Tuesday, November 28, 2006
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Carnival of Citizens #1
Welcome to the inaugural edition of the Carnival of Citizens. Many thanks to all who submitted entries -- I've had to be fairly selective in order to keep this to a manageable size. A quick disclaimer: as the mission of this carnival is to promote reasoned discussion, my introductory summaries will try to highlight possible issues for readers to respond to. These are by no means exhaustive, however, so I encourage you to check out the full posts, as you may find yourself more engaged by issues that I've neglected here.
First up, at the Open University, Cass Sunstein proposes three characteristics of political charity: to cast others' motives in the best possible light, to respect their deepest moral commitments, and to favour practical reforms that can be accepted even by those who reject your underlying theoretical ideals. Hence, "a central goal of those who display political charity is to obtain agreements on practices amidst disagreement or uncertainty about what, precisely, accounts for those practices." Do you think this captures the essence of political charity that we should be aiming at?
Erin O'Connor of Critical Mass raises some concerns about "in your face" protests:
Atheist Ethicist Alonzo Fyfe calls for more "internal criticism" of our partisan allies who violate the norms of civil, democratic discourse:
Timothy Scriven wants to develop a glossary for citizens, to introduce the key concepts that every citizen should learn. Head on over and contribute your suggestions.
At Overcoming Bias, Eliezer Yudkowsky explores "the metaphor that rationality is the martial art of mind":
The Good Neighbours blog promotes and exemplifies reasoned discussion between citizens of Middle Eastern nations. The linked post advocates the use of modern art like rap and slam poetry, for catharsis. The resulting discussion raises some interesting questions: "is expressing anger really cathartic? Or does it just lead to more anger, especially in the listeners?"
Greensmile tackles religion:
The post raises some interesting issues. In a central paragraph, the author suggests that they would rather just stop at the sociological observation that some people believe in God and others don't, rather than trying to settle which position is true. They add, "Where [religion] begets helpful attitudes and positive results, who am I to criticize?"
Yet, it seems to me, others might reasonably value truth and rationality for their own sakes, and hence be reluctant to simply abandon the pursuit of knowledge for the sake of social cohesion. Fortunately, total withdrawal from religious debate may not be necessary. The key lesson of the post, it seems to me, is that we should be willing to cooperate for practical purposes even with those with whom we have strong theoretical disagreements. This doesn't require abandoning those disagreements, but simply bracketing them temporarily, in recognition that there is a time and a place to pursue them further.
Speaking of religion: Heartfulls, as a supporter of gay marriage, would like to gain a better understanding of the biblical basis for opposition to homosexuality. Any Christian readers should feel welcome to head on over and share their thoughts on the issue.
Does raising the minimum wage lead to greater unemployment? Hilzoy of Obsidian Wings grants that higher costs drain demand when all else is equal, but puts forward some empirical evidence suggesting that the real world effects are less clear cut, and perhaps even non-existent. Is she right? Do you know of any opposing evidence to suggest that the costs of a minimum wage hike would outweigh the benefits to human welfare? If so, join in the conversation.
Riversider wants to Save The Ribble from a proposed local council development. For a non-local like myself, the post raised more general issues about the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives. It criticizes councillors for failing to commit to their position prior to sitting on a related committee. But shouldn't we want our representatives to be open-minded in their deliberations? The committee would be a farce if its members had pre-determined positions. Yet my criticism here is not entirely clear-cut, for it lies in tension with the democratic idea that councillors should be guided by public opinion, and held to account by their constituents. (For more on this issue, see my post contrasting the 'selection' vs. 'control' models of political representation.)
Finally, Brandon of Siris presents a two-part series on 'Government Neutrality and the Good Life'. The first part argues, contrary to a popular liberal view, that government cannot always remain "neutral" on questions of what constitutes the good life. The sequel argues that attempts to "legislate morality" may instead be opposed on the grounds that such intrusions violate basic rights -- rights that must be upheld no matter the majority opinion. Along the way, Brandon suggests that legal moralism confuses moral ends with the alleged means to their achievement:
My rough summaries really can't do them justice though, so do be sure to read these carefully reasoned and rewarding posts in their entirety!
That concludes this edition of the Carnival of Citizens -- I hope it serves to catalyze some interesting discussions. The second edition will be hosted by Brandon at Siris on Dec 17, with the theme: Justice, War, and the Quest for Peace. He writes: "This edition will be devoted primarily to questions related to just war theory and pacifism, but all reasoned reflection about issues of war and peace are welcome." After writing such a post, you may submit it here.
First up, at the Open University, Cass Sunstein proposes three characteristics of political charity: to cast others' motives in the best possible light, to respect their deepest moral commitments, and to favour practical reforms that can be accepted even by those who reject your underlying theoretical ideals. Hence, "a central goal of those who display political charity is to obtain agreements on practices amidst disagreement or uncertainty about what, precisely, accounts for those practices." Do you think this captures the essence of political charity that we should be aiming at?
Erin O'Connor of Critical Mass raises some concerns about "in your face" protests:
No one learns from behavior like that. But plenty of people are angered. And that takes us that much further from the kind of civil, reasoned exchange that we should be trying to have about our country's hot button issues.
I'd love to know what readers think about styles of protest on both left and right, as well as about how students who want to raise awareness about issues--which usually amounts to promoting a particular view of an issue--can do so responsibly, with the greatest prospect of real, lasting success.
Atheist Ethicist Alonzo Fyfe calls for more "internal criticism" of our partisan allies who violate the norms of civil, democratic discourse:
We need to learn the importance of quickly standing up to members of whatever groups we belong to when they carry their dislike of some other group too far - to the point that they are engaging in immoral actions such as murder, theft, vandalism, or even lies and deception.
Timothy Scriven wants to develop a glossary for citizens, to introduce the key concepts that every citizen should learn. Head on over and contribute your suggestions.
At Overcoming Bias, Eliezer Yudkowsky explores "the metaphor that rationality is the martial art of mind":
How to communicate procedural skills of rationality, or measure them, is probably the single largest open issue that stands between humanity and rationality dojos - at least it's the part of the problem that most baffles me. Meanwhile I lecture. So does anyone out there have ideas?A job for philosophers, perhaps?
The Good Neighbours blog promotes and exemplifies reasoned discussion between citizens of Middle Eastern nations. The linked post advocates the use of modern art like rap and slam poetry, for catharsis. The resulting discussion raises some interesting questions: "is expressing anger really cathartic? Or does it just lead to more anger, especially in the listeners?"
Greensmile tackles religion:
In some ways, the gulf between believers and non believers may be unbridgable but I have seen too many who actually share common political or social goals engaged in casual and callous disrespect when their own purposes would have been better served by not dwelling on the differences.
The post raises some interesting issues. In a central paragraph, the author suggests that they would rather just stop at the sociological observation that some people believe in God and others don't, rather than trying to settle which position is true. They add, "Where [religion] begets helpful attitudes and positive results, who am I to criticize?"
Yet, it seems to me, others might reasonably value truth and rationality for their own sakes, and hence be reluctant to simply abandon the pursuit of knowledge for the sake of social cohesion. Fortunately, total withdrawal from religious debate may not be necessary. The key lesson of the post, it seems to me, is that we should be willing to cooperate for practical purposes even with those with whom we have strong theoretical disagreements. This doesn't require abandoning those disagreements, but simply bracketing them temporarily, in recognition that there is a time and a place to pursue them further.
Speaking of religion: Heartfulls, as a supporter of gay marriage, would like to gain a better understanding of the biblical basis for opposition to homosexuality. Any Christian readers should feel welcome to head on over and share their thoughts on the issue.
