tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post958607490292402464..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Relative Truth and DisagreementRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-15244061639480468552007-10-07T07:47:00.000-04:002007-10-07T07:47:00.000-04:00Richard, sounds to me like you are advancing the s...Richard, sounds to me like you are advancing the sort of relativism that John MacFarlane has argued for (see <A HREF="http://johnmacfarlane.net/disagreement.pdf" REL="nofollow">here</A>).<BR/><BR/>His interest is not in moral relativism, rather in giving a general framework for making sense of how relativisms in general might not have severely counter-intuitive results. One such would be the sort of infallibility concern you've previously expressed. Another, the fact that people with different propositional attitudes toward the same proposition don't seem to be disagreeing on some forms of relativism, as you say.<BR/><BR/>In brief, MacFarlane sets up a framework on which a relativistic concept is contextual, but instead of taking in context-of-use as determinative of the truth of sentences in which it appears, these concepts take in context-of-evaluation as determinative of the truth of sentences in which they appear. For instance, John and Sally read the sentence "Apples are delicious." This sentence includes a relativistic term "delicious". Accordingly, when evaluated by John is comes out true (he likes apples) and when evaluted by Sally it comes out false (she hates them). Why are they disagreeing? Because there is no context-of-evaluation C such that were John and Sally both deploying C, they would both be right (in making their divergent judgments about the deliciousness of apples).Colinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11764726376012276409noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-38896275061366779152007-10-07T04:18:00.000-04:002007-10-07T04:18:00.000-04:00If we are willing to go this far, wouldn't taking ...If we are willing to go this far, wouldn't taking the extra step to some form of prescriptivism make everything more tidy by allowing us to lose that "strange" version of truth that's used here and still keep all the cognitive and rational aspects of ethic?Peli Grietzerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02338260572782761649noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-54459218882676467222007-10-06T18:37:00.000-04:002007-10-06T18:37:00.000-04:00Yes. Is that enough to cause problems, do you thin...Yes. Is that enough to cause problems, do you think?Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-19023915120563058422007-10-06T18:34:00.000-04:002007-10-06T18:34:00.000-04:00Richard,Should Anne('s idealized self) think that ...Richard,<BR/><BR/>Should Anne('s idealized self) think that Bob's idealized self is rational in judging and believing that abortion is not wrong?Jack Spencerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01560248410206874289noreply@blogger.com