692005-02-16T05:26:00.000-05:002005-02-16T05:26:00.000-05:00Tom, I entirely agree (see here, for instance). B...Tom, I entirely agree (see <A HREF="http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/02/ethics-of-generalization.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>, for instance). But just imagine for the sake of argument that there would be no further bad consequences from allowing the murder rather than the accidental death. Does the mere fact that the murder is 'evil' provide you with more reason to prevent it than the accident? That's the only real issue here, since the question is whether the moral status of an action can 'add value' above and beyond the non-moral value that accompanies it.<br /><br />Brandon, are you using 'intrinsic evil' to mean the same thing as what I describe above? It might just be that the terminology is misleading, and there's no substantial disagreement here at all - I'm not sure.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1108546882768266172005-02-16T04:41:00.000-05:002005-02-16T04:41:00.000-05:00If you're going to do this sort of utilitarian cal...If you're going to do this sort of utilitarian calculus, I think you need to add in the less direct effects of the acts. Virtues and vices are built into character by practice. Promising to breathe is an overly trivial example, but someone who practices promise-keeping (even if they start with easier stuff) becomes better at it and more likely to do it again in the future. Moreover, their good example may have a good effect on others. Conversely, a second murder may well be easier than the first, and a "successful" murder may provide a bad example for others.<br /><br />Even if you're a pure consequentialist (i.e., holding no intrinsic good/evil in acts qua "means"), you need to consider indirect as well as direct consequences. There's more than just the stone at the bottom of the pond; there are the ripples on the surface.Tom Chatthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14570407221616215818noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1108533600780391672005-02-16T01:00:00.000-05:002005-02-16T01:00:00.000-05:00I'm unconvinced by the Parfit argument. That murde...I'm unconvinced by the Parfit argument. That murder is intrinsically evil and an accidental death is not doesn't entail that stopping a murder is intrinsically better than stopping an accidental death (one might hold that they are incommensurable, for instance, or that the only salient feature for determining the intrinsic goodness of the act in either case is whether the action stops an unnecessary death). And surely what should guide our actions, assuming that they can be intrinsically good or not, is whether <I>our</I> actions are intrinsically good. So the Parfit argument seems to be missing something.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.com