Does raising the minimum wage lead to greater unemployment? Hilzoy of Obsidian Wings grants that higher costs drain demand when all else is equal, but puts forward some empirical evidence suggesting that the real world effects are less clear cut, and perhaps even non-existent. Is she right? Do you know of any opposing evidence to suggest that the costs of a minimum wage hike would outweigh the benefits to human welfare? If so, join in the conversation.
Riversider wants to Save The Ribble from a proposed local council development. For a non-local like myself, the post raised more general issues about the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives. It criticizes councillors for failing to commit to their position prior to sitting on a related committee. But shouldn't we want our representatives to be open-minded in their deliberations? The committee would be a farce if its members had pre-determined positions. Yet my criticism here is not entirely clear-cut, for it lies in tension with the democratic idea that councillors should be guided by public opinion, and held to account by their constituents. (For more on this issue, see my post contrasting the 'selection' vs. 'control' models of political representation.)
Finally, Brandon of Siris presents a two-part series on 'Government Neutrality and the Good Life'. The first part argues, contrary to a popular liberal view, that government cannot always remain "neutral" on questions of what constitutes the good life. The sequel argues that attempts to "legislate morality" may instead be opposed on the grounds that such intrusions violate basic rights -- rights that must be upheld no matter the majority opinion. Along the way, Brandon suggests that legal moralism confuses moral ends with the alleged means to their achievement:
[For example,] even if you think it completely wrong-headed, based on inadequate grasp of facts or inadequate understanding of moral ends and what counts as a family, you can see how a sincere argument that gay marriage should be illegal because the preservation of the family is a moral end of society might be worth the trouble of a careful response. An argument that gay marriage should be illegal because a lot of people think homosexuality is wrong seems, on the other hand, to be missing the point of government completely. [Italics added]
My rough summaries really can't do them justice though, so do be sure to read these carefully reasoned and rewarding posts in their entirety!
That concludes this edition of the Carnival of Citizens -- I hope it serves to catalyze some interesting discussions. The second edition will be hosted by Brandon at Siris on Dec 17, with the theme: Justice, War, and the Quest for Peace. He writes: "This edition will be devoted primarily to questions related to just war theory and pacifism, but all reasoned reflection about issues of war and peace are welcome." After writing such a post, you may submit it here.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
Bad Petition
A reader asked me to draw attention to this petition against LSE Professor Satoshi Kanazawa for his research claiming that low IQ is the cause of Africa's woes. Judging by the news story, his claims sound ludicrous. (If based on correlational data alone, it seems far more plausible that any causal arrow would go in the other direction!) But I can't support the anti-academic, politically motivated petition. It reads as follows:
Almost every single sentence of this petition betrays its anti-intellectual PC ideology.
1) The mere fact that something "could be read" in a racist way does not justify opposition to it. Surely we should instead oppose those things that really are racist. Despite what some leftists apparently believe, a mere accusation is not enough to establish guilt.
2) The petition then objects to what Kanazawa's research "claims to show". But it never addresses the crucial question of whether the research succeeds in showing this. Yet that is the only question relevant to assessing academic research. Academics are meant to pursue truth, not comforting conclusions. We should object not to Kanazawa's heretical claims, but to their lack of reasoned support (assuming they are in fact unsupported).
3) Okay, the third sentence is harmless enough. Though it seems a bit hypocritical to lament bad publicity in a public petition against the school!
4) The conclusion is a straightforward denial of academic freedom. The LSE's response has been entirely appropriate:
The petitioners, in contrast, are asking the school to condemn unpopular research, based simply on the claims it makes, and without regard for its academic merit. That's so incredibly wrongheaded, and fundamentally anti-academic, that I'm struggling for words. (Maybe you could go read Butterflies and Wheels instead.)
By all means, refute Kanazawa's arguments. Even condemn him for irresponsibly drawing politically dangerous conclusions on such a flimsy basis. But for God's sake don't just complain about heretical conclusions without regard for their truth! Such ideological witchhunts give the Left a bad name. Aren't we meant to be the "reality-based community"? Let's please start acting like it...
We, the undersigned, feel that the academic paper 'Mind the gap…in intelligence: Re-examining the relationship between inequality and health' written by LSE lecturer Satoshi Kanazawa could be read as promoting racist stereotypes. Dr Kanazawa claims to show that the lower life expectancies and higher levels of infant mortality in less developed nations are the result of lower levels of intelligence, rather than economic inequality.
We also regret the negative publicity this has attached to the LSE, which prides itself on being a diverse and tolerant institution, through the media coverage surrounding the publication of this paper.
We ask that the LSE reaffirms its opposition to racist or racially reductionis[t] standpoints and condemns the publication of any research that may jeopardise students' safety and well being by providing ammunition for those seeking to promote a racist agenda.
Almost every single sentence of this petition betrays its anti-intellectual PC ideology.
1) The mere fact that something "could be read" in a racist way does not justify opposition to it. Surely we should instead oppose those things that really are racist. Despite what some leftists apparently believe, a mere accusation is not enough to establish guilt.
2) The petition then objects to what Kanazawa's research "claims to show". But it never addresses the crucial question of whether the research succeeds in showing this. Yet that is the only question relevant to assessing academic research. Academics are meant to pursue truth, not comforting conclusions. We should object not to Kanazawa's heretical claims, but to their lack of reasoned support (assuming they are in fact unsupported).
3) Okay, the third sentence is harmless enough. Though it seems a bit hypocritical to lament bad publicity in a public petition against the school!
4) The conclusion is a straightforward denial of academic freedom. The LSE's response has been entirely appropriate:
The LSE declined to offer any opinion on Kanazawa's conclusions but defended his right to publish controversial research. A spokeswoman said: 'This is academic research by Dr Kanazawa based on empirical data and published in a peer-reviewed journal. People may agree or disagree with his findings and are at liberty to voice their opinions to him. The school does not take any institutional view on the work of individual academics.'
The petitioners, in contrast, are asking the school to condemn unpopular research, based simply on the claims it makes, and without regard for its academic merit. That's so incredibly wrongheaded, and fundamentally anti-academic, that I'm struggling for words. (Maybe you could go read Butterflies and Wheels instead.)
By all means, refute Kanazawa's arguments. Even condemn him for irresponsibly drawing politically dangerous conclusions on such a flimsy basis. But for God's sake don't just complain about heretical conclusions without regard for their truth! Such ideological witchhunts give the Left a bad name. Aren't we meant to be the "reality-based community"? Let's please start acting like it...
Where have all the citizens gone?
Unfortunately few people have shown any interest in the Carnival of Citizens so far. It sure would be a shame if we didn't even get enough submissions for a decent first edition next week. My thanks to Brandon, Coturnix, tng, and Tim for their support. Doesn't anyone else think this carnival is at least worth a shot? If you do, you're going to need to do something about it.
The easiest way to support the carnival is just to post about it on your own blog (like those linked above), and perhaps add a permanent link to your sidebar. I'm having a lot of trouble just getting the word out, especially to non-liberals. Of course, people can't participate in the carnival if they don't even know it exists. So if you want others to hear about it, start talking!
And remember, the deadline for submissions is Thursday 23rd, so if you want to send in an entry, don't forget to get on to it soon!
The easiest way to support the carnival is just to post about it on your own blog (like those linked above), and perhaps add a permanent link to your sidebar. I'm having a lot of trouble just getting the word out, especially to non-liberals. Of course, people can't participate in the carnival if they don't even know it exists. So if you want others to hear about it, start talking!
