tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post109592757552137293..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Naming and NecessityRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-50602745833667455342011-05-26T15:34:07.171-04:002011-05-26T15:34:07.171-04:00I think fiddlestix's point about how these ...I think fiddlestix's point about how these 'necessary' qualities are not so necessary is a good one. But my biggest concern is, even if we concede that proper names are rigid designators and that this can result in necessary a posteriori knowledge, so what? <br /><br />I don't see how being able to say that cats are necessarily animals, assuming that they actually are animals, is useful. It certainly doesn't help us answer the question of whether cats are animals. I tried to ask this question on my own blog and no one has answered, but maybe someone will answer here: what are some practical implications of proper names being rigid designators? Not just the standard, vague, "well isn't it cool that there can be necessary a posteriori truths" but something concrete that shows how this information can be put to use.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-26632649036169178982010-08-24T03:13:13.796-04:002010-08-24T03:13:13.796-04:00In the article it was stated...
Assuming that cat...In the article it was stated...<br /><br />Assuming that cats are actually animals, if you imagine another possible world where the cat-like things are strange demons rather than animals, then it seems a mistake to describe this other possible world as containing (genuine) cats.<br /><br />I noticed that you felt the need to insert "(genuine)" in your argument against saying that the cats in the other world were not just a different kind of cat. I'm somewhat put off with speculating how we refer to situations in other worlds but it would seem as likely to me to think that if we were to inspect some number of other worlds and found that cats were animals in 10% of these worlds, robots in 40% and demons in 50% then we could end up just saying that there were different kinds of cats in different worlds.<br /><br />I still don't know what you mean by "necessary" in your discussion. your argument for necessity seems based on. <br /><br />Surely we would say "those aren't really cats!". <br /><br />Even if this were true (I've alresdy expressed my doubts above) how does that make it necessary that cats are animals. Suppose we put it to an empirical test, what percentage would say "not cats" and what percentage would say "cats are different there". I'm sure that we'd get different results depending on the details of how the other worlds were described. Does the necessity of cats being animals depend on some minimum percentage of a random sample of English speakers saying "not cats"? <br /><br />What is your criterion for "necessary"?Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07839163547483232672noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-7431047017100483742010-07-23T11:13:32.190-04:002010-07-23T11:13:32.190-04:00Hi V, no, not all empirical properties are necessa...Hi V, no, not all empirical properties are necessary properties. For example, even supposing that all actual cats have four legs, we can easily imagine a possible world where a cat-like thing has three legs, and we would still judge that thing to be a 'cat'.<br /><br />The "cats are animals" case is different because 'being an animal' is not <i>just</i> an empirical property, it is also a <i>kind</i> term (i.e. it describes <i>the kind of thing</i> that cats are).<br /><br />Assuming that cats are actually animals, if you imagine another possible world where the cat-like things are strange demons rather than animals, then it seems a mistake to describe this other possible world as containing (genuine) <i>cats</i>. This is because that possible world lacks the <i>kind of creature</i> that is actually picked out by our word 'cat'. <br /><br />More generally, if cats are animals, then anything (in any possible world) that's not an animal is not <i>the same kind of thing</i> that cats are. And that's why it's a necessary truth that cats are animals: there's no possible world where there's a non-animal that is a cat.<br /><br />(But this isn't a priori, because we can imagine that we ourselves live in the strange-demon world, in which case our word 'cat' would pick out this very different kind of creature. In that case, our sentence "Cats are strange demons" would express a necessary truth, and "cats are animals" would be a necessary falsehood. That's because the word 'cat' would, in that case, mean something different from what it actually means -- assuming that it actually refers to a kind of animal.)Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-6161548667228600782010-07-23T01:51:35.647-04:002010-07-23T01:51:35.647-04:00"If they happen to be animals, then "cat..."If they happen to be animals, then "cats are animals" is a necessary truth."<br /><br />Why necessary? <br /><br />"If they happen" seems the opposite of necessary. Especially the "if" part. <br /><br />By extention would you say that any empirical property of cats was a necessary property? <br /><br />That all empirical properties are necessary properties?Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07839163547483232672noreply@blogger.com