tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post9057747310571661917..comments2023-10-29T10:32:36.914-04:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Catering to Mistaken MoralsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-92069763283733475262012-12-02T17:07:51.268-05:002012-12-02T17:07:51.268-05:00"They simply rejoice in the saving of innocen..."<i>They simply rejoice in the saving of innocent human beings with worthwhile lives. That’s a good thing.</i>"<br /><br />Yes, good point. Everyone should feel happy about that pro tanto good result. But I'm dubious of the idea that we have an <i>interest</i> in this, of a sort that weighs against doing more good that we never find out (and hence feel happy) about. After all, the whole reason we feel happy is because <i>others have been helped</i>. It's the helping of others that we care about, not our (happy) learning of it. So it would seem very strange to help others less for the sake of letting more of us learn about it.<br /><br />So that's a slightly different argument from the main one in my post. There I was thinking more of emotional responses that would be <i>distinctive</i> to RR supporters, i.e. being pleased <i>that an RR policy is put into place</i>, or that miners are being saved <i>rather than</i> "statistical lives". Though, now that you mention it, it does seem pretty unlikely that ordinary people would be thinking about these more "big picture" considerations at all.Richard Y Chappellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-25240446409341630032012-12-02T16:43:02.271-05:002012-12-02T16:43:02.271-05:00Greeting from crudely hedonistic Stockholm here,
I...Greeting from crudely hedonistic Stockholm here,<br />I think your moralistic dismissal of the sentiments of rule of rescue bliss is unwarranted. People who feel joy when, say, miners or a kidnapped kid, are rescued do not do so because they hold a substandard philosophical view. They simply rejoice in the saving of innocent human beings with worthwhile lives. That’s a good thing. And we have stronger grounds for claiming such joy is a good thing than we have for any theory of distributive justice. If someone listened to convincing evidence that in fact the rule of rescue is an unsupportable position and then, against his own better judgment, felt a sort of spiteful joy when the televised rescue of some marketable group of people were saved over a larger number of statistical lives, then I agree the situation is more analogous to say sadistic pleasure (though in fact I think such pleasures actually do count too, lest you want to be a perfectionist instead of some sort of mental state theorist on these matters). Would you agree we have stronger grounds for thinking sadism generally is a bad thing than we have for thinking the rule of rescue false? It seems to me an open question whether or not the rule of rescue is defensible and partly because of that it seems to me strange to think well-being derived from states of affairs favored by (though causally unrelated to) the rule of rescue would not matter morally, or matter less. If I take pleasure in playing with my daughter this is a good thing even if it is true that had I not played with her right then and there the world would be better in some other respect. <br />Best,<br />Henrik Ahlenius <br />Henrik Ahleniushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08834547607320494143noreply@blogger.com