And remember, the deadline for submissions is Thursday 23rd, so if you want to send in an entry, don't forget to get on to it soon!
Monday, November 13, 2006
Chomsky on Academia
There are inherent dangers in professionalization that are not sufficiently recognized in university structure. There is a tendency, as a field becomes truly professionalized, for its problems to be determined less by considerations of intrinsic interest and more by the availability of certain tools that have been developed as the subject matures. Philosophy is not free from this tendency, of course. In part, this is of course not only unavoidable but even essential for scientific progress. But it is important to find a way, in teaching even more than in research, to place the work that is feasible and productive at a certain moment against the background of the general concerns that make some questions, but not others, worth pursuing....
I think that in most academic fields a graduate student would benefit greatly from the experience, rarely offered in any academic program, of defending the significance of the field of work in which he is engaged and facing the challenge of a point of view and a critique that does not automatically accept the premises and limitations of scope that are to be found in any discipline. I am putting this too abstractly, but I think the point is clear, and I think it indicates a defect of much of university education.
-- Noam Chomsky (1968), 'Philosophers and Public Policy', Ethics 79.
What do you think?
Sunday, November 12, 2006
Calling all Citizens!
The inaugural Carnival of Citizens will be held here in two weeks' time. Submissions -- due by November 23 -- should be written in a generous and deliberative spirit, to engage rather than insult those who might disagree with the author. (See the guidelines for more details, and let me know if they are at all unclear.)
Submissions are invited on any topic relevant to public debate. For example, suppose you have the attention of a friendly and reasonable "opponent": what would you want to discuss with them? To advance your own view, what crucial insight or argument would you bring to their attention? To better understand their view, what would you like further explained?
Alternatively: you might write a post explaining why you deviate from the "party line" on some particular issue (as suggested by Tim). Or you may be able to think up other possible approaches that align with the carnival's civic values -- if so, go for it!
While I have high hopes for the new carnival, it can only succeed by securing the good will and participation of diverse bloggers, spanning the entire spectrum of political perspectives. So please help "spread the word"!
Submissions are invited on any topic relevant to public debate. For example, suppose you have the attention of a friendly and reasonable "opponent": what would you want to discuss with them? To advance your own view, what crucial insight or argument would you bring to their attention? To better understand their view, what would you like further explained?
Alternatively: you might write a post explaining why you deviate from the "party line" on some particular issue (as suggested by Tim). Or you may be able to think up other possible approaches that align with the carnival's civic values -- if so, go for it!
While I have high hopes for the new carnival, it can only succeed by securing the good will and participation of diverse bloggers, spanning the entire spectrum of political perspectives. So please help "spread the word"!
Friday, November 10, 2006
Proxy Policy Wars
Our failure as a society to deliberate properly about our core values means that rival ideologies instead engage in proxy warfare over particular issues, with inconsistent results. Returning to that Canberra Times article:
Of course, funding the vaccine isn't the only -- or even the best* -- way to respect those values. Compare two potential solutions to this problem: (1) reduce the market price of this particular good, or (2) increase the purchasing power of the buyers. (Why not give the $460 to each individual and let her decide what to do with it?)
The latter type of solution is not even considered! But really, not being able to afford a fancy new vaccine is the least of poor people's worries. Rather than slapping on a bandaid, why don't we actually do something to alleviate poverty, say by introducing an unconditional basic income? That would do a hell of a lot more to show respect for the value of these people's lives.
The fundamental issue here concerns distributive justice: is it fair that poor people get fewer opportunities in life? Should we redistribute wealth in order to help them? If so, then go ahead and do so (and then they can buy the vaccine themselves). If not, then presumably publicly funded healthcare is wrong for all the same reasons. Either way, this policy debate is a cop-out, and a distraction from the real issues. We ought to have a real public debate about valuing "the lives and health" of the poor. This particular instance of federal funding is a proxy issue that doesn't really settle anything.
Aside: it's a familiar libertarian refrain that "liberals think the government knows how to spend your money better than you do." But we should distinguish government spending from redistribution. We can -- and arguably should -- support the latter without the former.
NSW Cervical Screening Program scientific director Gerry Wain said the decision was "staggeringly disappointing". "There's no dispute that Gardasil works so for the Government to knock it back on the basis that it's just going to cost too much seems so amazing," Dr Wain said. "They clearly don't value the lives and health of Australian women, especially young, poor women who can't afford to buy it but need it most."
Of course, funding the vaccine isn't the only -- or even the best* -- way to respect those values. Compare two potential solutions to this problem: (1) reduce the market price of this particular good, or (2) increase the purchasing power of the buyers. (Why not give the $460 to each individual and let her decide what to do with it?)
The latter type of solution is not even considered! But really, not being able to afford a fancy new vaccine is the least of poor people's worries. Rather than slapping on a bandaid, why don't we actually do something to alleviate poverty, say by introducing an unconditional basic income? That would do a hell of a lot more to show respect for the value of these people's lives.
The fundamental issue here concerns distributive justice: is it fair that poor people get fewer opportunities in life? Should we redistribute wealth in order to help them? If so, then go ahead and do so (and then they can buy the vaccine themselves). If not, then presumably publicly funded healthcare is wrong for all the same reasons. Either way, this policy debate is a cop-out, and a distraction from the real issues. We ought to have a real public debate about valuing "the lives and health" of the poor. This particular instance of federal funding is a proxy issue that doesn't really settle anything.
Aside: it's a familiar libertarian refrain that "liberals think the government knows how to spend your money better than you do." But we should distinguish government spending from redistribution. We can -- and arguably should -- support the latter without the former.
* = (One issue I've neglected here is that vaccination is arguably a public good, which benefits others besides the receiver by preventing the spread of infections. This could justify subsidizing the goods rather than boosting people's purchasing power. But then this is an argument from market failure, rather than the values that Dr Wain half-heartedly appeals to.)
Civics and Cynics
An interesting post from Peter Levine:
Indeed. Casting my mind back to high school: the administration's attempts to instill "school spirit" (read: mindless obedience) just made me all the more cynical. It was only after I left school behind -- and started blogging -- that I developed any sense of civic identity. Empowerment beats indoctrination any day. Perhaps the principal would've had better luck with a "Yes, the system sucks; here's what you can do to change it" approach. But "stand up straight and sing the school song"? Barf.
Maybe it isn’t reasonable to expect our young people to hold positive civic attitudes and be actively engaged. Citizens (both young and old alike) may rightly shun voting when most elections have already been determined by the way district lines were drawn. They may rightly ignore the news when the quality of journalism, especially on television, is poor. And they may rightly disengage from high schools that are large, anonymous, and alienating. Civic education that teaches people to admire a flawed system is mere propaganda.
Indeed. Casting my mind back to high school: the administration's attempts to instill "school spirit" (read: mindless obedience) just made me all the more cynical. It was only after I left school behind -- and started blogging -- that I developed any sense of civic identity. Empowerment beats indoctrination any day. Perhaps the principal would've had better luck with a "Yes, the system sucks; here's what you can do to change it" approach. But "stand up straight and sing the school song"? Barf.
Documentation Wants to be Free
Someone should create a secure and trustworthy online archive to which we can upload official documents (e.g. academic transcripts, GRE score reports, etc.). That way, instead of having to send out dozens of original certified documents to all the people/institutions that demand them, we could simply organize to have one original sent to the official database certifiers, who would scan it and put it on the net with their trusted seal of approval, so that I'd merely need to pass along the URL to everyone else. They could even offer password-protection for privacy purposes.
