tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post108185610833242815..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Skepticism and Possible WorldsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-88969963082200132172008-12-24T00:10:00.000-05:002008-12-24T00:10:00.000-05:00But it's trivial that we can't be absolutely certa...But it's trivial that we can't be absolutely certain of most things. If that's all the skeptic claims, then everyone agrees with him. (Of course we would disagree with the claim that sub-certain knowledge "isn't much better than no knowledge at all", but you haven't given any reason to accept <I>that</I>. Perhaps this is the real point of contention.)<BR/><BR/>P.S. <A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2006/08/mailbag-externalism-and-dialectical.html#comments" REL="nofollow">This</A> would be a better place to continue the discussion.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-33864789950569690142008-12-24T00:00:00.000-05:002008-12-24T00:00:00.000-05:00If you're going to say that you know you have hand...If you're going to say that you know you have hands if that belief is true and it tracks the truth then i guess that is fine by your definition of knowledge but i still think the sceptical objection has weight because it remains true that one cannot be sure that their belief is true. The stronger sceptical position - that knowledge is impossible - is what you have refuted by showing the possibility of knowledge under your definition, but it still stands that we cannot be sure of the factual truth of many of our beliefs. You might be right that beliefs that havn't been shown to be true can still count as knowledge but the sceptic can still maintain that we cant be sure that it is knowledge, which isn't much better than no knowledge at all.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14935675335390688258noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-71657192839159404842008-12-23T21:33:00.000-05:002008-12-23T21:33:00.000-05:00I address that objection here.I address that objection <A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/10/know-show.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-85824793126581928412008-12-23T21:22:00.000-05:002008-12-23T21:22:00.000-05:00I think that in explaining how one knows that they...I think that in explaining how one knows that they have two hands you have assumed what you were trying to prove. To say that in the closest possible worlds where you do not have two hands you are aware of this - due to an accident or something of the sort - assumes that the closest possible worlds are not brain-in-vat-type scenarios, which they would be if in the actual world we are brains in vats. So if these closest possible worlds involved brain-in-vat-type scenarios then condition 3 would not be satisfied and you (by Nozick's standards) could not claim to have knowledge that you have two handsUnknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14935675335390688258noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-45055656778141383212008-03-15T20:54:00.000-04:002008-03-15T20:54:00.000-04:00Interesting.(1) I don't think the Gumshoe countere...Interesting.<BR/><BR/>(1) I don't think the Gumshoe counterexample succeeds. The proposition in question is <I>that Gumshoe won</I>. If the agent forms this belief on the basis of a bad logical inference (which just happens to work out in the actual world), there are presumably close possible worlds where the agent forms the belief even when it isn't true. Irrational agents are not going to be reliable truth-trackers.<BR/><BR/>(2) On the interpretation I gave in the post, the counterfactuals truly are not transitive. In any case: DeRose's contextualism, as discussed in the latter half of my post, develops Nozick's account in a way that doesn't depend on intransitivity.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-24287833760221320042008-03-14T20:45:00.000-04:002008-03-14T20:45:00.000-04:00Problem's with Nozick's analysis:Martine argues th...Problem's with Nozick's analysis:<BR/><BR/>Martine argues that Nozick's view is unacceptable because it does not require a belief to be justified in order for someone to have knowledge:<BR/><BR/>"A problem for it is that it seems that someone could have a belief that P which tracked the fact that P even though he was not justified in believing P" (Martin, P30)<BR/><BR/>Counter-example of person S who makes a bet that will gain him $10 if either Gumshoe wins the first race, or Tagalong wins the second race or they both win their respective races. Furthermore, suppose that Tagalong is such a bad horse that there is no hope of winning the second race. Now, S infers that Gumshoe won the first race from the fact that he receives $10 from the cashier, but we would not want to say that S knows that Gumshoe won, even though this case satisfies all Nozick's conditions for knowledge. <BR/><BR/>It is a condition of the success of Martin's and Garrett's counter-examples to Nozick that illustrate one must not only have a reliable method, but must also believe one's method to be reliable in order to have knowledge.<BR/><BR/>The way in which Nozick replies to the sceptical challenge is problematic because it relies on the notion that counterfactuals are not transitive (transitive = requiring direct object, involving some relation between terms); which can be shown to be erroneous.<BR/><BR/>To conclude, then I would argue that Nozick's answer to scepticism falls down on two accounts. Firstly, it can be shown that Nozick's account of knowledge is not sensitive to examples where true belief is arrived at by way of an unreliable method. Secondly, Nozick's answer to scepticism only works if counterfactuals are not transitive, and it can be shown that they do "like all conditionals, sustain transitivity in context" (Wright, P140)<BR/><BR/>****These infos are all from this website:<BR/>http://www.annewitton.org.uk/nozick.htmlmkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15447273680477677622noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-67511269782550257582007-10-14T14:29:00.000-04:002007-10-14T14:29:00.000-04:00I'm studying degree level philosophy and was strug...I'm studying degree level philosophy and was struggling with the possible-worlds theory. Finally I understand! Thank you.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-84545993222135273292007-05-30T18:25:00.000-04:002007-05-30T18:25:00.000-04:00That was extremely useful in clarifying the possib...That was extremely useful in clarifying the possible world scenario. I wouldn't necessarily have concluded that it actually refutes the sceptic. It certainly makes the sceptic argument less relevant, and allows one seeking to identify knowledge to focus on the more relevant information rather than forever trying to defeat the sceptic. The problem that the sceptic's argument creates still looms. That is, one can, in the De Rose and Nozick's sense have knowledge, but this is determined externally, if the subjunctive conditionals are actually true. If we are in the actual world, as we suppose we are, then they are satisfied, yet our actual world may be the one where we are a BIV where they would not be satisfied. <BR/><BR/>So if we are in the real world, then they are satisfied and we have a high level of knowledge of them. But we have no way of knowing that we actually are in the real world and therefore no way of knowing that we have that knowledge. <BR/><BR/>Therefore we are still not really any further than we were before. <BR/><BR/>Thank you very much though. I found this explanation very helpful.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-1128970515967771302005-10-10T14:55:00.000-04:002005-10-10T14:55:00.000-04:00you don't happen to have a copy of nozick's origin...you don't happen to have a copy of nozick's original paper do you? that'd be useful reading...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com