Why does this service not exist? It needn't be centralized, even. Each document-granting institution could simply be responsible for its own online certifications. Why don't universities make their official transcripts freely available online (again, password-protected if necessary)? It wouldn't be that hard, surely, and it'd be so much more convenient. If they're worried about losing money, I'd pay just as much (or more!) for this service. After all, who in their right mind would use snail mail now that instant access is possible?
(Is security the problem? But surely if internet banking is possible, then these sites could be made hack-proof too...?)
Why does this service not exist? It needn't be centralized, even. Each document-granting institution could simply be responsible for its own online certifications. Why don't universities make their official transcripts freely available online (again, password-protected if necessary)? It wouldn't be that hard, surely, and it'd be so much more convenient. If they're worried about losing money, I'd pay just as much (or more!) for this service. After all, who in their right mind would use snail mail now that instant access is possible?
(Is security the problem? But surely if internet banking is possible, then these sites could be made hack-proof too...?)
Thursday, November 09, 2006
Tradeoffs and Medical Values
Newsflash: health policy and medical practice are value-laden, and may involve tradeoffs. That should hardly be news. Yet there are doctors in the news who don't appear to realise that it's true at all! See, for example, this article on active euthanasia for severely damaged newborns (HT: inactivist):
But aren't such decisions ubiquitous in modern medicine? Given the fact of limited resources, doctors can't always provide all patients with the care (or organs, etc) they need. They must make "subjective" (but hopefully reasonable!) decisions about which lives to save, and which to let die. Perhaps in cases of scarcity they can avoid assessing the quality of lives by simply aiming to prolong as many of them as possible. (Though such an approach implicitly assumes equal worth, so it's not as though they can avoid value judgments altogether!) But there's still the issue of passive euthanasia, or withdrawal of life-support -- which might still be desired in some cases even if resources were not an issue -- implying that the machine-supported life is not worth living.
You can argue that there's something importantly different about intentional killing, as opposed to simply "letting die", but the difference isn't the introduction of "a subjective decision of whose life is worthwhile." Sure, the policy would lead to some tough ethical decisions for medical practitioners. But that's nothing new -- bioethics has been around for a while now.
The second example comes from the Canberra Times:
Of course, the existence of opportunity costs reduces this to pure rhetoric. Each dollar the government spends here means one less available for other -- perhaps more effective -- policies. By my rough calculations, the vaccine discussed in the article costs over $1 million per life saved. (Better journalism wouldn't leave this calculation to the reader.) Are there better ways the money could be spent? If we truly value human life, wouldn't we do better to demand, say, a huge boost to the foreign aid budget? I bet that if the federal government gave that money to Oxfam instead, it'd do a whole lot more good. So why don't they?
In a flourishing democracy, such trade-offs between conflicting values would be recognized, and the hard questions about our ethical priorities would be central to public debate. As things stand, they're simply ignored. Such complexities are overlooked throughout the article, starting with the headline, "Women miss out on freelunch cancer vaccine" (oops, my slip), and the rest is no better. For example:
This is a little misleading (especially in the context of the whole, one-sided article). It would be "free" in the sense that the patients are not directly charged for it. But that doesn't mean the costs disappear, of course; they're simply shifted on to other taxpayers. Is it worth it? The article precludes discussion of this key question by pretending that the trade-off doesn't even exist. As if we could judge the merits of a policy by looking at the benefits alone! What sorry journalism.
John Wyatt, consultant neonatologist at University College Hospital, [said]: "Intentional killing is not part of medical care... once you introduce the possibility of intentional killing you change the fundamental nature of medicine. It becomes a subjective decision of whose life is worthwhile."
But aren't such decisions ubiquitous in modern medicine? Given the fact of limited resources, doctors can't always provide all patients with the care (or organs, etc) they need. They must make "subjective" (but hopefully reasonable!) decisions about which lives to save, and which to let die. Perhaps in cases of scarcity they can avoid assessing the quality of lives by simply aiming to prolong as many of them as possible. (Though such an approach implicitly assumes equal worth, so it's not as though they can avoid value judgments altogether!) But there's still the issue of passive euthanasia, or withdrawal of life-support -- which might still be desired in some cases even if resources were not an issue -- implying that the machine-supported life is not worth living.
You can argue that there's something importantly different about intentional killing, as opposed to simply "letting die", but the difference isn't the introduction of "a subjective decision of whose life is worthwhile." Sure, the policy would lead to some tough ethical decisions for medical practitioners. But that's nothing new -- bioethics has been around for a while now.
The second example comes from the Canberra Times:
"How do you put a cost on saving anybody's life when prevention is at hand?"
Of course, the existence of opportunity costs reduces this to pure rhetoric. Each dollar the government spends here means one less available for other -- perhaps more effective -- policies. By my rough calculations, the vaccine discussed in the article costs over $1 million per life saved. (Better journalism wouldn't leave this calculation to the reader.) Are there better ways the money could be spent? If we truly value human life, wouldn't we do better to demand, say, a huge boost to the foreign aid budget? I bet that if the federal government gave that money to Oxfam instead, it'd do a whole lot more good. So why don't they?
In a flourishing democracy, such trade-offs between conflicting values would be recognized, and the hard questions about our ethical priorities would be central to public debate. As things stand, they're simply ignored. Such complexities are overlooked throughout the article, starting with the headline, "Women miss out on free
The vaccine costs about $460 for the recommended three doses but will be free if subsidised by the Federal Government through the national immunisation program.
This is a little misleading (especially in the context of the whole, one-sided article). It would be "free" in the sense that the patients are not directly charged for it. But that doesn't mean the costs disappear, of course; they're simply shifted on to other taxpayers. Is it worth it? The article precludes discussion of this key question by pretending that the trade-off doesn't even exist. As if we could judge the merits of a policy by looking at the benefits alone! What sorry journalism.
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
CotL #25: Metapolitical Edition
Welcome to the 25th Carnival of the Liberals! With our faith in democracy restored by the recent elections, what better way to celebrate than a carnival on liberalism and democratic discourse?Starting with some light relief: Jon Swift humourously suggests that Kerry's "botched joke" should reassure us about the 2004 election result: "Can you imagine having a President who mangles the English language the way Kerry does?" Banish the thought.
Barry Leiba of Staring at Empty Pages looks at NYC proposals to legislate health in relation to fatty foods. Leiba notes that consumer ignorance undermines the case for "letting the market decide". On the other hand, banning unhealthy foodstuffs would seem overly paternalistic, infringing the liberties even of those who would make the informed decision to value taste over health. Is there a reasonable middle ground? Read it and see.
Of course, we shouldn't always prefer the middle ground. Indeed, Peter Levine contends that "one's position on the political spectrum is independent of one's impact on deliberation and the political culture. Moderates are no more likely to help the quality of our politics than are liberals or conservatives." He makes the important point that the relevant civic value in this vicinity is not moderation per se, but rather, comity, i.e. "an ability to cooperate on topics that do not provoke ideological disagreement." We need politicians who won't let partisan bickering preclude co-operation when their values are aligned; but that doesn't mean they should compromise their principles for the sake of a false consensus.
Alonzo Fyfe, the Atheist Ethicist, is also skeptical of moderation for moderation's sake, instead defending The Appropriate Use of Negative Political Statements. He laments the lies and distortions that dominate contemporary smear campaigns, and concludes:
It is important to improve the quality of political discourse. However, what political discourse is not missing is more 'niceness'. It is missing honesty... There is nothing wrong with condemnation - as long as it is honest condemnation that targets the wrongs that people actually perform.
Over at The Greenbelt, The Ridger highlights the news media's complicity in such dishonesty. Further, in discussing When Discourse Isn't, she also explains how inherent features of modern media - especially television - work against reasoned discourse, or indeed any kind of discourse at all.
Mike the Mad Biologist also questions the possibility of political discourse. He points out that most citizens simply don't have the specialized knowledge required to solve -- or even assess -- technical problems. Hence, he argues, liberal technocrats need to construct compelling narratives with a more general appeal.
How about a picture book? SteveG of the Philosophers' Playground argues that a bumpersticker slogan is not enough to revive the Democratic brand: "A picture is worth more than eight words and we need a picture of the life we are promising."
Martin of Writings on the Wall offers Hope, Poverty, and "f*ck you", a wide-ranging and contentious post that defies summary. But I would like to draw attention to his concluding recommendation:
Grassroots, small scale, humble changes are what are needed. We have been seduced by the big easy, but it's a confidence trick. People are not stupid because they are poor, and they usually know far better than foreigners or governments what can be done to benefit their community. So find the programs which make realistic, genuine, and community based improvements in people's lives. Do a little when you can. Get together with your own community for support, ideas, and the power of numbers. Help people locally and overseas, and don't be discouraged by failure.
Indeed, is the alternative of seeking top-down influence even possible? Doctor Biobrain disputes The Pundit Power Myth, arguing that pundits' "influence is fairly negligible in the long run, because the people most likely to watch them and be influenced are also most likely to already have fully formed opinions which aren’t likely to shift." But is that right? It's sometimes thought that the speculations of today's wacky philosopher may become tomorrow's common sense. Perhaps pundits have a similarly indirect influence on the public culture, by mediating the flow of ideas? And is it really true that after all our arguing, we never actually change our minds? That would be a worry for any hopes of deliberative democracy.
Perhaps the simple act of voting is the most we can expect from democracy. Though can we trust even that? With electronic voting machines, who really knows? Expert Opinion argues that Voting should not be a black box affair, for the sake of public confidence and democratic legitimacy.
That concludes this edition of the Carnival of the Liberals. (If you've enjoyed the metapolitical theme, feel free to glance through some of my recent posts on related topics while you're here!) Many thanks to all who offered submissions, including several fine entries that I couldn't fit into the final ten. But there's always next time: CotL #26 will be hosted by Montag at Stump Lane on November 22.
Monday, November 06, 2006
Philosophers' Carnival #38
1) The 38th Philosophers' Carnival is up at "The Splintered Mind", playfully hosted by Eric Schwitzgebel. There's an incredible selection there -- something like 40 entries, I think! -- so be sure to check it out...
2) The old carnival submissions form was getting inundated with spam, so I've removed it. You can still use the BlogCarnival form.
Updated:
3) Tanasije has helpfully volunteered to host the next edition of the carnival. Later editions are still open though, so check out the hosting guidelines, and get in touch if you want to give it a shot.
4) I'm trying out a "widget" on the carnival homepage. Is it helpful enough to outweigh the aesthetic disvalue? Let me know what you think. (It includes tabbed lists of past and future hosts, so I could remove the lengthy old "carnival list" section if I ended up keeping the widget.)
2) The old carnival submissions form was getting inundated with spam, so I've removed it. You can still use the BlogCarnival form.
Updated:
3) Tanasije has helpfully volunteered to host the next edition of the carnival. Later editions are still open though, so check out the hosting guidelines, and get in touch if you want to give it a shot.
4) I'm trying out a "widget" on the carnival homepage. Is it helpful enough to outweigh the aesthetic disvalue? Let me know what you think. (It includes tabbed lists of past and future hosts, so I could remove the lengthy old "carnival list" section if I ended up keeping the widget.)
Political Representation: selection vs. control
I went to an interesting lecture the other day by Jane Mansbridge, arguing that the public should focus more on electing the right politicians (and "kicking the bastards out" when they go wrong), rather than trying to control them once elected.
The standard "accountability" model assumes that politicians are unprincipled actors with no intrinsic political motivations besides the desire to get re-elected. Hence voters need to control their representatives through re-election incentives. We always need to know what politicians are up to, so that we can scare them away from bad policies by threatening to change our votes. Good governance thus relies upon "monitoring and sanctions" to keep representatives in line. High incumbency rates are bad because politicians confident of re-election will have no incentive to behave themselves.
Mansbridge proposes an alternative, "selection" model. This view assumes, more plausibly, that people have diverse intrinsic political motivations. The key for voters, then, is to select representatives with "aligned objectives", i.e. who want the same things as they do. There will never be perfect alignment, of course, but we should hopefully be able to find politicians whose goals are close enough to our own. We can then sit back and let them do their job, trusting that they will achieve what we want, since - after all - they want the same thing. (On this view, a high incumbency rate need not be a problem after all: perhaps the politicians really are that good!)
Compare choices made regarding tenure for academics, lifelong appointment of judges, selecting a school or college for a student, and hiring a nanny. All of these cases follow the "selection" rather than "accountability" model. We take care to choose the right person from the start -- someone we trust to have objectives aligned with ours -- rather than trying to micromanage their behaviour through intrusive monitoring and sanctions. Mansbridge suggests that we might add politicians to the list. We should take advantage of their intrinsic motivations. And as psychologists have shown, such motivation may be undermined through the "crowding out effect" of manipulative external incentives.
Indeed, Mansbridge made the stronger claim that it's practically impossible to change the basic direction of a politician. (Incentives are only effective at the margin.) The only way to achieve real change is to "kick the bastards out", and select a new representative whose objectives are better aligned with ours.
The selection model has ambiguous implications regarding the need for "transparency" in government. Mansbridge claimed that we should demand less transparency in process, but more transparency in reasons. Representatives need to be allowed to negotiate and deliberate tentatively, free from the silencing, oppressive gaze of the public eye. But of course they remain ultimately accountable to the public, and hence they must seek to justify the decisions they finally settle on. Here Mansbridge suggested an analogy to Supreme Court opinions: they generally offer well-reasoned explanations of the Court's decision. But the process of deliberation, by which the judges reached their decision, takes place in confidence.
In assessing the competing models, I guess there are two key issues:
1) To what extent are representatives intrinsically motivated in ways aligned to the public interest?
2) Will politicians be more effective if allowed to exercise their discretion, or if instead answerable to the public for their every move?
On the first question: if we are able to select well-aligned politicians, this would seem more efficient, because it relieves the need for costly monitoring and sanctions. We can leave them to do as they wish, just as we do with nannies, teachers, judges, and so forth. (Of course, we can still assess them afterwards, and fire them if need be. The crucial point is that we don't try to micromanage them in the meantime. Absent evidence of gross incompetence or corruption, they should be trusted to do their job.)
As for the second issue, it seems plausible that an unhampered executive will be more effective. A related question here is what to do in case of an unforeseen crisis, e.g. 9/11. If a fast response is required, the executive will be able to react more flexibly. The risk here is that they might turn in a very different direction from what the public want or expect (cf. Tony Blair). Must we wait until the next election? Or should the public try - perhaps in vain - to control their renegade representatives in the meantime? I won't even attempt an answer.
One thing worth noting is that the selection model still recognizes the vital importance of communication. It doesn't reduce democracy to mere voting. Citizens should follow political events, to ensure that their representatives are still aligned with them. They should voice concerns, and assess the reasons offered in response. And if they don't like what they hear, they should vote for someone else at the next opportunity. But the focus here is on communication and selection, not micromanagement and control.
Also, it highlights the need to be better informed about candidates and their accomplishments (or lack thereof). Yet electoral campaigns are designed to mislead rather than inform the public. This undermines the public's ability to select well-aligned representatives. (Apparently 3/4 of those who voted to re-elect Bush believed that there were WMD in Iraq. A similar number believed that Saddam was behind the 9/11 attacks. Now look at them.) Something must be done to improve this aspect of democracy. But what?
I'll leave that as another unanswered question, and move on now to a local application: NZ Greens co-leader Russel Norman has criticized the "undemocratic secrecy" surrounding the NZ government's trade negotiations with China. But if Mansbridge is right, then it may be entirely appropriate for such negotiations to take place out of public view. What democracy requires is that the results be made public, and that our governing representatives subsequently explain and justify their decisions. Whether the justification is good enough, is something voters can judge for the next election. But in the meantime, the decision is our representatives' to make, and there's nothing necessarily "undemocratic" about that.
The standard "accountability" model assumes that politicians are unprincipled actors with no intrinsic political motivations besides the desire to get re-elected. Hence voters need to control their representatives through re-election incentives. We always need to know what politicians are up to, so that we can scare them away from bad policies by threatening to change our votes. Good governance thus relies upon "monitoring and sanctions" to keep representatives in line. High incumbency rates are bad because politicians confident of re-election will have no incentive to behave themselves.
Mansbridge proposes an alternative, "selection" model. This view assumes, more plausibly, that people have diverse intrinsic political motivations. The key for voters, then, is to select representatives with "aligned objectives", i.e. who want the same things as they do. There will never be perfect alignment, of course, but we should hopefully be able to find politicians whose goals are close enough to our own. We can then sit back and let them do their job, trusting that they will achieve what we want, since - after all - they want the same thing. (On this view, a high incumbency rate need not be a problem after all: perhaps the politicians really are that good!)
Compare choices made regarding tenure for academics, lifelong appointment of judges, selecting a school or college for a student, and hiring a nanny. All of these cases follow the "selection" rather than "accountability" model. We take care to choose the right person from the start -- someone we trust to have objectives aligned with ours -- rather than trying to micromanage their behaviour through intrusive monitoring and sanctions. Mansbridge suggests that we might add politicians to the list. We should take advantage of their intrinsic motivations. And as psychologists have shown, such motivation may be undermined through the "crowding out effect" of manipulative external incentives.
Indeed, Mansbridge made the stronger claim that it's practically impossible to change the basic direction of a politician. (Incentives are only effective at the margin.) The only way to achieve real change is to "kick the bastards out", and select a new representative whose objectives are better aligned with ours.
The selection model has ambiguous implications regarding the need for "transparency" in government. Mansbridge claimed that we should demand less transparency in process, but more transparency in reasons. Representatives need to be allowed to negotiate and deliberate tentatively, free from the silencing, oppressive gaze of the public eye. But of course they remain ultimately accountable to the public, and hence they must seek to justify the decisions they finally settle on. Here Mansbridge suggested an analogy to Supreme Court opinions: they generally offer well-reasoned explanations of the Court's decision. But the process of deliberation, by which the judges reached their decision, takes place in confidence.
In assessing the competing models, I guess there are two key issues:
1) To what extent are representatives intrinsically motivated in ways aligned to the public interest?
2) Will politicians be more effective if allowed to exercise their discretion, or if instead answerable to the public for their every move?
On the first question: if we are able to select well-aligned politicians, this would seem more efficient, because it relieves the need for costly monitoring and sanctions. We can leave them to do as they wish, just as we do with nannies, teachers, judges, and so forth. (Of course, we can still assess them afterwards, and fire them if need be. The crucial point is that we don't try to micromanage them in the meantime. Absent evidence of gross incompetence or corruption, they should be trusted to do their job.)
As for the second issue, it seems plausible that an unhampered executive will be more effective. A related question here is what to do in case of an unforeseen crisis, e.g. 9/11. If a fast response is required, the executive will be able to react more flexibly. The risk here is that they might turn in a very different direction from what the public want or expect (cf. Tony Blair). Must we wait until the next election? Or should the public try - perhaps in vain - to control their renegade representatives in the meantime? I won't even attempt an answer.
One thing worth noting is that the selection model still recognizes the vital importance of communication. It doesn't reduce democracy to mere voting. Citizens should follow political events, to ensure that their representatives are still aligned with them. They should voice concerns, and assess the reasons offered in response. And if they don't like what they hear, they should vote for someone else at the next opportunity. But the focus here is on communication and selection, not micromanagement and control.
Also, it highlights the need to be better informed about candidates and their accomplishments (or lack thereof). Yet electoral campaigns are designed to mislead rather than inform the public. This undermines the public's ability to select well-aligned representatives. (Apparently 3/4 of those who voted to re-elect Bush believed that there were WMD in Iraq. A similar number believed that Saddam was behind the 9/11 attacks. Now look at them.) Something must be done to improve this aspect of democracy. But what?
I'll leave that as another unanswered question, and move on now to a local application: NZ Greens co-leader Russel Norman has criticized the "undemocratic secrecy" surrounding the NZ government's trade negotiations with China. But if Mansbridge is right, then it may be entirely appropriate for such negotiations to take place out of public view. What democracy requires is that the results be made public, and that our governing representatives subsequently explain and justify their decisions. Whether the justification is good enough, is something voters can judge for the next election. But in the meantime, the decision is our representatives' to make, and there's nothing necessarily "undemocratic" about that.
Homunculi and Objective Purpose
'Homunculi' are the metaphorical "little men" in your head that perform cognitive sub-tasks that contribute to your overall cognition.* You might have one responsible for word recognition, for example, and others might guide belief formation. My question is whether any of these homunculi must have intrinsic purposes. For example, Rob Koons (scroll down) argues that "if there were no non-human purposes, then... this would mean that human beings lack minds":
Clayton Littlejohn is unconvinced:
I think that misunderstands Koons' argument, though. It isn't a simple fallacy of division -- Koons isn't assuming that a property of the whole must be present in its parts, or anything like that. Instead, as I understand it, his starting point is the assumption that cognition is inherently normative. One commonly hears this view expressed through the slogan: "belief aims at truth" -- the idea being that this 'aim'/purpose is partly constitutive of belief. I think this is false (on any strong interpretation of the claim), but at least it's not as odd as would be an argument from division where the property transmitted from the whole to the part isn't even the same!
Anyway, returning to the central question: do homunculi have objective purposes? It depends how much we build into the concept of "purpose". There's a very weak sense of the claim that's unobjectionable. We can talk of biological "functions" which mean nothing more than "naturally selected operation", for example (as Brandon points out in comments to Clayton's post). We can describe certain functional roles -- e.g. information acquisition -- that could aid an organism's survival, and no doubt (some of) our cognitive processes evolved precisely because they fill such a role. (To clarify: the initial appearance of a trait is mere chance; what's more predictable is that a functionally apt trait is retained and promoted in the population through natural selection.) But there's nothing metaphysically deep about such talk; such "purposes" invoke nothing over and above the historical facts.
[Besides, I don't think those historical facts are essential to cognition in any case. If a freak quantum accident created an atom-for-atom replica (cf. "Swampman") of me, he would certainly have a mind just as I do, and arguably with all the same beliefs.** But any ascription of "objective purposes" to his accidentally assembled parts would presumably be our mere projection. Unless, I suppose, we individuate purposes the same way (I propose) we do mental states, by forward-looking rather than historical criteria. But that seems ad hoc, and - more importantly - still wouldn't add any metaphysical depth to the claims.]
Koons' view would appear to imply that there could be people that were just like us in every descriptive respect (incl. physics + qualia), and yet they somehow "don't have minds" due to lacking the essential normative components. They have (non-mental?) states that are exactly like beliefs in every respect, except that they don't intrinsically "aim at truth", so they're not "beliefs". Similarly, they form fake "intentions", arising from cognitive processes that happen in fact to "supply deliberation with goals", but because this is not their "intrinsic purpose", none of it really counts.
Now that does seem odd.
(Perhaps one could hold that objective purposes supervene on the descriptive facts, just like morality does, so that it's not really possible to subtract it whilst holding all descriptive facts the same? But then the descriptive facts suffice to establish mentality after all: the supervening normative properties come along for free!)
* = A fun aside: the GFP quote a delightful passage from Michael Freyn which draws on the metaphor of homunculi to motivate skepticism about free will:
** = Bracketing issues about semantic externalism -- "narrow content" will do for present purposes -- I think it's most plausible to hold that beliefs are functionally reducible (perhaps modulo qualia, if you hold that beliefs have an essential phenomenal "feel" to them), e.g. to facts about one's present dispositions and such.
[T]he very possibility of belief presupposes the existence of cognitive faculties with the intrinsic purpose of seeking truth. Similarly, the very possibility of intentions or purposes presupposes the existence of cognitive faculties with the intrinsic purpose of supplying deliberation with goals. Human will cannot be the source of all purpose (function, value, etc.), since brain processes can constitute the human will only by having the appropriate intrinsic purposes (and functions).
Clayton Littlejohn is unconvinced:
It seems that Koons is saying that I couldn't have a mind unless I had parts that had purposes. Isn't it a mistake to say that I have the purposes I do because my brain or cognitive processes has those very purposes? To say that I have the purpose of discovering truth because part of my brain does seems to make a number of mistakes. What's odd is that he goes beyond this in suggesting that I, CL, have the purposes I do because CL's cognitive processes have purposes AND (worse) that they aren't the same as my purposes. Odd, no?
I think that misunderstands Koons' argument, though. It isn't a simple fallacy of division -- Koons isn't assuming that a property of the whole must be present in its parts, or anything like that. Instead, as I understand it, his starting point is the assumption that cognition is inherently normative. One commonly hears this view expressed through the slogan: "belief aims at truth" -- the idea being that this 'aim'/purpose is partly constitutive of belief. I think this is false (on any strong interpretation of the claim), but at least it's not as odd as would be an argument from division where the property transmitted from the whole to the part isn't even the same!
Anyway, returning to the central question: do homunculi have objective purposes? It depends how much we build into the concept of "purpose". There's a very weak sense of the claim that's unobjectionable. We can talk of biological "functions" which mean nothing more than "naturally selected operation", for example (as Brandon points out in comments to Clayton's post). We can describe certain functional roles -- e.g. information acquisition -- that could aid an organism's survival, and no doubt (some of) our cognitive processes evolved precisely because they fill such a role. (To clarify: the initial appearance of a trait is mere chance; what's more predictable is that a functionally apt trait is retained and promoted in the population through natural selection.) But there's nothing metaphysically deep about such talk; such "purposes" invoke nothing over and above the historical facts.
[Besides, I don't think those historical facts are essential to cognition in any case. If a freak quantum accident created an atom-for-atom replica (cf. "Swampman") of me, he would certainly have a mind just as I do, and arguably with all the same beliefs.** But any ascription of "objective purposes" to his accidentally assembled parts would presumably be our mere projection. Unless, I suppose, we individuate purposes the same way (I propose) we do mental states, by forward-looking rather than historical criteria. But that seems ad hoc, and - more importantly - still wouldn't add any metaphysical depth to the claims.]
Koons' view would appear to imply that there could be people that were just like us in every descriptive respect (incl. physics + qualia), and yet they somehow "don't have minds" due to lacking the essential normative components. They have (non-mental?) states that are exactly like beliefs in every respect, except that they don't intrinsically "aim at truth", so they're not "beliefs". Similarly, they form fake "intentions", arising from cognitive processes that happen in fact to "supply deliberation with goals", but because this is not their "intrinsic purpose", none of it really counts.
Now that does seem odd.
(Perhaps one could hold that objective purposes supervene on the descriptive facts, just like morality does, so that it's not really possible to subtract it whilst holding all descriptive facts the same? But then the descriptive facts suffice to establish mentality after all: the supervening normative properties come along for free!)
* = A fun aside: the GFP quote a delightful passage from Michael Freyn which draws on the metaphor of homunculi to motivate skepticism about free will:
I discover that I am not an absolute ruler after all. I am a mere constitutional fiction, a face on the postage stamps, a signature at the bottom of decrees written by unidentified powers behind the throne over which I have no control... even my private entertainments are devised for me by invisible courtiers working in parts of the palace that I have never entered, and could never find my way to go.
** = Bracketing issues about semantic externalism -- "narrow content" will do for present purposes -- I think it's most plausible to hold that beliefs are functionally reducible (perhaps modulo qualia, if you hold that beliefs have an essential phenomenal "feel" to them), e.g. to facts about one's present dispositions and such.
Saturday, November 04, 2006
Solum on the Virtue of Justice
Insights from the Legal Theory Blog:
Very holistic -- I like it! Do read the whole thing...
Decision on the basis of private, first-order judgments about fairness is the rule of individuals and not of law. From Aristotle’s point of view, a regime that rules by decree does not provide the stability and certainty that is required for human communities to flourish. Kraut continues: We can now see why Aristotle thinks that justice in its broadest sense can be defined as lawfulness, and why he has such high regard for a lawful person. His definition embodies the assumption that every community requires the high degree of order that that comes from having a stable body of customs and norms, and a coherent legal code that is not altered frivolously and unpredictably.
Justice in its broadest sense is the intellectual and emotional skill one needs in order to do one’s part in bringing it about that one’s community possesses this stable system of rules and laws.
Very holistic -- I like it! Do read the whole thing...
Friday, November 03, 2006
Carnival of Citizens: advancing public debate
The public sphere is in disarray. Dominated by demagoguery, mudslinging, and dogmatic regurgitation of partisan talking points, there’s scant room left for fair-minded deliberation about the issues we care about. The Carnival of Citizens is a response to this challenge: it aims to foster genuine dialogue between bloggers of diverse perspectives, to bring us one step closer to the ideal of a healthier, more deliberative, democracy.
What’s a “carnival”? A blog carnival is a regular (e.g. weekly or monthly) roundup of blog posts from around the web. Anyone is invited to submit a relevant link for consideration; the carnival “host” then collates the best of these into a single post, or “edition” of the carnival, which briefly introduces each of the accepted entries.
The point of this arcane exercise is to help bring together an online community of writers and readers. As everyone knows, there’s a wealth of information available on the internet: the difficulty is knowing where to look. The best carnivals serve as a portal into a blogging community. If you’re interested in philosophy, for instance, the Philosophers’ Carnival serves to showcase some of the best posts from philosophy blogs that you might not otherwise have noticed. This exposure likewise benefits the blog authors, who see their work presented to a broader audience.
Why a “carnival of citizens”? There’s no readily identifiable community of “citizens” who blog in a deliberative spirit. My hope is that this carnival will forge such a community from individuals, united in their civic ideals, who may previously have been unknown to each other. I trust that there are many open-minded bloggers and readers out there who wish to challenge their preconceptions through reasoned dialogue with fair-minded political opponents. The Carnival of Citizens exists to bring these people together.
Topical scope: The Carnival of Citizens covers all topics of “public debate”, i.e. politics and applied ethics, very broadly construed. This may include issues of broader cultural interest – e.g. science, religion, and philosophy – insofar as they connect to public discourse or matters of general interest. We also invite “meta” discussion about the public sphere, rational discourse, and general civic issues. Note that special “themed” editions might restrict their scope to a particular issue, however. (Advanced notice will be given, so that interested bloggers have plenty of time to prepare a post on the given topic.)
Key Guidelines: The defining feature of the Carnival of Citizens lies not in one’s choice of topic, but rather the way in which one approaches it. Hosts will be very selective in this respect. Submissions that demonize one’s opponents, or that are otherwise unconstructive in tone or style, will be instantly rejected. Note that this need not preclude passionate criticism of public figures. One must simply take care not to tar all the well meaning (if misguided) citizens who have yet to be persuaded to abandon their support of the unscrupulous leader. More generally, entries must be conducive to public debate, and hence engage rather than insult those who might initially be disposed to disagree with the author’s thesis.
Participants are expected to approach the carnival in a deliberative spirit. There are several aspects to this: (1) You should welcome comments that offer reasonable dissent and counter-arguments. (2) Dissenting comments should still aim to be generous, helping the other to see flaws in their previous view, rather than trying to embarrass them or otherwise score cheap points. (3) You should be open to the possibility of changing your mind, if presented with sufficiently compelling reasons. (4) The discussion should be viewed as a collaborative effort of inquiry, rather than an adversarial dispute, or a brute assertion of conflicting beliefs or values. (5) Above all, you should exhibit good will and respect towards your fellow citizens and interlocutors – e.g. refrain from impugning their intellectual honesty without good reason.
Unfortunately, it can be difficult to understand those who approach an issue from a different background, bringing foreign assumptions to the table. Incomprehension breeds suspicion, poisoning the public sphere. It is thus crucial to approach the discussion in good faith, and assume that one’s interlocutors have done likewise.
Ideally, the Carnival of Citizens provides a forum for those who wish to persevere through their initial mutual incomprehension, to obtain a deeper understanding – and perhaps, eventually, a resolution – of the disagreement. If these civic ideals resonate with you, I hope you will give it a go!
N.B. Those who lack a blog of their own may still participate by emailing me their contribution, which I can publish here as a "guest post".
Support the Carnival:
1) Contribute with a submission.
2) Spread the word: post about it on your own blog, and encourage your readers to sign up to the carnival newsletter to keep informed about upcoming editions.
3) Volunteer as a host (email me if you're interested).
What’s a “carnival”? A blog carnival is a regular (e.g. weekly or monthly) roundup of blog posts from around the web. Anyone is invited to submit a relevant link for consideration; the carnival “host” then collates the best of these into a single post, or “edition” of the carnival, which briefly introduces each of the accepted entries.
The point of this arcane exercise is to help bring together an online community of writers and readers. As everyone knows, there’s a wealth of information available on the internet: the difficulty is knowing where to look. The best carnivals serve as a portal into a blogging community. If you’re interested in philosophy, for instance, the Philosophers’ Carnival serves to showcase some of the best posts from philosophy blogs that you might not otherwise have noticed. This exposure likewise benefits the blog authors, who see their work presented to a broader audience.
Why a “carnival of citizens”? There’s no readily identifiable community of “citizens” who blog in a deliberative spirit. My hope is that this carnival will forge such a community from individuals, united in their civic ideals, who may previously have been unknown to each other. I trust that there are many open-minded bloggers and readers out there who wish to challenge their preconceptions through reasoned dialogue with fair-minded political opponents. The Carnival of Citizens exists to bring these people together.
Topical scope: The Carnival of Citizens covers all topics of “public debate”, i.e. politics and applied ethics, very broadly construed. This may include issues of broader cultural interest – e.g. science, religion, and philosophy – insofar as they connect to public discourse or matters of general interest. We also invite “meta” discussion about the public sphere, rational discourse, and general civic issues. Note that special “themed” editions might restrict their scope to a particular issue, however. (Advanced notice will be given, so that interested bloggers have plenty of time to prepare a post on the given topic.)
Key Guidelines: The defining feature of the Carnival of Citizens lies not in one’s choice of topic, but rather the way in which one approaches it. Hosts will be very selective in this respect. Submissions that demonize one’s opponents, or that are otherwise unconstructive in tone or style, will be instantly rejected. Note that this need not preclude passionate criticism of public figures. One must simply take care not to tar all the well meaning (if misguided) citizens who have yet to be persuaded to abandon their support of the unscrupulous leader. More generally, entries must be conducive to public debate, and hence engage rather than insult those who might initially be disposed to disagree with the author’s thesis.
Participants are expected to approach the carnival in a deliberative spirit. There are several aspects to this: (1) You should welcome comments that offer reasonable dissent and counter-arguments. (2) Dissenting comments should still aim to be generous, helping the other to see flaws in their previous view, rather than trying to embarrass them or otherwise score cheap points. (3) You should be open to the possibility of changing your mind, if presented with sufficiently compelling reasons. (4) The discussion should be viewed as a collaborative effort of inquiry, rather than an adversarial dispute, or a brute assertion of conflicting beliefs or values. (5) Above all, you should exhibit good will and respect towards your fellow citizens and interlocutors – e.g. refrain from impugning their intellectual honesty without good reason.
Unfortunately, it can be difficult to understand those who approach an issue from a different background, bringing foreign assumptions to the table. Incomprehension breeds suspicion, poisoning the public sphere. It is thus crucial to approach the discussion in good faith, and assume that one’s interlocutors have done likewise.
Ideally, the Carnival of Citizens provides a forum for those who wish to persevere through their initial mutual incomprehension, to obtain a deeper understanding – and perhaps, eventually, a resolution – of the disagreement. If these civic ideals resonate with you, I hope you will give it a go!
N.B. Those who lack a blog of their own may still participate by emailing me their contribution, which I can publish here as a "guest post".
Support the Carnival:
1) Contribute with a submission.
2) Spread the word: post about it on your own blog, and encourage your readers to sign up to the carnival newsletter to keep informed about upcoming editions.
3) Volunteer as a host (email me if you're interested).
Blogger bug makes drafts public
I have an unpublished draft post saved to my Blogger account. Being "unpublished", you would think that no-one else can read it yet. Surprise! You can view it here. As you can see, I even posted a comment to it. Bizarre. It's still unpublished, at least. (That is, the item page does not exist.) But the content is publicly accessible, which Blogger drafts presumably shouldn't be. So the upshot is similar enough.
Blogger users take note: anyone can read your drafts if they learn the postID (and hence can load the comment window using a similar link to my above example).
Of course, it'd probably never happen in practice, since (1) how would a would-be spy find the right postID? and (2) who would want to read our drafts anyway?
Still, as a matter of principle, Blogger probably shouldn't be leaving our saved drafts out in public cyberspace like that, for anyone to stumble upon...
Blogger users take note: anyone can read your drafts if they learn the postID (and hence can load the comment window using a similar link to my above example).
Of course, it'd probably never happen in practice, since (1) how would a would-be spy find the right postID? and (2) who would want to read our drafts anyway?
Still, as a matter of principle, Blogger probably shouldn't be leaving our saved drafts out in public cyberspace like that, for anyone to stumble upon...
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